Fernando José Longo Filho[2]
ABSTRACT
TDC is a legal institute, whose objective is to overcome the difficulties of possible financial burdens on the public treasury in the event of a cultural heritage listing. There is a constitutional issue in the application of the TDC in the event of cultural heritage in view of the constitutional rule that expropriation can only occur through prior and fair compensation in money (art.5, XXIV of the CF). The investigation will begin with the origin and conformation of the TDC in the City Statute. Next, we will analyze the decisions of the American Supreme Court on Transferable Development Rights, the origin of our TDC. Subsequently, the alternatives of Brazilian doctrine will be presented to face the dilemma of the constitutionality of the application of the TDC. Finally, I will outline the proposal for a constitutionally adequate reading of the TDC.
Keywords
right to property — transfer development rights — compensation
RESUMO
A transferência do direito de construir (TDC) é um instituto jurídico, cujo objetivo é superar as dificuldades de eventuais encargos financeiros do erário público frente ao ato de tombamento. Existe uma questão constitucional na aplicação da TDC nas hipóteses de tombamento em face da regra constitucional de que a expropriação somente pode ocorrer mediante prévia e justa indenização em dinheiro (art. 5º, XXIV da CF). A investigação terá início com a origem e a conformação da TDC no Estatuto da Cidade. Em seguida, se passará a análise de decisões da Suprema Corte Americana sobre o Transferable Development Rights, a origem da nossa TDC. Posteriormente, serão apresentadas as alternativas da doutrina brasileira para enfrentar o dilema da constitucionalidade da aplicação da TDC. Por último, será esboçada a proposta de uma leitura constitucionalmente adequada à TDC.
Palavras-chave
direito de propriedade— transferência do direito de construir — indenização
Litigation associated with real estate property rights and their regulatory frameworks is poised to surge in Brazil over the next decades. This increase is driven by climate change[3], water scarcity, disordered land occupation, and the decline of biodiversity, necessitating the restructuring of rights in both rural and urban contexts[4].
Entitlement to compensation arising from historic preservation orders remains a thorny legal issue. The prevailing legal opinion is that where a regulatory act strips a property of economic value, compensation is due.[5]. An example in this regard is REsp No. 220.983[6], ruled by the Superior Court of Justice (STJ). The Court held that even though the landmarked property was encumbered by clauses of inalienability, unattachability, and non-communication, an economic wipeout had occurred, triggering the right to compensation.
The Transferable Development Rights (TDR) framework was introduced as a mechanism to mitigate the potential economic wipe out of property rights caused by landmark designation. TDR was codified in the City Statute[7] a general framework for urban law (Art. 24, Clause I of the Constitution). Thus, the implementation of TDR is contingent upon local municipal regulations. According to Sundfeld, the City Statute is an intermediate set of regulations.[8]
The Transfer of Development Rights (TDR), as configured in the City Statute, serves various purposes such as the implementation of urban and community facilities, as well as urban land regularization (article 35, items I and III of the City Statute). The framework of the TDR in these instances was modeled on the Spanish mechanism of Transferência de Aproveitamento Urbanístico, aimed at securing land for urban public infrastructure through a planning-led approach.[9]
However, our focus here is limited to TDS in relation to landmark designation [heritage listing] (Art. 35, item II of the City Statute) The justification for this delimitation is the controversy regarding the right to compensation for listed real estate.
Landmark designation is a public law instrument governed by Decree-Law No. 25/37. It has constitutional status (Art. 216, § 1, of the 1988 Federal Constitution) and is closely related to property rights. Legal scholarship is divided on whether heritage designation constitutes an administrative limitation or easement[10].
The view that landmark designation constitutes an administrative easement implies a de facto expropriation arising from the legal regime of immovable property.[11] Writing prior to the 1988 Federal Constitution, Professor Orlando Gomes addressed the issue in the following terms[12]:
[…] Administrative limitations, even those that rendered property rights useless, were obviously excluded from the concept of expropriation. The inherent injustice of these blanket expropriations, which occurred without indemnification, catalyzed the successful efforts to redefine the legal concept. The starting point was the observation that in reality there is no difference between an owner whose rights are appropriated by the State and one whose rights are suppressed. As so often, this reworking derives from German doctrine. In the era of the Weimar Constitution, the concept of expropriation was no longer linked solely to the compulsory transfer of ownership. Instead, the existence of expropriatory limitations was recognized, and it was maintained that these constituted unmistakable expropriations. This was based on the logical conclusion that expropriation occurs when a particular sacrifice is imposed upon property rights, or, more clearly, when “an intervention occurs involving compulsory substitution, to a prevailing degree, of the substance (essential content) of the individual’s property right”. […]
In general terms, TDS allows the owner of a landmarked property to use the development potential on another property they own or to transfer the development rights to someone else. Furthermore, according to the City Statute, this same right is guaranteed to owners who donate the landmarked property to the Public Authority. It is, then, a legal mechanism that provides public officials with a practical alternative: instead of providing just and prior cash compensation, the Public Authority may authorize the transfer of development rights.
However, a constitutional issue arises when applying the TDS to landmark designations, given the constitutional rule that expropriation may only occur in case of just and prior cash compensation (Art. 5, XXIV of the Federal Constitution) Does the right to TDS replace compensation? Is the owner obligated to accept the TDS? May a property owner, even after utilizing TDS, still sue for any residual value of the property they believe is owed by the State but remains unpaid?
These are practical matters that the Judiciary has actively addressed, as shown in Ag. Reg. in AREsp No. 179.340,[13] regarding whether compensation owed for a landmark designation could be offset during the enforcement of judgment by the value of TDR. Unfortunately, the appeal was dismissed as the court found that the issue turned on the interpretation of local law, triggering STF Precedent No. 280.
In this light, the present study focuses on the hypothesis that the transfer of development rights is a constitutionally valid substitute for fair and prior monetary indemnification, specifically when landmark designation is characterized as indirect expropriation.
