On signalling in politics and “outsider” marketing claims
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Outsiders Políticos, Instituições, América Latina, BrasilResumo
We design a signaling model to explain how a political outsider (the president) can implement his agenda without sharing power with establishment politicians. The president has two strategies: to ally with traditional political parties or to nomi-nate a popular public figure perceived by the public as a corruption fighter. Given that the president’s type (honest or dishonest) is uncertain, the presence of the public figure in the government may legitimize the presidency by signaling that the president is honest. If the signal is informative, the president can implement his agenda. We demonstrate that, under certain conditions, both separating and aggregating equilibria can exist. Moreover, the quality of institutions and the cost of allying with the establishment are the primary factors influencing the president’s choice. Our model serves as a valuable tool for analyzing the success of policies implemented by this increasingly common type of politician around the world, particularly when their legitimacy depends on popular figures.
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