Eduardo Oliveira Agustinho[2]
Kim Palhano Nogueira[3]
ABSTRACT
This article aims to analyze the effects of applying the theory of Failing Firm Defense (FFD) in the Brazilian context. The theory allows mergers between companies that would be considered anti-competitive under normal circumstances, on the grounds that, given the company’s imminent bankruptcy, there would be no other more competitive solution that would preserve the company. The theory was initially developed in the USA in 1930 with the case Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission. However, the theory has found support in other jurisdictions. Thus, based on a bibliographical study and cade’s decisions analysis related to the subject through the deductive method, this article aims to analyze the correctness regarding the admissibility of the FFD in the Brazilian jurisdiction and its possible effects. The relevance of the study lies in the necessary balance between the preservation of economic activity and competitive market structures, legal aims protected by corporate insolvency law and antitrust law, respectively.
Keywords
law & economic — development — antitrust — bankruptcy — failing firm defense
RESUMO
O presente artigo pretende analisar os efeitos da aplicação da teoria da failing firm defense (FFD) no contexto brasileiro. A tese permite que ocorram atos de concentração que seriam considerados, em situações normais, anticompetitivos, pela justificativa de que, dada a iminente falência, não existiria outra saída mais competitiva que preservasse a empresa envolvida na fusão. A teoria foi desenvolvida inicialmente no EUA, em 1930, com o caso Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Todavia, a teoria encontrou bases em outras jurisdições. Assim, a partir de estudo doutrinário e das decisões do Cade, por meio do método dedutivo, analisa-se no presente artigo o cabimento da FFD na jurisdição brasileira e seus possíveis efeitos. A relevância do trabalho reside no necessário equilíbrio entre a preservação da atividade econômica e as estruturas de mercado com competitividade, bens jurídicos tutelados pelo direito das empresas em crise e concorrencial, respectivamente.
Palavras-chave
direito econômico — desenvolvimento — concorrência — falência — failing firm defense
As a general rule, antitrust law prohibits mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or encourage a monopoly by excessively reinforcing the dominant market position of a company. Such regulation can be found in Brazilian law (Art. 88, § 5 of Law 12.529/11), U.S. law (Section 7 of the Clayton Act), and the legal framework of the European Union (Article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation).
However, as Fabio Holanda and Lise Barroso explain, bankruptcy proceedings may interfere with competition, especially during the business sale phase,[4] as the merger of one or more companies through this procedure constitutes a reportable transaction.[5] Hence, the importance of assessing the potential complications that are bound up with this.
Atypical situations may necessitate the establishment of exceptions to the rule. The imminent bankruptcy of a company is a case in point: when approval of an anti-competitive merger may be preferable, if the assets will otherwise exit the market, causing greater harm to competition than the transaction itself.
Hence, the theory of Failing Firm Defense—FFD[6] emerged in the USA to address the issue of companies in crisis, permitting the takeover of demonstrably insolvent business entities by other firms, even where the merger or acquisition results in an exaggerated increase in market control. This theory has received significant international support and is currently well-established in the jurisprudence of CADE (Administrative Council for Economic Defense).
Our aim here is to elucidate the theoretical and practical bases for application of FFD, especially in the US and the European Union (EU), to understand the rationale and limitations of its application. We will also explore the contours of this theory within the Brazilian context, vis-a-vis its application and the approach and understanding of CADE. This research is based on a review of the relevant literature, legislation, and jurisprudence on the subject A deductive methodology was used to address the questions: to what extent is the theory of FFD compatible with Brazilian law? What are the limits of its application? The significance of this study lies in the balance between preserving the economic viability of insolvent firms and maintaining competitive market structures, the primary interests protected by insolvency and antitrust laws, respectively.
Prior to examining how CADE applies the FFD in Brazil, we must first contextualize it by examining its roots in U.S. competition law, where the doctrine first emerged as a framework for reviewing mergers involving firms at risk of bankruptcy.