Thus, our investigation begins with the origin and structure of TDR in the City Statute. As we shall see, the original framework is North American, and the core issue is the decoupling of building rights from property rights. Following this, we examine the U.S. Supreme Court precedents on TDR, which serve as the foundation for the Brazilian system. Proposed solutions from Brazilian legal doctrine are advanced to address the constitutional dilemma surrounding application of TDR. Finally, we outline a constitutionally sound interpretation.
Transferable Development Rights originated in the United States[14]. The cities of New York and Chicago pioneered the use of this mechanism to protect landmarks without overburdening public funds.[15] It became so common, nationally,[16] that it underwent thorough examination by the Supreme Court.
In Brazil, the statutory origin of the TDR, as codified in the City Statute, is the concept of 'created land' (solo criado). In simple terms, created land refers to the verticalization of cities—i.e., the increase in development potential In 1976, the Prefeito Faria Lima Foundation organized meetings involving architects, urban planners, jurists, public managers, and private stakeholders to discuss the urban planning and legal viability of created land.[17]. In particular, the legal dimension was the focus of a technical seminar, "Aspectos jurídicos do solo criado" held in Embu[18]. The result was the Embu Charter, whose conclusions were as follows[19]:
1. The establishment by the Municipality of a single floor area ratio (FAR) for all urban lots is constitutional. 1.1. The setting of such a coefficient does not interfere with the establishment of varying land-use ratios, as currently implemented via zoning legislation. 1.2. Any construction exceeding this base coefficient is considered created land, whether it involves occupation of air rights or subsurface space. 2. It is constitutional for a municipality to require, by law, that a developer dedicate proportional land areas to the public authority as a condition for 'creating land'. When such land cannot be provided—because it is unavailable or fails to meet legal requirements—it may be substituted by a cash equivalent. 2.1. The owner of a property subject to administrative limitations that prevent the full use of the building coefficient may sell the unusable portion of the building rights. 2.2. Regarding landmarked properties, the owner is authorized to transfer the building rights equivalent to the total floor area or the base building coefficient
The conclusions of the Embu Charter are that 'created land' encompasses both the onerous grant of building rights—now provided for in Article 28 of the City Statute (item 2)[20] and the TDR mechanism (item 2.2). It is evident, therefore, that the onerous grant of building rights and the TDR are closely related mechanisms, insofar as they are premised on the concept of 'created land'. Legal doctrine is in full agreement[21]:
[…]
The transfer of development rights was conceived in the 1970s as a cornerstone of the institutionalization of an innovative urban intervention solution: “created land” Thus, any analysis of the foundations of TDR must first be contextualized within this broader framework.
[…]
C.f. Alochio.[22]:
[…]
The concepts introduced by the Embu Charter eventually led to Law No. 10.257/2001 (the City Statute), suggesting a reconsideration of our initial reflections—specifically regarding the distinction between 'created land' (the onerous grant of building rights) and the transfer of development rights (TDR). The Embu Charter saw fit to describe, in items 1, 1.1., 1.2 and 2, what, in the City Statute, was termed the onerous granting of the right to build, regulated in articles 28 to 31, as mentioned.
The City Statute adopted the nomenclature 'transfer of development rights' to address the points originally raised in the Embu Charter.
[…]
Against this backdrop, the TDC was codified into the Brazilian legal framework, drawing upon the initial experimentation of various municipalities.[23] Notably, the City of Curitiba pioneered this approach through Law No. 6.337/82, establishing the 'Transfer of Building Potential' (TPC), an instrument specifically designed to promote the revitalization of properties with significant cultural heritage.[24] After TDR spread to other municipalities, the mechanism was formalized at the national level in the City Statute.
The regulatory framework within the City Statute is complex, as it defers the most critical issues to municipal laws. A municipal law must regulate the conditions for application of the TDR (Article 35, §2 of the City Statute). Another essential piece of local legislation is the Master Plan, pursuant to the caput of Article 35 of the City Statute The role of the Master Plan is key in the use of TDR, which importantly, is inextricably linked to the onerous grant of building rights. These are compatible legal instruments and can only be properly understood in conjunction with each other.
To understand TDR, it is vital to grasp the concept of the Floor Area Ratio (FAR), defined as the “ratio between the buildable area and the lot area” (Art. 28, § 1 of the City Statute). The law establishes a building coefficient, which may be standardized for the entire city or variable for specific zones (Art. 28, § 2 of the City Statute). Alongside the FAR, the law establishes a maximum building coefficient (CAMax), which must take into account the balance between available infrastructure and the projected density growth in the area (Art. 28, § 3 of the City Statute).
The Master Plan establishes the basic and the maximum coefficient (art. 28). The base coefficient is entitled to the property owner, while the maximum building limit is accessible only through a quid pro quo [financial offset] provided during the municipal licensing. This contribution is referred to as an 'urban burden' in legal doctrine[25]. The STF established a precedent in this regard, ruling out the tax nature of the consideration and characterizing it instead as an administrative fee[26]. This contribution may or may not be monetary[27], as the purpose is not to generate revenue, but to compensate the community for the use of development potential the property owner did not help to fund[28]. Hence the importance of the Master Plan, by which the basic and maximum utilization coefficients are defined, i.e., in terms of infrastructure available to accommodate the increase in construction potential.
This is the context in which TDR operates: when a landmark designation restricts the base building rights of a lot, the owner may use that excess potential on a different site or sell it to others. This process is governed by the Master Plan, which identifies the eligible receiving areas and sets the absolute development ceiling (Maximum FAR).
A distinction is made between inter-property transfers, where development potential is shifted to another parcel under the same ownership, and intersubjective transfers, which involve the transfer of such potential to a different legal entity[29].
