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CASE STUDY & TEACHING

DuLocal: The challenges of a startup with a positive social impact

Raissa Helena Paiva Apolinario [1]
Samara de Carvalho Pedro [2 3]
Ed de Almeida Carlos [4]
Edson Sadao Iizuka [5]

[1] Centro Universitário FEI / Departamento de Engenharia de Produção, São Paulo – SP, Brazil

[2] Faculdade Sebrae / Unidade Cultura Empreendedora, São Paulo – SP, Brazil

[3] Universidade de São Paulo (USP) / Faculdade de Economia, Administração de Empresas e Contabilidade, Programa de Pós-graduação em Administração, São Paulo – SP, Brazil

[4] Centro Universitário SENAC / Departamento de Gestão de Negócios, São Paulo – SP, Brazil

[5] Centro Universitário FEI / Programa de Pós-graduação em Administração, São Paulo – SP, Brazil

Abstract

Felipe encountered the concept of sustainability during his academic career, and throughout his professional journey, he decided to start a business model that would generate a growing positive socio-environmental impact directly linked to the economic side of the business. Directing his challenges and professional steps to accumulate expertise and experience, he managed to structure a plant-based food startup with a business model that would lead him to achieve a positive socio-environmental impact. When he secured investment to continue scaling his startup in search of the necessary growth, an unexpected obstacle came up: the COVID-19 pandemic. From then on, several challenges arose: how could he reach a financial break-even point and make the business sustainable? Is it more important to keep the business running, even if you have to give up some of the positive impact purposes? Based on this dynamic and complex case, what would you do in the place of the young social entrepreneur?

Keywords: Social entrepreneurship. Hybrid business models. Social business. Startup.

DuLocal: os desafios de uma startup de impacto social positivo

Resumo

Felipe teve contato com o conceito de sustentabilidade durante sua trajetória acadêmica e, ao longo da jornada profissional, resolveu empreender um modelo de negócio que gerasse impacto socioambiental positivo crescente e diretamente ligado à parte econômica do negócio. Direcionando seus desafios e etapas profissionais de modo a acumular *expertise* e bagagem, conseguiu estruturar uma *startup* de alimentação *plant based*, com um modelo de negócio que o levasse a atingir um impacto socioambiental positivo. Quando conseguiu investimentos para continuar escalando sua *startup* em busca do necessário crescimento, veio um obstáculo inesperado: a pandemia de covid-19. A partir daí, alguns desafios foram surgindo: como chegar a um ponto de equilíbrio financeiro e fazer o negócio se sustentar? É mais importante manter o negócio funcionando, mesmo que se tenha de abdicar de alguns dos propósitos de impacto positivo? Com base nesse caso dinâmico e complexo, o que você faria no lugar do jovem empreendedor social?.

Palavras-chave: Empreendedorismo social. Modelos de negócios híbridos. Negócio social. Startup.

DuLocal: los retos de una startup de impacto social positivo

Resumen

Felipe entró en contacto con el concepto de sostenibilidad durante su carrera académica y, a lo largo de su trayectoria profesional, decidió emprender un modelo de negocio que generase un impacto socioambiental positivo creciente y directamente vinculado a la vertiente económica del negocio. Dirigiendo sus retos y pasos profesionales de forma que acumulara conocimientos y experiencia, consiguió estructurar una *startup* de alimentación vegetal con un modelo de negocio que lo llevara a lograr un impacto socioambiental positivo. Cuando consiguió inversión para seguir escalando la *startup* en busca del crecimiento necesario, surgió un obstáculo inesperado: la pandemia de COVID-19. A partir de entonces, surgieron una serie de retos: ¿cómo alcanzar un punto de equilibrio financiero y hacer sostenible el negocio? ¿Es más importante mantener el negocio en marcha, aunque haya que renunciar a algunos de los propósitos de impacto positivo? A partir de este caso dinámico y complejo, ¿qué harías en el lugar del joven emprendedor social?

Palabras clave: Emprendimiento social. Modelos de negocio híbridos. Negocios sociales. Startup.

