Efficiency wages, insiders-outsiders and wages determination: theories and evidence

Main Article Content

Francisco G. Carneiro

Abstract

The article discusses alternative explanations for the rigidity of real wages in the
presence of involuntary unemployment. It is argued that real wage rigidity can be viewed as
the result of two factors: (i) trade unions’ bargaining power, in the form of insider power;
and (ii) the deliberate action of firms which try to avoid the costs associated with labour
turnover. The article also presents recent empirical evidence on the importance of insider
factors in the process of wage determination for a number of countries.


JEL Classification: J20; J31.

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How to Cite
Carneiro, Francisco G. 1997. “Efficiency Wages, Insiders-Outsiders and Wages Determination: Theories and Evidence”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 17 (2):278-98. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31571997-0937.
Section
Review