The development potential may not be used in any area; only those where infrastructure is available. Hence, the Master Plan is pivotal. In fact, Resolution No. 34, Art. 4, of the Council of Cities establishes a directive requiring application of the TDR only where stipulated in the Master Plan and supported by a technical justification[30].
This constitutes the application of the principle of the equitable distribution of the benefits and burdens resulting from the urbanization process (Art. 2, item IX of the City Statute). Furthermore, Correia presents the concept of planning-related damages, referring to the impairment of development rights resulting from urban planning instruments or regulatory frameworks.[31] According to Correia, such damages are an exception rather than the rule within urban planning mandates; only a 'small portion of planning provisions are expropriatory in nature."[32].
From this perspective, according to Correia, a system that guarantees equal treatment for landowners under the urban planning plan is required, whereby the “equalization framework"[33] functions “to recover land value increases arising from urban planning measures” and “compensate for any diminutions in value triggered by those same measures"[34]. At the same time, he cautions that no magic mechanism exists that "creates a situation of total legal equality for property owners"[35].
While the purpose of the onerous grant of building rights is to recapture the increase in property value resulting from an expanded floor area ratio (FAR), the TDR is the flip side of the coin. Its purpose is to compensate for the diminution in value caused by urban regulations—in this case landmark designation—which prevents the full utilization of the base FAR, potentially constituting inverse condemnation.
These concepts are key for an understanding of how TDR works. Nevertheless, its legal classification remains a subject of intense debate—a controversy that is clear upon examination of U.S. Supreme Court case law.
The concept of indirect expropriation is mirrored in the American constitutional doctrine of inverse condemnation. Its legal basis is the Fifth Amendment, which states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”.
Over its long history, this clause has never been the subject of major legal disputes. However, as the State began to regulate private real estate more intensely, especially due to urban and environmental factors, the issue became more problematic[36]:
[…]
For more than a century, this issue was uncontroversial. Expropriation was a form of government interference with physical property, and typically one that was quite obvious—the government would expropriate a piece of privately owned land in order to build a road or public facility and pay the private owner the fair market value for their land. The only uncertainty in these cases was whether the government compensation—its assessment of the fair market value of the land—was accurate. Meanwhile, the government routinely regulated private property in ways that reduced its economic value, and the courts consistently ruled that no compensation was due.
However, in the context of innovation and dispersion of zoning and environmental regulation in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court interpreted the Expropriation Clause to extend beyond physical expropriations to so-called "regulatory takings". In 1922, the Supreme Court ruled in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that Pennsylvania legislation prohibiting coal mining that may cause subsidence constituted a compensable expropriation of property. For the first time, the Court ruled that the mere regulation of property, even for a legitimate purpose, can give rise to claims relating to expropriation. In his opinion to the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that 'private property can be regulated to a certain extent; if the regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as expropriation.'
[…]
Providing a schematic overview of American jurisprudence, Alexander[37] notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has shifted its orientation, preventing property rights advocates using the Takings Clause to usher in a new Lochner Era[38] in real estate law. He also points out that, in terms of property rights regulation, the battleground should progressively shift from the courts to legislative bodies.
The 1978 U.S. Supreme Court case Penn Central v. New York City centered on a municipal ordinance that designated Grand Central Terminal as a protected landmark. The law required the owners to maintain the historic integrity of the building and prohibited structural modifications without formal Commission approval. This decision remains a cornerstone of modern historic preservation and regulatory takings law.
The primary mechanism of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Act was not the acquisition of historic buildings, but the engagement of public entities in land-use decisions affecting these properties. It aimed to establish the services, regulations, oversight, and incentives necessary to encourage preservation by private actors
The property owners sought administrative approval for a modification project at Grand Central Terminal, to utilize all available air rights above the original building. The application was denied on aesthetic and preservation grounds, based on the determination that the project would compromise the building's historical value.
Following this decision, the owners sued the administration, arguing that a 'regulatory taking' had occurred in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;[39] they further argued that the 'transferable development rights' offered were insufficient to constitute [40] just compensation.
The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in a 1978 majority decision that no taking had occurred, and therefore, no right to compensation existed.
In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue of regulatory takings. Although the Court did not directly analyze the substantive merits—limiting its holding to a procedural matter—the case addressed whether a taking had occurred despite the granting of TDRs.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that a final administrative decision by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency had been reached on the regulatory taking claim, thereby authorizing the lawsuit to proceed. Although the case turned on a matter of procedural admissibility, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion sheds light on the broader issues surrounding regulatory takings and Transferable Development Rights. The following passages from his opinion stand out[41]:
Placing TDRs on the regulatory taking side of the equation, rather than on the just compensation side (as the Ninth Circuit did, below), is a clever—even transparent—device that seeks to exploit the peculiarities of our takings jurisprudence. […]
If the funds provided by a government regulator to a property owner are factored into the determination of whether a regulatory taking exists—on the grounds that the land retains substantial value and thus was not taken—rather than the question of whether just compensation is adequate, the government may effectively evade paying much more. That is precisely what is happening here.
[…]
The ingenuity of the current arrangement is that the compensation does not come directly from the state, but from private third parties. The government essentially 'reimburses' these parties by awarding them variances to zoning laws that would otherwise restrict their own development.
[…]
Justice Scalia aptly identified the core problem involving regulatory takings and the transfer of development rights. On one side of the equation, the existence of TDRs is considered sufficient to preclude characterization of a regulatory taking. On the other hand, TDRs are viewed merely as a form of compensation within an established taking, which entitle the affected owner to just and prior compensation in cash, or a supplement thereof should the development rights prove insufficient. How can this deadlock be broken?
The primary response to unconstitutionality is to deny the existence of a problem; to maintain that a landmark designation does not, “in principle, trigger a right to compensation"[42]. In other words, if there is no restriction on property rights—no regulatory taking—there is no obligation to provide compensation. Thus, the legal mechanism of TDR is not applicable.
