National Bank: Ponzi game, PROER and FCVS

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Fernando de Holanda Barbosa

Abstract

This paper analyses the causes of the failure of Banco Nacional and the resolution method adopted by the Brazilian central bank. The program (PROER) designed by the central bank and its legal framework allowed the failed bank to buy “defaulted securities”, financed by the central bank, and to use them as borrowing collateral. The paper also analyses the private and social costs of this bank failure.


JEL Classification: E58, G21.

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How to Cite
Barbosa, Fernando de Holanda. 2008. “National Bank: Ponzi Game, PROER and FCVS”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 28 (1):97-115. https://periodicos.fgv.br/bjpe/article/view/95682.
Section
Review