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FELIPE'S PROFESSIONAL JOURNEY LEADING TO THE BUSINESS IDEA

Felipe was raised in close contact with nature. During visits to family members, he stayed in a house in Visconde de Mauá, near the Itatiaia National Park, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, where he spent his childhood vacations. This connection with waterfalls and natural rock formations made him aware of his privilege and sparked a desire for more people to have access to a healthy ecosystem.

This connection with nature profoundly influenced the paths and challenges in his life. In 2010, at the age of 22, Felipe graduated in Environmental Engineering from the University of São Paulo (USP). He then pursued a course in the Local Development Research Program in France, followed by a master's degree from the same institution in the field of Energy Economics and Sustainable Development. Upon returning to Brazil, he worked for a year as a local development sustainability project consultant at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV). During this period, he collaborated with key figures in his professional development, such as Cecília Ferraz, who helped him refine the idea of local development in the territory—i.e., human development is achieved when one works within a territory, taking local knowledge into account. His experience at FGV allowed him to integrate the knowledge acquired in his master's program with the practical expertise of locally applied consultancy work.

However, while the role of consultant maintained its value, Felipe still felt that something was missing. He wanted to become more actively involved in driving meaningful, sustainable transformation around him, which went beyond his current role: he sought to bring about systemic change. His academic background, particularly from his master's degree, had led him to develop a critical perspective on economics and sustainable development, especially regarding the perceived dichotomy between the two, as though they were mutually exclusive objectives—something with which he strongly disagreed.

> The system we have in place is one that we ourselves created, so it is possible to propose something different. We need to bring forth proposals and initiatives aimed at creating something new. The current system thrives on growing companies. I have always thought about how we can build a company that, as it grows, generates positive environmental and social impact. This is how the initial idea for the business model emerged—by envisioning a product that, the more it is produced, the more positive impact it will generate (Felipe).

It was through the prospect of entrepreneurship that Felipe began to understand his role in driving the systemic change underlying his restlessness. However, he realized the need to further develop his knowledge of how to build a business. Thus, at the end of 2012, he embarked on a new phase as an entrepreneurial consultant for the Endeavor network, a company that has been providing support, promoting, and accelerating entrepreneurship-related initiatives since 2000. His role there was to connect entrepreneurs and mentors, identify growth bottlenecks, and match them with the most suitable mentor. For Felipe, this was a period of significant learning in terms of how to create and develop business models, as well as the maturation of ideas, especially since it coincided with a major Endeavor initiative: the launch of their first acceleration program, which evolved into what is now known as Endeavor's Scale-Up. This program has accelerated more than 3,000 entrepreneurs from over 2,000 scale-ups—companies that have moved beyond the startup phase and aim to grow rapidly while sustaining that new pace—across the country.

His time at Endeavor enabled Felipe to build essential relationships with other entrepreneurs and witness the daily challenges they faced, such as dilemmas, difficulties, the agility required to adapt, and what truly made a difference in their businesses. For him, "an entrepreneur is someone who can simplify thought processes to the level of execution, even without always having all the necessary information at hand."

Felipe recalls many experiences that were rich in knowledge and learning. A particularly memorable case was that of a company in the construction sector that, at the time it started working with Endeavor, didn't even exist yet. The entrepreneur had clients, an idea, and investors, but was just beginning to set up the physical business. Felipe, in addition to facilitating contacts and relationships with key stakeholders, also assisted with setting up the office. Through this, he understood that having an idea, customers willing to buy into it, and investor funding are crucial factors in starting a company. Interestingly, that same entrepreneur would later become the first investor in the company that Felipe would eventually create during his journey, and which is the focus of this case study: DuLocal.

However, Felipe also learned from cases involving challenges and setbacks, as entrepreneurship is not always a smooth ride. One such case involved an entrepreneur who decided to purchase a block manufacturing plant—a business highly specialized in the construction sector and quite different from his previous experience. Due to insufficient prior planning, the financial situation and growth potential of the business were severely compromised, as resources that could have been invested in marketing were drained. Despite this setback, it was a significant learning experience, as Felipe participated in the turnaround committee—a process of deep and comprehensive restructuring aimed at reversing a deteriorating situation and putting the company back on the path to growth and profitability—where he learned how to act in situations requiring abrupt course corrections. From this, he learned the important lesson that there are moments when an entrepreneur must remain calm and make certain concessions to overcome difficulties. This experience proved invaluable during the challenging times at DuLocal.