Fernandes’ view—that landmark designation does not inherently trigger a right to indemnity—is likely derived from a conception of the Right to the City grounded in Lefebvrean Marxist theory.[43] The Marxist perspective is clearly embedded in the formulation of the right to the city, as Lefebvre was the first to develop the concept[44].
Lefebvre distinguishes the right to property from the right to appropriation, asserting that [45]:
[…]
The right to the city manifests as a superior form of rights: the right to freedom, to individualization within socialization, to habitat, and to inhabitation. The right to the oeuvre (to participatory activity) and the right to appropriation (as distinct from the right to property) are implied in the right to the city.
[…]
Lefebvre does not clarify what this right to appropriation—as distinct from the right to property—actually entails. The concept of land value increment may help identify the basis for this distinction. For Furtado, land value increment suggests that the owner does not have an exclusive claim to all land-based income. He clarifies the notion as follows[46]:
[…]
Let us now return to our opening observation. The term used is 'urban land value recovery' rather than 'the recovery of...', as determining the extent of unearned increments in both instances belongs to the political sphere.
In the theoretical analysis of which plus-values should be—or are—considered recoverable, establishing the qualitative horizon of this assessment is essential. The broadest perspective would entail communalizing all land, or alternatively, as proposed by Henry George, capturing all land rents; but even he acknowledges this is a utopian idea.
[…]
It may be concluded that the decrease in property value resulting from a historic preservation order does not constitute a 'loss'; in reality, the lost rent never belonged to the owner, as it was a result of unearned increment (land value increment). Hence, if landmark designation entails no compensable loss, there is no right to indemnity, and no reason to consider application of TDR.
According to the Penn Central precedent, TDRs can be used to argue that no regulatory taking has occurred. By avoiding this classification, the government avoids the standard indemnity regime, which would otherwise mandate fair and prior cash compensation. Under this interpretation, no constitutional issue arises
The alternative perspective is to view TDR as a form of compensation within the scope of a consensual eminent domain process. This approach was successfully implemented in Porto Alegre for municipal land acquisition for public works; property owners preferred compensation through building potential over cash payments due to the high market value attributed to these development rights[47].
What if the taking is non-consensual? And what if the TDRs do not cover the full amount the owner believes is owed for the value lost due to landmark designation? In other words, what if we follow the reasoning of Justice Scalia in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and place TDRs on the indemnity side of the equation—as one of the various means by which an owner may be compensated? In this context, the transfer of development rights could be refused, resulting in litigious eminent domain proceedings regarding the amount and method of compensation owed by the government. The Ministry of Cities technical guide on TDR explicitly recognizes this fact[48].
A final approach to remedying unconstitutionality is to view TDRs as a partnership[49]. Alochio explains this concept as follows[50]:
[…]
Regulations governing the transfer of development rights consider that their function is not to limit the speculative risks inherent in private market transactions. The purpose of these regulations is to prevent infrastructure overburdens on the receiving area. Furthermore, the economic value must be as attractive as possible to incentivize the owner to participate in the TDR program.
[…]
Under this view, the gain accrued by the owner through the TDR mechanism is of no concern to the state. The primary goal is to protect the public coffers from the significant costs of providing indemnity for landmark designations. The advantage of TDRs in the scope of a consensual eminent domain process lies in the elimination of the risk of an indemnity action based on the allegation that the compensation was neither full nor provided as fair and prior payment in cash. Under this arrangement, the regulatory duty of the municipality is only to verify that the building potential transferred to a different site does not exceed the carrying capacity of the local infrastructure.
Which is the most legally sound approach?
At its core, the theoretical dilemma is how we define the right to property. What criteria justify allocation of resources in our society? Under a Marxist view of resource allocation, for example, property owners have no right to compensation for the impacts of a landmark designation. At the other extreme, within the framework of economic liberalism, the right to just and prior cash compensation arises from any loss in the monetary value of a property.
Between these two extremes is the view that property must serve a social function (Art. 5, XXIII, CF), justifying the power of the State to intervene in private interests for the public good. This perspective holds that property must fulfill its social function (Art. 5, XXIII, CF), thereby providing a normative justification for interference in private interests.
Evidently, this brief overview of the normative foundations of property rights is intended to show how these principles shape legal views on historic preservation and the right to prior cash compensation.
In light of the legal interpretations analyzed, Alochio’s proposal to justify TDR as a market mechanism appears the most appropriate. In fact, both functionalist and more liberal hermeneutical perspectives converge on the idea that TDR serves as a market-based tool for compensating the owner.
At any rate, understanding TDR as a market mechanism does not eliminate all controversies. To ensure participation, TDR must offer greater value than a prior monetary settlement. Failing this, owners will have no reason to choose development rights over a cash-based eminent domain claim.
In this regard, the Ministry of Cities technical handbook on the application of TDR notes that some municipalities are granting these rights up to the maximum utilization coefficient. By exceeding the basic coefficient, they argue that the transfer provides a more accurate reflection of the actual market value of the property[51]. Such an advantage disrupts the TDR market logic; the maximum FAR is not incorporated into property rights except through the fulfillment of an urbanistic burden. The possibility of utilizing the maximum FAR is a mere expectancy of a right, although it admittedly holds a quantifiable market value. Furthermore, granting additional building potential to the owner reduces the demand for the onerous grant of the right to build (outorga onerosa) in scenarios where both instruments coexist[52].
Thus, ensuring TDR remains more attractive than a monetary settlement is a complex challenge, given that its effectiveness is contingent upon the existence of a well-functioning market for development rights.
Consider the case of Porto Alegre: after a period of active TDR trading, the city began auctioning off building potential, creating a conflict with the existing TDR market.[53] This move constituted a direct intervention in the pricing of development potentials, ultimately devaluing the assets held by those who had opted for TDR-based indemnity.
In this sense, the government should facilitate the TDR market rather than manipulate its prices. While values will inevitably shift due to various factors, including state policy, the market itself should dictate their worth.