Establishment of the FFD in the U.S. was based on the leading case International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission. In this instance, the court admitted the corporate merger of two companies, which, in theory, would cause an excessive increase in market share, on the grounds that the rival company was so financially distressed that, if the merger did not occur, the only likely outcome was bankruptcy. The Court argued that:
the purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business of the purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and does not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the intent of the Clayton Act. P. 280 US 301.[7]
In other words, the Court’s purposive interpretation of the Clayton Act—a cornerstone of U.S. antitrust enforcement—suggests that no actual harm to competition occurs when a failing firm is absorbed by a viable competitor, provided no other solution exists. The reference to the Clayton Act is to Section 7, specifically, which governs merger and acquisition matters.
That no person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be expected to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.[8]
Evidently, FFD is a significant exception to competition protection in the US, insofar as it justifies the acquisition of all or part of a competitor's assets, even where this results in an effective monopoly or a substantial reduction in competition.
Accordingly, to legitimize such a legal carve-out, the state must rigorously oversee the use of economic mergers as a mechanism for rehabilitating companies, so that such transactions do not serve as a pretext for anticompetitive abuses.
Companies on the verge of bankruptcy are "firms that are clearly ceasing to be effective competitors but have not yet technically failed.”[9] In other words, this concept does not stem directly from the Bankruptcy Code or the Clayton Act but is rather a judicial construct. Under this doctrine, a firm facing imminent collapse need not be technically insolvent; rather, it is a firm for whom reorganization under Chapter 11 is no longer a viable alternative to a merger with a market competitor. In this sense, the US Department of Justice—DoJ in Horizontal Merger Guidelines states that no harm to competition arises from a merger between competitors where one is faced with imminent bankruptcy. However, specific and precise conditions are required for acceptance of this defense, namely:
A merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise if the following circumstances are met: 1) the ostensibly failing firm will be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future; 2) it will not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act; 3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable 35 alternative offers of acquisition of the assets of the failing firm that would both maintain its tangible 36 and intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than the proposed merger; and 4) without acquisition, the assets of the failing firm will exit the relevant market.[10]
In terms of these criteria, the failing firm defense requires a good faith attempt to find less anticompetitive alternatives for the acquisition of such a company. This situation demonstrates a concern to reserve the FFD as a last resort; to be used only in case of a lack of adequate alternatives, when acquisition of assets by competitors with significant market power is clearly preferable to the damaging impacts of bankruptcy.
In this regard, Agnieszka Zwirska clarifies that application of this condition must account for the likelihood that a competitor may be willing to pay a higher premium than other bidders due to the potential for increased market power. Therefore, a good faith offer from a third party should be sufficient to disqualify the failing firm defense[11]
The conditions established by the DOJ are largely based on another landmark ruling which was instrumental to the development of the FFD: Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States The case pertained to the attempted merger between Tucson, Arizona's two daily newspapers: The Arizona Daily Star and The Tucson Citizen The Supreme Court rejected the merger, finding insufficient evidence that TheCitizen had made good-faith efforts to identify an alternative purchaser for the operation. Moreover, the parties failed to establish the absence of alternative buyers for the newspaper. The burden of proof of supporting each element of the failing firm defense with conclusive evidence lies with the petitioning business entity.[12] Similarly, in a submission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the U.S. clarifies that the FFD is rarely invoked. Although based on sound economic principles, its scope is narrow and any interpretation must necessarily be strict.[13]
As a result, the prevailing view is that the failing firm defense has been invoked successfully only in exceptional circumstances since its inception in 1930.[14] Furthermore, the mere fact that a company is experiencing financial distress or is on the verge of losing a significant market share—becoming a 'weak' firm—does not mean it is facing impending collapse. A thorough, case-by-case study is required to determine a crisis situation in which the risk of imminent bankruptcy may justify authorizing a merger that is harmful to competitive market structures.[15]
The U.S. submission also highlights its regulatory approach to the anticipated surge in Failing Firm Defense (FFD) claims during economic downturns. As for applying FFD during these periods, the consensus is that even during systemic financial downturns, the defense should only be granted if it strictly meets the criteria for each specific merger. Each case must be analyzed in isolation to protect economic stability.[16]
The OECD organized two conferences focused on the topic of FFD, one in 1995 and another in 2009. The conclusions arising from these discussions are worth examining.[17]
The 2009 conference highlighted a rise in mergers among distressed entities. Hence, a clear distinction needs to be made between merely weak business entities and those actually in the pre-insolvent stage.[18]
In this context, the absence of a causal link between the problematic merger and resulting competitive harm serves as the primary justification for the FFD; authorizing such a merger may prove more beneficial to the market than outright liquidation and dissolution of the failing firm.[19]
Furthermore, the debates highlighted that despite slight variations most antitrust regulators agree on three criteria for the application of the FFD: (i) without the merger the distressed firm would exit the market; (ii) there is no less anti-competitive alternative buyer willing to merge with the firm; and (iii) without the merger, the assets of the entity in question would likewise exit the market.[20]
Nonetheless, the OECD notes a key difference across jurisdictions: in some countries insolvency proceedings are considered more favorable for antitrust protection than the granting of an exception for a merger that prompts concerns about competition. From this perspective, bankruptcy may be considered less anti-competitive, as it allows other firms to compete for the market share created with the departure of the insolvent company.[21]
Regarding the 1995 conference, a concern already existed about the distinction between companies facing imminent bankruptcy and those merely weakened.
