The Political Economy of COVID-19 Pandemic Mitigation Policies:
Theory and evidence from Brazil
Palavras-chave:
COVID-19, NPI, Political Economy, Electoral Incentives, BrazilResumo
We build a signaling model in which mayors seeking reelection have to decide whether or not to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. Mayors are office-seekers but also have preferences over policies (ideology). Municipalities' voters are heterogeneous: an (uncertain) share cares only about the implementation of NPIs, while the other is ideological and wants to reelect the incumbent only if she shares their ideology. We test the main predictions of our model using data from the 2020 Brazilian mayoral elections. By analyzing close-race elections, we show that electoral incentives played an important role in incumbent mayors’ decisions about implementing NPIs. When we run separate regressions according to mayors’ and municipalities’ ideology, we find that the results are mostly driven by right-wing politicians in right-leaning municipalities. Yet, even left-wing mayors are affected by electoral incentives when one considers the municipality's share of elderly people -- as a proxy for voters who only care about NPIs.
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