> It is essential to gauge the size of the leap, to understand that things can go wrong, and to know what to do when that happens. In this case, he was able to sell the factory again and recover part of the lost capital (Felipe).

With his experience at Endeavor, Felipe gained a deep understanding of how business models operate and gathered valuable knowledge, which led him to define the sector he wanted to pursue: food, with a focus on social entrepreneurship. In his view, there is a clear cause-and-effect relationship in this sector, given that about 30% of the planet's agricultural land is dedicated to farming, and over 80% of this land is used for the meat and dairy supply chain, which provides less than 20% of the calories consumed by humanity. He soon thought: "There's something significant to be done here."

Since he was unfamiliar with the industry, he decided to learn about it through immersive hands-on experience. At the end of 2015, he began working in the restaurant chain of a famous English chef, dedicating himself to various operational roles in different cities, such as São Paulo, Campinas, and London. It was during this experience that he realized that, generally, restaurants are often inefficient businesses due to the high waste of ingredients, preparation processes, and labor. For instance, Saturday nights are chaotic in a restaurant, whereas weekday nights have very low demand. The idea of creating a business that could balance supply and demand emerged from this first-hand experience in a traditional restaurant.

Upon returning to Brazil from London in July 2016, Felipe decided to leave the restaurant industry, having gained a wealth of experience in the sector. He then chose to embark on his own food-related venture by founding, along with his sister, Fazenda Malabar Itatiba, an organic produce farm that operated on a subscription model, supplying up to 100 families who received baskets of produce weekly. This first entrepreneurial experience helped him understand the importance of maintaining consistent demand, a key factor that inspired DuLocal's business model. It is essential to design a business that can absorb all that a producer will yield, as by adjusting the products, one can address the production fluctuations that the producer is subject to. This experience as a producer was crucial, as it allowed him to incorporate the perspective of organic producers into his business model.

However, Felipe still wasn't satisfied, as he realized that this business model wouldn't be scalable enough to generate the positive impact he had envisioned from the start of his entrepreneurial journey. In 2018, during a brainstorming session with a group of technology professionals in São Carlos, introduced by another organic producer, Felipe came up with the initial idea for the business model that would eventually become DuLocal: using organic food to produce ready-to-eat meals in underprivileged areas, creating income and job opportunities, and later selling these products to a niche market of higher-income consumers.

FROM MVP TO UNIMAGINABLE GROWTH

After this journey, Felipe developed the business proposal for DuLocal, a gastronomy startup focused on delivering healthy meals through delivery. The business aimed to go beyond just producing food; it was an initiative with a social and inclusive appeal, connecting small organic producers to a network of cooks/entrepreneurs from underprivileged areas, with the goal of creating a movement of positive social and environmental impact throughout the network. According to its business model, DuLocal facilitated the financial intermediation between the following agents: the organic food producer, the cooks, the delivery person, and the customer, thereby creating a social impact chain by practicing fair remuneration for all parties involved.

In August 2018, DuLocal launched its MVP—Minimum Viable Product, a simplified version of a product or service with only the essential features needed to address customer needs and evaluate the business idea's viability—in São Carlos, hiring two cooks from Jardim Zavaglia, a neighborhood on the city's outskirts, to prepare the meals. At the time, his partner Fernanda was responsible for training and facilitating connections between organic food producers and the cooks. During this MVP phase, they sold between 10 and 20 meals per day. At the beginning of 2019, DuLocal held its first investment round—a process of seeking financial resources from investors to fuel the company's growth—raising 500,000 reais with angel investors from Endeavor's network, with the objective of expanding DuLocal to São Paulo, where the business had greater potential to scale.

In April 2019, they began selling lunch meals in São Paulo, marking DuLocal's entry into its early stage, the initial operational phase of a company's development, characterized by both high uncertainty and risk , as well as significant growth potential. Since it was not feasible to maintain two operations at this stage, they decided to close the São Carlos branch and focus solely on São Paulo. Initially, the São Paulo operations didn't produce even a single meal per day, but by the end of the year, production had increased to around 150 meals per day.