There are several reasons why competition authorities may be unwilling to extend the failing firm defense/exception to firms which are clearly ceasing to be effective competitors but have not yet technically failed. The first is a desire to avoid evidentiary disputes they are poorly situated to resolve, i.e., whether the "flailing" firm is truly likely to fail. An anti-competitive merger almost by definition produces extra profits. If a flailing firm defense/exception exists, parties to competition reducing mergers would naturally have a strong tendency to claim that one (or both) of them are flailing when in fact any financial problems are minor or strictly temporary.
Even if flailing firms could be reliably identified, competition authorities may take the view that the competition such firms provide, albeit weak or weakening, benefits consumers and should be allowed to continue as long as possible. That view makes sense, but should be tempered with considerations of longer-term competitive effects. A merger involving a flailing firm might foster a considerably better competitive environment than a similar merger occurring only after one of the parties has sunk into irreversible failure, i.e. there is a tradeoff between present and future levels of competition.[22]
Thus, it is clear that, within the scope of competition law, there is significant difficulty in differentiating between an imperiled company and one weakened due to financial difficulties. This limitation is raised as a justification for not applying FFD.
However, the OECD favors the position that a merger involving companies where one or both face economic-financial crisis is preferable to the bankruptcy of one of the parties, as the latter is irreversible and its socioeconomic consequences cannot be ignored.[23]
To understand the European position regarding the FFD, we should first analyze European Commission guidelines and legislation.
In this regard, the EU Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers—the current merger control framework—stipulate that the Commission may approve a problematic merger involving an insolvent firm, provided the transaction does not result in a further deterioration of the competitive structure. Thus, it is clear the EU is in favor of applying the FFD when the company is demonstrably in a situation of imminent bankruptcy. In line with the US directive, the European Commission stipulates that analysis of a merger should not be based on an exhaustive list of requirements, but rather that its economic and legal viability, from a competitive standpoint, should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The aforementioned guideline also determines the criteria for the possible application of the FFD. The criteria considered by the Commission are threefold: i) whether the company would necessarily be excluded from the market if the merger did not occur; (ii) the impossibility of an alternative acquisition that will resolve the financial crisis; and (iii) whether the assets would leave the market if the merger did not occur. Furthermore, the guidelines require the parties to prove that the inevitable deterioration of the competitive structure is not caused by the merger itself but is a consequence of the insolvency.
With these clarifications in mind, we should also the participation of the European Commission in the OECD report with respect to the FFD.
