A note on auctions with compulsory partnership

Autores

  • Paulo K. Monteiro EPGE-FGV
  • Aloisio Araujo FGV/EPGE
  • Otávio Damé FGV/EPGE
  • Clara Costellini FGV/EPGE

Palavras-chave:

pre-salt auction, equilibrium existence

Resumo

We study a symmetric, profitt share, common value auction with
a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter
a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at
rate (say) 0 < r < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium in
pure strategies.

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Publicado

2016-12-28

Edição

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