The initial decision-making framework and activities in this early phase in São Paulo were led by a team of three: Felipe, who was responsible for coordinating various stakeholders, including investors, producers, cooks, and customers; Roberta, the operations director, responsible for managing spreadsheets and scheduling at DuLocal; and Rafaela, the executive chef, who oversaw product portfolio development and the training of women for the food service industry.

Rafaela began her journey with DuLocal in mid-2018, when the startup was still in São Carlos, while Roberta came on board at the beginning of 2019. Both were instrumental in the development and improvement of the company, playing key roles in decision-making. Gradually, Rafaela and Roberta assumed more responsibilities and became increasingly involved in the business.

In the beginning, DuLocal established a commercial relationship with several partner producers who made deliveries to São Paulo, working with cooperatives of small producers in the Sorocaba region, as well as other producers from the regions of Morungaba and Ipeúna. Working with producers located near São Paulo was a decision driven by environmental concerns related to logistics and transportation. In addition, DuLocal prioritized organic producers who already had some form of certification to ensure the origin of the food, aiming to build stronger partnerships with these producers. The business was developed to create mutual benefits for each of its stakeholders.

> I believe our greatest differentiator is our ability to adapt the ingredient requirements to the availability of organic food producers. We have spreadsheets that calculate all the quantities we will need. Our menu is planned—since we have two dishes per day that alternate throughout the week. This allows us to know how many dishes we will produce by Wednesday of the following week. This makes it easy to adapt the recipes. This planned production enables us to maintain a direct relationship with the producers (Felipe).

Based on the initial investments, DuLocal was able to successfully scale its operations while maintaining an administrative office in the Vila Olímpia area and a team of 15 people. Orders were placed through the website, which offered a monthly subscription option, accounting for more than 50% of sales. This allowed for better revenue forecasting in terms of cash flow, as well as creating predictability and recurrence, as the goal had always been to develop a business with a strong focus on recurring revenue.

Additionally, DuLocal's website enabled automatic renewal via credit card or meal vouchers, ensuring that customers maintained a credit corresponding to the number of meals they selected on the site. Another important aspect of the company's operations was the production of a specific number of meals each day, based on demand figures. This business model, which did not rely on daily order demands, aided in effective planning and controlling the ingredients used in the dishes, optimizing costs and avoiding waste, thus facilitating the planning of organic ingredient usage from local producers.

DuLocal's initial strategy targeted areas with high concentrations of offices in São Paulo, such as Vila Olímpia and Faria Lima, primarily taking into account the population density and purchasing power of these neighbourhoods. In this early phase, the company envisioned scalability and the consequent transition to the traction phase of the business, investing significantly in conducting company visits and tastings as marketing actions aimed at promoting the company and its products.


DuLocal opted for two predefined dishes per day, based on weekly planning, knowing the quantity of food required for each dish, and being able to substitute components or ingredients if necessary. Maintaining a smaller menu was crucial

for controlling food costs. Another interesting aspect was the operational planning. The meals were already designed for delivery, meaning the packaging for the meals was developed with preservation and transportation in mind. By considering sustainable items for packaging and transport, they also ensured optimization of the delivery person's trips, who could carry up to 25 meals in their delivery bag.

DuLocal's focus has always been on providing thorough training to the cooks, individual micro-entrepreneurs from the Paraisópolis community, a neighbourhood located in the South Zone of São Paulo. This was the core element of the social and financial inclusion that the company's business model aimed for, rather than primarily investing in equipment. The training for the cooks/entrepreneurs took place before their involvement in operations and centred around DuLocal's menu, utilizing the essential tools for their work.

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the meals were prepared in the cooks' homes, with each professional producing up to 25 dishes, earning 5 reais per meal prepared. In this system, the organic ingredients were delivered to a location in Vila Olímpia—serving as a distribution center for both inputs and meals—where the inputs were transported from that location to the cooks' homes, who then prepared the meals. Afterwards, the delivery persons collected the meals and took them to the administrative office for distribution in the designated area. Even though DuLocal's business model was structured hierarchically, with strategic decisions made by the three main managers directing other levels of the organization, there was a strong emphasis on involving the agents of the chain, especially the cooks, as users of the product, gathering feedback. The training and recipe development were conducted by Rafaela, DuLocal's executive chef. The importance of this close engagement and the collection of information regarding the business model of the key agents involved aimed to be transparent and improve the decisions made internally.

