Revenue Sharing: A Problem of Federalism in Brazil

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Ricardo da Costa Nunes
Selene Peres Nunes

Abstract

This paper shows that the extension and inefficiency of federalism in Brazil is
mostly associated with gaps in the competence to tax, as well as to distortions in the system
of transfers to States and Local Governments, respectively known as State Participation
Fund – SPF and Municipal Participation Fund – MPF. We discuss the concepts of fiscal
federalism and decentralization and suggest changes that could contribute to a better distribution of resources and to fiscal discipline.


JEL Classification: E21; E22; H77.

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How to Cite
Nunes, Ricardo da Costa, and Selene Peres Nunes. 2000. “Revenue Sharing: A Problem of Federalism in Brazil”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 20 (4):501-20. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572000-1374.
Section
Review