Another example of market failure, or rather, the impossibility of establishing a market for building potentials, is found in the Federal District. Despite having specific legislation to regulate TDR (Distrito Federal Law No. 3,922/2006), the mechanism remains economically unviable.
In the Federal District a territory-wide adjustment factor of 0.20% (governed by District Law No. 1.170/96) is applied for the purchase of additional building rights under the onerous grant system.[54] This serves as a transitional rate pending the establishment of localized indices tailored to each individual Administrative Region. Thus, all building potential acquired through the onerous grant of the right to build In the FD receives an 80% discount on the value of the required financial consideration. The value of TDRs simply cannot compete with the price of building potential acquired through the onerous grant of the right to build.
Costonis, a participant in the seminar 'Legal Aspects of Created Land', presented a vision of TDR inspired by the U.S. experience, where the mechanism originated, based on the creation of a Development Rights Bank administered by public authorities[55].
In this scenario, municipal action requires a high degree of sophistication, as it depends on creating a building rights market capable of making the TDR option both advantageous and secure compared to just and prior cash compensation.
TDR is compensation triggered by a landmark designation which amounts to a regulatory taking. However, the economic and legal viability of TDR depends on the understanding that it is, essentially, a market mechanism.
Once the constitutional validity of TDR as a market-based instrument is established, further issues arise. How should the market value of the transferred development rights be determined? How should the urban infrastructure overburden in the receiving zone be estimated? These issues are intertwined, insofar as building potential becomes more valuable in proportion to its scarcity, which in turn depends on the available infrastructure.
Hence, the key concern is how to create a market with the constructive potential for TDR to work. Responses will likely differ across jurisdictions; each city follows a distinct urban planning path, a factor that fundamentally shapes the development of a local building rights market.
ALEXANDER, Gregory S. The global debate over constitutional property: lessons from American Takings Jurisprudence. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006
ALOCHIO, Luiz Henrique Antunes. Do solo criado (Outorga onerosa do direito de construir): instrumento de tributação para a ordenação do ambiente urbano. Rio de Janeiro: Lúmen Júris, 2005.
ALOCHIO, Luiz Henrique Antunes. O direito do urbanismo e a transferência do direito de construir: requisitos de limitação de leis locais. Revista de Direito Administrativo, Rio de Janeiro, v. 249, p. 119-141, set./dez. 2008.
BLANCO-GONZÁLES, Antônio. Transferência do direito de construir: revisitando o instituto a partir do novo Plano Diretor de São Paulo. BDM — Boletim de Direito Municipal, a. 33, n. 5, p. 305-329, maio 2017.
CORREIA, Fernando Alves. O plano urbanístico e o princípio da igualdade. Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1989.
FERNANDES, Edésio. Constructing the “Right to the city” in Brazil. Social Legal Studies, v. 16, n. 2, p. 201-219, 2007.
FERNANDES, Edésio. Do tombamento ao planejamento territorial e à gestão urbana. In: FERNANDES, Edésio; ALFONSIN, Betânia (coord.). Revisitando o instituto do tombamento. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2010. p. 23-35.
FURTADO, Fernanda. Recuperação de mais-valias fundiárias urbanas: reunindo os conceitos envolvidos. In: SANTORO, Paula (org.). Gestão social da valorização da terra. São Paulo, Instituto Pólis, 2004. (Cadernos Pólis, 9).
FURTADO, Fernanda; RABELLO, Sonia; BACELLAR, Isabela. Transferência do direito de construir: caderno técnico de regulamentação e implementação. Brasília: Ministério das Cidades, 2017.
GASPARINI, Audrey. Tombamento e direito de construir. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2005.
GOMES, Orlando. Novíssimas questões de direito civil. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1988.
GREGO, Marco Aurélio. O solo criado e a questão fundiária. In: PESSOA, Álvaro (org.). Direito do urbanismo: uma visão sócio-jurídica. Rio de Janeiro: Livros Técnicos e Científicos Editora S.A., 1981.
LEFEBRVE, Henri. O direito à cidade. São Paulo: Centauro, 2001.
LINS, Ana Paula Mota de Bitencourt da Costa. A Transferência do direito de construir e a sua interface na conservação do patrimônio cultural edificado da Cidade de Curitiba. In: FERNANDES, Edésio; ALFONSIN, Betânia (coord.). Revisitando o instituto do tombamento. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2008.
MARCHESAN, Ana Maria Moreira. A tutela do patrimônio cultural sob o enfoque do direito ambiental. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2007.
MARQUES NETO, Floriano Azevedo. Outorga onerosa do direito de construir. In: DALLARI, Adilson Abreu; FERRAZ, Sérgio (coord.). Estatuto da Cidade (Comentários à Lei Federal 10.257/2001). São Paulo: Malheiros, 2002.
MELLO, Celso Antônio Bandeira de. Curso de direito administrativo. 26. ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2009.
MELLO, Celso Antônio Bandeira de. Curso de direito administrativo. 30. ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2013.
MENDES, Gilmar Ferreira; COELHO, Inocêncio Mártires; BRANCO, Paulo Gustavo Gonet. Curso de direito constitucional. Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, Inocêncio Mártires Coelho, Paulo Gustavo Gonet Branco. 4. ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2009.
MOLIN, Ângela. Mudanças climáticas: adaptação do direito de propriedade à elevação do nível do mar na zona costeira do Brasil. Blumenau, SC: Dom Modesto, 2024.
O SOLO criado. Anais do Seminário. São Paulo: Fundação Prefeito Faria Lima, 1977.
PINTO, Victor Carvalho. Direito urbanístico: plano diretor e direito de propriedade. 3. ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2011.
SABATH, Mark E. The perils of the property rights initiative: takings stock of Nevada County’s Measure D. Harvard Environmental Law Review, v. 28, n. 1, p. 249-280, jan. 2024.