Figure 1
Operational Model of DuLocal Before the Crisis



Source: Elaborated by the authors.

In the second half of 2019, two significant events took place for DuLocal. The first was its participation in Facebook's Estação Hack and its involvement with Artemísia, a pioneering organization in promoting and disseminating social impact businesses in Brazil. These experiences helped lend greater legitimacy and structure to DuLocal's entire business model. Another event that contributed to the company's recognition, which occurred concurrently with the first, was the reality show Planeta StartUp, where DuLocal secured first place and a prize of 500 thousand reais. This was a pivotal experience for Felipe and the team, which at the time comprised 15 people.

At the beginning of 2020, DuLocal was achieving the exponential growth it had aimed for, expanding the number of orders in offices, resulting in a surge during lunchtime, and was on the verge of producing 350 dishes per day. However, in mid-March, the shock of the pandemic hit, resulting in the closure and physical shutdown of offices, effectively disrupting DuLocal's primary method of customer acquisition.

> We were beginning to reach 350 meals per day when we observed the situation abroad. My friends who live in Europe told me what was happening there, and I said, 'Guys, let's reduce our production to one-third of what it was because it's going to go badly.' [...] This crisis harmed the business, as, in the world of startups, the priority is to demonstrate growth to secure the next round of investments. [...] The financial metrics of a startup differ from those of a conventional company (Felipe).

THE SETBACK OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON DULOCAL'S OPERATIONS

The crisis stemming from the pandemic was unfortunate; it disrupted DuLocal's primary customer channel, resulting in the temporary closure of most offices. Consequently, although the pandemic boosted delivery consumption, the usual delivery audience became dispersed, exposing a vulnerability for a startup: securing a new customer acquisition channel. Therefore, when DuLocal finally reached this target, it needed to adjust its approach. The funds obtained from the reality show provided crucial support during this crisis, but the team was still awaiting the results of a new bridge funding round—an investment aimed at financing the growth of a startup—that would enable DuLocal to transition to an expansion phase, with a validated business model.

While contemplating ways to acquire new customers and balance the books, Felipe had to make swift decisions to protect the company's cash flow. According to him, "The longer you take to make these types of decisions, the worse it is for the company's cash flow, which keeps burning." Having been monitoring news regarding the pandemic in Europe, he gained insights into what Brazil would face when the first cases emerged. Thus, on March 20, 2020, he called a meeting with the DuLocal investment board to devise an action plan.

The decision was made to implement temporary cost-cutting measures until the next round of investments could be secured, allowing for continued acceleration of growth, which ultimately failed to materialize. Another decision involved downsizing the team, which had grown too large for the projected decrease in demand. Consequently, half of the staff was laid off, reducing the team to seven operational members as part of efforts to decrease fixed costs and protect remaining cash reserves. This decision was collectively reached by the three key players.

Initially, DuLocal invested minimally in digital marketing, primarily focusing on brand positioning. However, in light of the crisis and the disruption of the primary sales channel, the idea of significantly increasing investment in digital marketing emerged as an alternative, albeit with a cost that diverged from initial calculations and expectations for a low-margin food business, as the risk of unforeseen cost increases loomed large.

Given that the company was still in its growth and startup phase, it had not yet reached its break-even point. Beyond concerns over initial fixed costs, there was also significant anxiety about variable costs—expenses necessary to sustain the company throughout its average lifespan compared to its gross margin, which is the percentage of net revenue retained after deducting direct production costs or product/service purchases. The challenge was that DuLocal's gross margin had always been relatively low, around 20%, due to the remuneration of cooks and delivery personnel, while the expected figure would typically be around 30%. In light of this context of crisis and decision-making, two possibilities emerged: either to double customer revenue by raising the price of the meals or to double the product's gross margin by cutting costs.

