Political economy of preferencial trade agreement the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation

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Daniel Augusto Motta

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg “coalition-proof” equilibrium defines t the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy’s negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.


JEL Classification: F02, F13, F15.

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How to Cite
Motta, Daniel Augusto. 2007. “Political Economy of Preferencial Trade Agreement : The Case of Bilateral Asymmetric Negotiation”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 27 (2):193-208. https://periodicos.fgv.br/bjpe/article/view/95132.
Section
Review