Initially, the European Commission stated that, at the time, there was no express mention of the FFD in the internal Merger Regulation However, it was noted that in European jurisprudence, the concept of a 'rescue merger' served a similar purpose. The Commission explains that 'rescue mergers' apply to scenarios where the loss of competition is not directly caused by the merger. The rationale is that the competitive structure would have deteriorated irrespectively.[24]
The Commission further presented the criteria typically used to determine whether a merger is the main cause of a decline in competition, in line with the requirements previously highlighted. These are: (i) whether, in the absence of the merger or acquisition, the company will be forced out of the market in the near future; (ii) whether any prospect of a merger or takeover by another company would cause less harm to the market; and (iii) whether evidence proved that, if the company failed, the bulk of its market share would, in any event, accrue to the acquirer. Likewise, the Commission stated that the burden of proof as to whether the merger was the main cause of market distortion fell on the companies involved in the transaction.[25]
In this context, Ioannis Kokkoris's observations on the European directive are revealing. In his terms, the commission views the FFD as a means of incorporating the social and economic goals of a firm facing imminent bankruptcy into the merger analysis. This serves to protect general welfare through efficiency gains, reallocation of capacity to higher-value uses, or simply in terms of job preservation and other labor-related issues[26]
In this sense, the protection afforded by the FFD under the European Commission Guidelines aligns with the principle of company preservation enshrined in Article 47 of Law No. 11.101/05 insofar as it seeks to protect the social function.[27]
Furthermore, Kokkoris highlights the potential economic benefits of protecting these firms—vis-a-vis scale, scope, and economic efficiency. He argues that prohibiting mergers or acquisitions involving companies facing imminent bankruptcy is detrimental to the economy and society as a whole, as insolvency would cause as much harm as the merger itself.[28]
In this manner, the foundational requirement justifying the exception to Article 2 of the Regulation is clear: there must be a clear absence of a causal link between the deterioration of competition and the merger itself. A merger does not necessarily have to be the cause of a decline in competition. This is demonstrated by the fact that if one of the merging parties is insolvent, it will exit the market regardless; market distortion, in this scenario, is not directly attributable to the merger. [29]
Hence, the European Commission's guidelines are closely aligned with the three conditions for application of the FFD proposed by the OECD, reflecting a consensus among global competition authorities in recent forums.
In Brazil, there is currently no express legal provision for application of the FFD. However, since enactment of Law No. 8.884/94, the theory has garnered legal debate.
Although the first case concerning this matter—Merger Case No. 16/94[30]—was decided more than thirty years ago, CADE did not successfully apply the defense in a specific ruling until 2008.[31]
Merger Case No. 08012.014340/2007-75, concerning acquisition of mining rights from Mineração Areiense S/A by Votorantim Metais Zinco S.A., was unconditionally approved by CADE, establishing the framework for the FFD in Brazil.
The authority granted unconditional clearance, ruling that, despite the direct rivalry between the parties, the transaction was admissible, as one firm was insolvent and the likelihood of exercising market power was negligible, given the low barriers to entry.
To see how FFD doctrine has evolved since this precedent, we should examine a more recent instance: Merger Case No. 08700.004163/2017-32, concerning the attempted acquisition of all Companhia Petroquímica de Pernambuco shares by the Petromex Group. In this case, analysis of the applicability of the FFD was conducted as follows:
Based on the arguments put forward by the applicants, elements of failing firm defence are identifiable. According to Guideline H, for this theory to be applied, the Applicants must cumulatively satisfy the following criteria: (a) if the transaction is rejected, the company would inevitably leave the market or be unable to meet its financial obligations owing to its economic-financial distress; (b) if the transaction is rejected, the firm's assets would not remain in the market, which could lead to reduced supply, higher market concentration, and a decline in economic welfare; and (c) the company must demonstrate it has made a good-faith effort to find less anticompetitive alternatives—such as alternative buyers or a judicial restructuring process—and that there is no way of continuing in business other than by way of the transaction, thereby requiring a counterfactual analysis. Note that the burden of proof concerning the existence of these elements rests with the Applicants.
Evidence in the case file points to fulfillment of the first two conditions. First, the financial data presented by Petrobras shows that the companies in question are indeed facing financial difficulties. Furthermore, Petrobras, the controlling company, states—supported by public information to that effect—that the aim of divestment is for the company to refocus on its core activities. Notwithstanding these factors, it cannot be conclusively stated that the firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations or that its assets would disappear from the market if the transaction were rejected. The parties have not provided sufficient information to indicate that maintaining operations was unfeasible under the current conditions.[32]
This decision serves as a critical benchmark for application of this theory within Brazilian antitrust law. It provides a clear view of how CADE implements the FFD while remaining aligned with the requirements established in jurisdictions that employ the same doctrine. It is clear from the outset that the three conditions discussed align with the aforementioned European Commission Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, as well as the recurring criteria for the FFD cited by the OECD.