The first conflict revolved around the price of the meals, which, at the time this case was written, cost 30 reais. Increasing the price could lead to a reduced consumer base. The market for organic and vegan food, although growing, was still an emerging niche and had not yet consolidated. Thus, there was a risk of diminishing the total number of current and potential customers with such a decision. The second conflict pertained to the idea of doubling the gross margin by reducing the remuneration of supply chain participants, which would undermine the business's fundamental purpose of creating a positive social impact.

In Felipe's words: "Experiencing moments of crisis is like having the taxi meter running: the company operates with technology and a team, but eventually, there comes a moment when the cash runs out." This situation demanded immediate prioritization from the entrepreneur, as growing a business and conserving cash are two opposing objectives. By mid-2021, DuLocal ceased its investments in digital marketing and began to cut costs, ultimately reducing the team to just three members.

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
In addition to the financial instability, the uncertainty brought about by the pandemic also affected workplace relationships. Following the significant staff reductions and the uncertain future of the startup, Felipe's two key partners and decision-making allies, Roberta and Rafaela, chose to leave the company. Both held partner roles and opted to depart, imparting a crucial lesson to Felipe:

> Partners must be included in the articles of incorporation to also be held accountable in times of crisis. [...] Previously, what mattered was who was fully committed and had the attitude of a partner. Today, I hold a somewhat different opinion, as when things go wrong, what counts is who is listed in the articles of incorporation.

The relationship with investors remained stable, primarily due to contractual obligations. Felipe received significant support and guidance in decision-making, although the final word was his. Considering the crisis, he decided to change the operational and logistical model. When DuLocal started, it mirrored the business model of Uber, where the exact timing and method of profitability were uncertain, necessitating adjustments along the way. However, this approach proved incompatible with DuLocal's business model, as, despite Uber being a physical economy company, its primary product does not contend with the intricacies associated with perishable goods. In Felipe's view, "it was somewhat naive to believe that technology alone could resolve the complexities of this type of business," referring to managing the organic supply chain and the cooks themselves.

Thus, the operation that previously transported organic food from producers to the homes of each cook in Paraisópolis, and then delivered the prepared meals to the distribution center in Vila Olímpia, underwent a strategic revision. In 2021, a logistical adjustment was made to transition production from each cook's kitchen to a central kitchen in Vila Sônia, adjacent to Paraisópolis. This consolidation unified the delivery of organic products and the cooks' production in a single location. The investment in this community kitchen was made gradually, totalling approximately 30,000 reais. All adaptations were implemented to ensure that the model could, at a minimum, be positioned to become profitable.

Figure 2
DuLocal's Post-Crisis Operational Model



Source: Elaborated by the authors.

When analysing the inception of DuLocal, Felipe attempted to embrace numerous causes simultaneously without fully accounting for the fact that, today, one operates within a system where competition tightens the pressure on all parties involved. In other words, offering the lowest price increases competitiveness, often at the expense of reducing the value passed on to all participants in the supply chain. Paying attention to the gross margin allocated within the business was crucial for understanding where to cut expenses, especially since the market for organic and plant-based meals remains a small niche compared to more varied menus.

Regarding the delivery of orders, the company was assigning orders to the nearest delivery person as new requests arrived. It was as if they were utilizing a virtual stock already available on the streets, which was one of the significant differentiators

of this adapted operational model: logistical efficiency. Thus, even with a remuneration equivalent to that of IFood, ranging from 5 to 6 reais per delivery, the delivery personnel earned more due to the allocation method, benefiting from economies of scale, as it was not necessary for them to return to the restaurant. This change in the operational and logistical model was a means to reduce variable costs. Such analyses were essential, considering the importance of maintaining a cash surplus for reinvestment in growth. For a startup, sustaining the company's operations while achieving a healthy financial position becomes a significant challenge.

> When we start a business, we want to maintain its essence and do everything possible to demonstrate that it operates this way. However, the fact is that, given my capabilities as an entrepreneur, the team that was involved in building the business, and the contexts we faced, we were unable to reach that point. We have the involvement of investors in these discussions and attempts to seek market assistance to understand how to make these moves in a way that ensures long-term sustainability for the business. This is the moment we find ourselves in currently (Felipe).

