Do political commentaries command? The case of the Central Bank of Brazil

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Gokhan Sahin Gunes
Dila Asfuroglu

Abstract

This paper investigates whether political pressure affects the conduct of
monetary policy in Brazil. For the period between January 2010 and August 2020, we
estimate a modified Taylor rule to empirically test whether the calls for lower interest rates
by presidents induce Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) to lower the policy rate. We document
that BCB is more likely to set the policy rate in line with the preferences of political leaders.
We also show that the response of BCB to political pressure remained significant even though
political pressure diminished in recent years.


JEL Classification: E42; E43; E52; E58.

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How to Cite
Gunes, Gokhan Sahin, and Dila Asfuroglu. 2023. “Do Political Commentaries Command? The Case of the Central Bank of Brazil”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 43 (3):686-705. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572023-3443.
Section
Review