Note, however, that CADE found that only two of the three preconditions were satisfied, suggesting the existence of a less anticompetitive alternative; and even regarding these two, the authority highlighted a lack of evidence concerning the company’s imminent insolvency.
This situation demonstrates—in line with the aforementioned U.S. DOJ report—the prevalence of a restrictive interpretation and the exceptional nature of the FFD in the analysis
Consistent with comparative law, CADE maintains a stringent application of criteria and heightened scrutiny, ensuring the FFD is rarely accepted as a basis for clearing mergers with significant competitive impact.
Another key merger case involving the FFD is the acquisition of Oi S.A. by Claro S.A. Telefônica Brasil S.A., and TIM S.A. (Merger Case No. 08700.000726/2021-08). In this instance, the reporting commissioner, Luis Henrique Bertolino Braido, explicitly stated that for the FFD to be accepted, all three requirements established in the CADE Horizontal Merger Guidelines must be satisfied.[33]
As to the first requirement— inevitable exit from the market if the merger is rejected—the reporting commissioner found that judicial reorganization of Oi S.A. was yielding positive results. Furthermore, the ongoing investments of the company suggested creditors would likely be paid. As a result, in his view, the first requirement had not been satisfied.[34] Regarding the second requirement—the inevitable exit of assets from the market—the reporting commissioner explained that Oi S.A. assets would not be withdrawn, even in the event of insolvency, given the specific nature of the telecommunications market.[35]
Finally, in his view, the third requirement—proof of an unsuccessful search for a better buyer—was unmet since the deal was not structured with the necessary diligence, suggesting the availability of less anticompetitive alternatives. Thus, he concluded, Oi SA does not meet the necessary requirements for application of the FFD.[36]
The decisive vote, cast by President Alexandre Cordeiro Machado, on the other hand, determined that Oi would necessarily go bankrupt if the acquisition operation were not approved.[37] Furthermore, the bankruptcy would ostensibly have significant impact on the market, since 16.6% of Brazilian telephone consumers were users of its services. Furthermore, the President explained that if Oi S.A. failed, its customers—given the lack of alternative providers—would migrate to the TTC group regardless. Accordingly, he voted in favor of conditional clearance of the merger.[38]
This case is a perfect example of Carl Schmitt’s maxim—that the exception proves everything, while the rule proves nothing.[39] The exception confirms both the rule and itself through the very act of being exceptional.[40]
Hence, the existence of a ruling that grants the rare FFD exception by loosening its requirements proves the applicability of the doctrine—showing the defense can be used to validate transactions that would otherwise be blocked due to their adverse structural impact on the market.
Nevertheless, the need for cautious application is underscored by the lack of consensus, evidenced by the dissenting opinion of the reporting commissioner.
To assess the impact of the FFD in Brazil, we should first examine Análise de Atos de Concentração Horizontal (the Horizontal Merger Guidelines). In the absence of explicit legislation, this document governs how the FFD should be interpreted by CADE.
According to the guide, the FFD must be applied with extreme caution, respecting three criteria: (i) inevitable exit of the firm from the market should the merger be blocked; (ii) subsequent exit of its assets from the market; and (iii) proof of a diligent search for an alternative, such as a less anticompetitive buyer or reorganization.[41] Thus, although the conditions are very similar to those of the European Commission and the OECD, the Brazilian guideline differs in making explicit mention of judicial reorganization.