To better understand Felipe's situation and assist in contextualizing the dilemma, the following financial information about DuLocal is presented up to the time this case study was written. The concept of cash burn refers to how much cash the company spends monthly in its operations. At present, this amount is around 20,000 reais (see Table 1).


Table 1
Cash burn

Cash	300.000,00
Debt	390.000,00
Cash Burn	~20.000,00

Source: DuLocal (2022).

In addition, the debts had already exceeded the company's cash by approximately 90,000 reais, and if the situation were to persist for much longer, the debt could reach 300,000, which would not be feasible without new investments, the sale of the operation, or some significant change in the current situation (Graph 1).

Graph 1
Sales x *burn*



Source: DuLocal (2022).

Given this scenario, what would you do in Felipe's place? As a social entrepreneur who has developed and implemented a business model with a positive impact, he was "with both feet on the accelerator," experiencing strong growth and attracting more consumers each day. However, he had to face an unexpected setback that required swift decisions, prompting him to rethink the applied business model and reprioritize the hierarchy of causes to be embraced. How can one achieve financial equilibrium and ensure the business remains viable? Is it more important to keep the business functioning, even if it requires sacrificing some of its positive impact goals?

TEACHING NOTES

The teaching notes have restricted access and are only available to professors and instructors associated with an academic institution upon request at: https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/93586/87503

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Raissa Helena Paiva Apolinario
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6340-4203
PhD in Business Administration from FEI University Center; Lecturer in the Undergraduate Program in Production Engineering at Centro Universitário FEI. E-mail: raissah.paiva@hotmail.com

Samara de Carvalho Pedro
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5130-2602
Postdoctoral Researcher in Business Administration (FEA-USP); Ph.D. in Business Administration (Centro Universitário FEI); Deputy Director of Education and Research at the National Association of Undergraduate Programs in Business Administration (ANGRAD); Coordinator and Professor of the Undergraduate Program in Business Administration at Faculdade Sebrae and, Researcher and member of the CEPID Bridge/FEA-USP. E-mail: samara.c.pedro@gmail.com

Ed de Almeida Carlos
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6564-8604
PhD in Business Administration from Centro Universitário FEI; Executive in the Brazilian Insurance Market and Lecturer in the Postgraduate Program in Business Management at Centro Universitário SENAC. E-mail: edalmei@gmail.com

Edson Sadao Iizuka
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2111-3587
PhD in Public Administration and Government (FGV EAESP); President of the Associação Nacional dos Cursos de Graduação em Administração (ANGRAD); Professor in the Undergraduate Program in Business Administration at Centro Universitário FEI; Adjunct Professor and Researcher of the Graduate Program in Business Administration (PPGA) at Centro Universitário FEI. E-mail: esadao@fei.edu.br

AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTION

Raissa Helena Paiva Apolinario: Conceptualization (Equal); Data curation (Equal); Formal analysis (Equal); Investigation (Equal); Methodology (Equal); Project management (Equal); Supervision (Equal); Validation (Equal); Visualization (Same); Writing- original draft (Equal); Writing- review and editing (Equal).

Samara de Carvalho Pedro: Conceptualization (Equal); Data curation (Equal); Formal analysis (Equal); Investigation (Equal); Methodology (Equal); Project management (Equal); Supervision (Equal); Validation (Equal); Visualization (Same); Writing- original draft (Equal); Writing- review and editing (Equal).

Ed de Almeida Carlos: Conceptualization (Equal); Data curation (Equal); Formal analysis (Equal); Investigation (Equal); Methodology (Equal); Project management (Equal); Supervision (Equal); Validation (Equal); Visualization (Same); Writing- original draft (Equal); Writing- review and editing (Equal).

Edson Sadao Iizuka: Conceptualization (Equal); Data curation (Equal); Formal analysis (Equal); Investigation (Equal); Methodology (Equal); Project management (Equal); Supervision (Equal); Validation (Equal); Visualization (Same); Writing- original draft (Equal); Writing- review and editing (Equal).

DATA AVAILABILITY

The entire dataset supporting the results of this study was published in the article itself.

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