SILVA, José Afonso da. Direito urbanístico brasileiro. 5. ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2008.
STEVENSON, Sarah J. Banking on TDRs: the government’s role as a banker of transferable development rights. New York University Law Review, v. 73, n. 4, p. 1329-1376, out. 1998.
SUNDFELD, Carlos Ari. O Estatuto da Cidade e suas diretrizes gerais. In: DALLARI, Adilson Abreu; FERRAZ, Sérgio (coord.). Estatuto da Cidade. Comentários à Lei nº 10.257/01. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2003.
SUNSTEIN, Cass R. A Constituição parcial. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2008.
TDR HANDBOOK. Designing and implementing Transfer of Development Rights. Artur C. Nelson [et al.]. Washington; Covelo; Londres: Island Press, 2012.
UZON, Néia. Transferência do direito de construir: a experiência de Porto Alegre, Brasil. Documento de Trabajo del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2013.
Article received on March 18, 2025 and approved on May 22, 2025. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-761220200706. ↑
PhD in Law from UniCEUB. Federal District Attorney. Country: Brazil. Email: fjlongofh@gmail.com. ↑
See: MOLIN, Ângela. Mudanças Climáticas: adaptação do direito de propriedade à elevação do nível do mar na zona costeira do Brasil. Blumenau, SC: Editora Dom Modesto, 2024, in which the application of TDC (Transfer of Development Rights) is proposed as a compensation mechanism for the loss of coastal real estate due to climate change. ↑
Consider, for instance, the disputes regarding the mandatory legal reserve—a requirement established by the Forest Code in 1965. ↑
MELLO, Celso Antônio Bandeira de. Curso de Direito Administrativo. São Paulo: Editora Malheiros, 2009, 26ª ed. rev. e atual., pág. 901. MARCHESAN, Ana Maria Moreira. A tutela do patrimônio cultural sob o enfoque do Direito Ambiental. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2007, págs. 215-216. ↑
"ADMINISTRATIVE. LANDMARK DESIGNATION JUST COMPENSATION PROPERTY SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER, MARITAL EXCLUSION, EXEMPTION FROM SEIZURE, LIFE ESTATE, AND TESTAMENTARY TRUST. 1. The owner of a property subject to restrictions on transfer, marital assets, creditor attachment, life estate, and testamentary trust has the standing to sue for de facto appropriation following a landmark designation. 2. A claim is legally barred only when it involves a remedy prohibited by law, such as an action to recover a gambling debt. 3. A landmark designation intended to protect a property's cultural and environmental value that results in a total economic wipeout is transformed, by operation of law, from a simple regulatory restriction into a de facto expropriation, requiring compensation at fair market value. In such cases, the Public Authority acquires ownership of the property. Property located on Av. Paulista, São Paulo. 4. An action for inverse condemnation is not the proper forum to resolve the status of restrictive covenants or encumbrances (including inalienability, separate property status, creditor protection, life estates, and fiduciary trusts) encumbering the property. The parties should seek to avert the effects of such encumbrances through separate legal action. 5. Once the right to compensation is recognized, by operation of law (Art. 31 of Decree-Law 3,365/1941), any liens or rights encumbering the expropriated property are subrogated to the award. 6. Pursuant to this provision, once just compensation is paid, the funds must be deposited in a court-monitored account until the litigation on the scope of the encumbrances is resolved. 7. Appeal denied.”↑
“Art. 35.Local municipal law, predicated on the Master Plan, may authorize owners of urban real property—private or public—to exercise elsewhere, or transfer via public deed, the development rights established in the Plan or derived land-use legislation, provided the property is deemed necessary for the following purposes: I—installation of urban and community facilities; II—preservation of sites of historical, environmental, aesthetic, social, or cultural significance; III—land tenure regularization programs, urbanization of areas occupied by low-income populations, and social interest housing. § 1. The same power may be granted to an owner who donates their property, or part of it, to the Public Authority for the purposes provided for in items I to III of the caput. § 2. The municipal law referred to in the caput shall establish the conditions regarding the application of the transfer of building rights".↑
SUNDFELD, Carlos Ari. O Estatuto da Cidade e suas diretrizes gerais. In Estatuto da Cidade. Comentários à Lei nº 10.257/01. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2003. 1ª ed., 2ª tiragem. (vários autores; coord. de Adilson Abreu Dallari e Sérgio Ferraz), págs. 52-53. ↑
BLANCO-GONZÁLES, Antônio. Transferência do Direito de Construir: revisitando o instituto a partir do novo Plano Diretor de São Paulo. In NDJ BDM, May 2017, pp. 305-306. ↑
Cf. MELLO, Celso Antônio Bandeira de. Curso de Direito Administrativo. São Paulo: Editora Malheiros, 2013, 30ª ed. rev. and updated, p. 927, in which the author changed his position (in the 26th edition of the classic work), no longer classifying heritage listing as administrative easement. ↑
Restricting the focus to real estate property defines the scope of this investigation, especially since current doctrine embraces an expansive view of property rights that includes social entitlements. See MENDES, Gilmar Ferreira. Curso de Direito Constitucional / Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, Inocêncio Mártires Coelho, Paulo Gustavo Gonet Branco. 4ª ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2009, pages. 467-469. ↑
GOMES, Orlando. Novíssimas Questões de Direito Civil. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva. ↑
“ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. CIVIL PROCEDURE. LANDMARK DESIGNATION EXCESSIVE EXECUTION 19 – INDEMNIFICATION COMPENSATION. TRANSFER OF BUILDING RIGHTS. ART. ARTICLE 35 OF THE CITY STATUE STF PRECEDENT NO. 280 APPLIED BY ANALOGY RE-EXAMINATION OF FACTS AND EVIDENCE FROM THE KNOWLEDGE PHASE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CHOSEN APPELLATE ROUTE. STJ PRECEDENT NO. 7. 1. Pursuant to Article 35 of the City Statute, determination of the feasibility of the transfer of development rights for a landmarked property necessitates an examination of the specific legislation of the Municipality of Santos. For this reason, it is evident that STF Precedent No. 280 applies by analogy, creating a procedural bar to the admissibility of the present appeal. 2. To overturn the findings of the lower court—specifically regarding the absence of a supervening cause and extinction of the right of compensation during the knowledge phase, upholding the alleged violation of Article 741, item VI of the CPC, requires re-examination of the evidence in the record. Such a review is prohibited in a special appeal, pursuant to Precedent No. 7 of this Court. 3 Interlocutory appeal denied".↑
ALOCHIO, Luiz Henrique Antunes. O direito do urbanismo e a transferência do direito de construir: requisitos de limitação de leis locais. In Revista de Direito Administrativo. v. 249, p. 119-141, set./dez. 2008. ↑
STEVENSON, Sarah J. Banking on TDRs: the government's role as a banker of transferable development rights. In New York University Law Review. Vol. 73, pp. 1333-1339. ↑
TDR Handbook. Designing and implementing Transfer of Development Rights. Artur C. Nelson [et. there], Island Press: Washington, Covelo and London, 2012. ↑
Created land Seminar Proceedings São Paulo; Fundação Prefeito Faria Lima, 1977, pages 7-8. ↑
Ibid., page. 8. ↑
Ibid., pp. 167-168. ↑
"The Master Plan may designate areas where building rights may be exercised above the established base floor area ratio (FAR), subject to a contribution to be provided by the beneficiary. § 1. For the purposes of this Law, the floor area ratio is the ratio between the buildable area and the lot area. § 2. The Master Plan may establish a single base floor area ratio for the entire urban zone or differentiated ratios for specific areas within it. § 3. The Master Plan shall define the maximum limits for floor area ratios, taking into account the proportionality between existing infrastructure and the expected increase in density for each area”. ↑
SUNDFELD, Carlos Ari. O Estatuto da Cidade e suas diretrizes gerais. In Estatuto da Cidade. Comentários à Lei nº 10.257/01. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2003. 1ª ed., 2ª tiragem. (vários autores; coord. de Adilson Abreu Dallari e Sérgio Ferraz), pág. 279. ↑
ALOCHIO, Luiz Henrique Antunes. Do solo criado (Outorga onerosa do direito de construir): Instrumento de tributação para a ordenação do ambiente urbano. Rio de Janeiro: Lúmen Júris Publishing House, 2005, p. 98. ↑
GASPARINI, Audrey. Tombamento e direito de construir. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2005, pages 74-76. LINS, Ana Paula Mota de Bitencourt da Costa. A Transferência do direito de construir e a sua interface na conservação do patrimônio cultural edificado da Cidade de Curitiba. In Revisitando o instituto do tombamento. Coordinators: Edésio Fernandes; Betânia Alfonsin: Editora Fórum, 2008, pp. 258-259. ↑
BITTENCOURT, Ana Paula. A transferência do direito de construir para a conservação do patrimônio natural e cultural: a experiência da cidade de Curitiba, pág. 4 ↑
"In reality, the urban development plan does not, in and of itself, grant building rights, but rather building potential”. The development potential defined by the urban parameters of the Master Plan is transformed into vested building rights only after the urban burdens are met, through which the owner helps fund the infrastructure. A burden [or onus] is a 'course of action an individual must undertake to achieve a specific benefit, which consists in the acquisition [vesting] or the preservation of a right. Fulfilling these burdens enables an owner to vest their property with the development rights provided for in the Master Plan. […]”. PINTO, Victor Carvalho. Direito Urbanístico: plano diretor e direito de propriedade. 3ª ed. rev. e atual., São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2011, pp. 263. ↑
“Recurso extraordinário. Lei n. 3.338/89 do Município de Florianópolis/SC. Created Land. Not classified as a tax. Granting of the right to create land for a fee. Distinction between burdens. Duty and obligation. Social function of property. Articles 182 and 170, III of the Constitution of Brazil. 1. Created land. Created land is artificial land created by human activity [above or below natural ground], resulting from construction that exceeds that permitted by uniform base floor area ratio (Base FAR) 2. Onerous grant of the right to create land A performance of a duty whose fulfillment by the party removes an impediment to their exercise of a specific legal power. Necessary action. Burden. There is no obligation in this case. It does not constitute a tax. A right granted to a property owner by which they are permitted to exceed the base building coefficient, contingent upon a contribution that constitutes an onus or burden. Where there is no obligation, there can be no tax. Distinction between burden, duty and obligation, and between a due act and a necessary act. 3 Burden on the urban property owner. An instrument specific to urban development policy, whose execution is the responsibility of the municipal government, in accordance with the provisions of art. 182 of the Constitution. An instrument aimed at rectifying the distortions caused by disorganized urban growth, promoting the full development of urban functions, and giving substance to the principle of the social function of property. (RE 387.047-5/SC, Rel. Min. Eros Grau, 6.3. 2008). ↑
MARQUES NETO, Floriano Azevedo. Outorga onerosa do direito de construir. InEstatuto da Cidade (Comentários à Lei Federal 10.257/2001) Coordenadores: Adilson Abreu Dallari and Sérgio Ferraz, São Paulo: (Ed.). Malheiros, 2002. 1st ed., page 242. ↑
GREGO, Marco Aurélio. O solo criado e a questão fundiária. In: Direito do Urbanismo. Uma visão sócio-jurídica. Org. Álvaro Pessoa. Livros Técnicos e Científicos Editora S.A. Rio de janeiro: 1981. Page 19. ↑
SILVA, José Afonso da. Direito Urbanístico Brasileiro. São Paulo: Editora Malheiros, 2008, 5ª ed., pág. 266. ↑
"Article 4. In accordance with Article 42, item II, of the City Statute, should the Master Plan provide for application of instruments such as the right of preemption, onerous grant of building and land-use alteration rights, consortium urban operations, and transfer of development rights (TDR), these may only be implemented if their geographic scope is clearly delineated within the Plan. Sole paragraph. In the explanatory memorandum, the Master Plan must provide a justification for the application of each instrument provided for in Article 4 of this Resolution, establishing a clear nexus with the respective strategies and objectives.↑
CORREIA, Fernando Alves. O plano urbanístico e o princípio da igualdade. Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1989, pág. 491. ↑
Ibid., page. 492. ↑
Ibid., pages 586-587. ↑
Ibid., page. 586-587. ↑
Ibid., page. 586-587. ↑
SABBATH, Mark E. The perils of the property rights initiative: taking stock of Nevada County's Measure D. In Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 2: “For more than a century, this question inspired little controversy. A taking was a government interference with physical ownership, and typically one that was quite obvious—the government condemned a piece of privately owned land in order to build a road or public facility, and paid the property owner the fair market value of his land.5 The only issue in these cases was whether the government's compensation—its assessment of the land's fair market value—was fair. Meanwhile, the government routinely regulated private property in ways that reduced its economic value, and the courts consistently held that no compensation was due. With the innovation and spread of zoning and environmental regulation in the twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court soon interpreted the takings clause to extend beyond physical expropriations to so-called 'regulatory takings.' In 1922, the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that a Pennsylvania statute forbidding coal mining that might cause subsidence represented a compensable taking of property. For the ªfirst time, the Court held that mere regulation of property, even for a legitimate purpose, could give rise to a takings claim. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”↑
ALEXANDER, GREGORY S. The global debate over constitutional property. Lessons from American Takings Jurisprudence. The University of Chicago Press, 2006, page. 95. ↑
In this regard, Sunstein's observes that. “[…] The Supreme Court decision in Lochner v. New York holds the rare distinction of lending its name to an era of constitutional law, characterized by judicial hostility toward economic regulation. During the so-called 'Lochner period', which spans 1905 to 1937, the Supreme Court struck down a series of state laws that sought to regulate the relationship between employers and employees. This period is often considered symbolic of an unjustified form of judicial 'activism': judicial interference in the democratic process with no grounding in the text and history of the Constitution. There is undoubtedly much to be said in favor of conventional wisdom. As we shall see, part of the problem with the Lochner period was, in fact, judicial aggressiveness. However, It should be understood that the case is linked to a specific concept of neutrality, one based on existing distributions of wealth and rights. The Lochner Court treated such distributions as pre-legal and just. And in this respect, there is a close relationship between the Lochner and Plessy cases. […]” (our emphasis) In SUNSTEIN, CASS R. A Constituição Parcial. Belo Horizonte: Editora Del Rey, 2008, pages 54-55. ↑
Article V “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Article XIV 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 2. […]”. ↑
The U.S TDR mechanism corresponds to the Brazilian legal concept of 'transferência do direito de construir' (TDC), specifically regulated under Article 35, Section II of the City Statute (Federal Law No. 10.257/2001). ↑
“[…] Putting TDRs on the taking rather than the just compensation side of the equation (as the Ninth Circuit did below) is a clever, albeit transparent, device that seeks to take advantage of a peculiarity of our Takings-Clause jurisprudence: […] If money that the government regulator gives to the landowner can be counted on the question of whether there is a taking (causing the courts to say that the land retains substantial value, and has thus not been taken), rather than on the question of whether the compensation for the taking is adequate, the government can get away with paying much less. That's all that's going on here. […] “[…] The cleverness of the scheme before us here is that it causes the payment to come, not from the government but from third parties—whom the government reimburses for their outlay by granting them (as the TDRs promise) a variance from otherwise applicable land-use restrictions.
[…]”.↑
FERNANDES, Edésio. Do tombamento ao planejamento territorial e à gestão urbana. In: FERNANDES, Edésio; ALFONSIN, Betânia (Coord.). Revisitando o instituto do tombamento. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2010. p. 23-35, pág. 29 ↑
SeeFERNANDES, Edésio. Constructing the “Right to the city” in Brazil. Social Legal Studies 2007; 16; 201. ↑
LEFEBRU, Henri. O direito à cidade. São Paulo: Centauro, 2001, p. 14. ↑
Ibid., page. 134. ↑
FURTADO, Fernanda. Recuperação de mais-valias fundiárias urbanas: reunindo os conceitos envolvidos. In SANTORO, Paula (Ed.) Gestão social da valorização da terra. São Paulo, Instituto Pólis, 2004. 80 p. (Cadernos Pólis, 9), pág. 66. ↑
UZON, Néia. Transferência do direito de construir: a experiência de Porto Alegre, Brasil. 2013 Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. ↑
FURTADO, Fernanda; Rabello, Sonia e Bacellar, Isabela. Transferência do Direito de Construir: Caderno Técnico de Regulamentação e Implementação. Brasília: Ministério das Cidades, 2017, pág. 27. ↑
ALOCHIO, Luiz Henrique Antunes. O direito do urbanismo e a transferência do direito de construir: requisitos de limitação de leis locais. In Revista de Direito Administrativo. v. 249, p. 119-141, set./dez. 2008. ↑
Ibid., page. 131. ↑
FURTADO, Fernanda; Rabello, Sonia and Bacellar, Isabela. Op. cit., page. 45. ↑
Ibid., p. 33. ↑
UZON, Néia. Op. cit., pages. 18-19. ↑
"§ 7. A uniform rate of 0.20 for index 'Y' is mandated across the Federal District until a new statute, introduced by the Executive, adjusts ODIR fees to the particularities of each Administrative Region. This adjustment must reflect the real infrastructure costs and the impact of additional development on public utilities.↑
O solo criado. Anais do Seminário. São Paulo; Fundação Prefeito Faria Lima, 1977, p. 85 ↑