Indeed, as is the case in the U.S., the concept of an imminently failing firm lacks a statutory basis in either Antitrust or Bankruptcy Law. Instead, it rests on the premise that the business entity, while not yet technically bankrupt, is effectively unviable. However, the inclusion of judicial reorganization as a condition for the FFD is appropriate, since, among the restructuring methods provided by the Bankruptcy and Restructuring Act, mergers and acquisitions are explicitly recognized as means of overcoming a financial crisis.[42] This was reinforced by the 2020 reform of the Bankruptcy Act, which explicitly adds the total sale of the enterprise to the list of recovery mechanisms for companies in financial crisis.[43]
In the Brazilian institutional context, however, CADE has increasingly treated the filing of judicial reorganization as a presumption that the debtor is pursuing alternative restructuring paths. This may provide a basis for approving a merger with a competitor, even if it results in market concentration
With regard to the intersection of the FFD and insolvency law, Joana Stelzer et al. contend that the doctrine harmonizes competition policy with the mandate of Law No. 11.101/05, prioritizing the maintenance of viable enterprises and fulfillment of their social function
However, this creates a conflict between antitrust principles and insolvency law: resolved by choosing between liquidation and a merger or acquisition. To this end, the social costs and negative externalities of each decision must be carefully analyzed.[44]
As Gerardo Alves de Lima Filho points out, besides the application of corporate insolvency principles, there is legal support for the FFD in Lei de Defesa da Concorrência (Law No. 12.529/11). Article 88, Paragraph 6,[45] specifically, authorizes mergers that may restrict competition, provided they are limited to what is strictly necessary and the resulting benefits are passed on to consumers—such as increased productivity, enhanced competitiveness, improved product or service quality, or gains in efficiency and technological or economic development.
Therefore, analysis of FFD applicability is justified, to ascertain economic efficiencies and the gains derived from the preservation of the key assets.[46]
In this regard, it is clear that there is no incompatibility in applying the FFD within the Brazilian system. Furthermore, CADE has guidelines that provide criteria in line with international standards for protection against potential abuse in the application of this theory.
Nevertheless, as noted, in several cases in the US and the OECD countries the theory prevailed, leading to merger clearance based on the FFD, despite the anticompetitive effects. This reality is reflected in the approach of the Brazilian antitrust authority, specifically due to the understanding that its application demands stringent identification of the requirements necessary to guarantee the FFD constitutes, in effect, the sole remaining alternative
Indeed, Henrique Janela Tamai Rocha argues that the most difficult criterion, especially in highly fragmented markets, is proof of a lack of better alternatives, i.e., that there is no potential buyer or other means of rescuing the company.[47]
Thus, application of the FFD is restricted to a few cases that meet the necessary requirements. Nonetheless, further theoretical study of the conditions for its application in Brazil is necessary, particularly given the degree of concentration across various national markets where transactions require CADE approval, from a product or geographic perspective
Based on our analysis of the FFD in the Brazilian context and comparative law, the following conclusions may be drawn.
First, although the doctrine was enshrined in U.S. case law nearly ninety years ago and the Department of Justice has incorporated it into its Horizontal Merger Guidelines, application of the FFD is strictly limited. The rationale lies in the fact that the doctrine functions as an exception to the rule; transactions that would otherwise impair competitive balance may be cleared only upon rigorous proof of the specific conditions for adoption, aimed at salvaging the assets of a firm facing imminent liquidation
Accordingly, the following are considered cumulative conditions for the FFD to be accepted: (i) the inability of the firm in question to meet its financial obligations; (ii) an inability to reorganize successfully without the proposed merger or acquisition; (iii) proof of due diligence in seeking alternative offers in good faith; and (iv) the inevitable exit of it assets from the market.
It is thus evident that, while this formulation is expressed as four distinct conditions in the United States, international majority doctrine—as postulated by the OECD—tends to reduce them to three: (i) the inevitable exit of the firm from the market in lieu of the merger; (ii) the absence of an alternative merger proposal that would be less harmful to competition; and (iii) exit of the assets from the market if the merger does not occur.
This is the formulation that was adopted in the CADE guidelines for horizontal mergers, with the added express mention of a prior attempt at judicial reorganization as an alternative to a competitively problematic merger under the third requirement.
With respect to CADE precedents, prominent cases include Merger Case No. 08012.014340/2007-75, where the FFD served as a basis for the approval of a transaction that theoretically impaired competition. However, in the few cases where the FFD was considered, such as Merger Case No. 08700.004163/2017-32, CADE has leaned toward disapproval, given the exceptional nature of the conditions that must be met for this defense to justify a merger. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Merger Case No. 08700.000726/2021-08, CADE may recognize that the market damage resulting from the failure of a firm may justify a merger, provided all FFFD criteria are strictly met.
Evidently, application of the FFD by CADE—based on the precedents analyzed and the guidelines published—follows the international practice of cautious application.
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BRASIL. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica. Ato de Concentração nº 08700.004163/2027-32. Relator: Cristiane Alckmin Junqueira Schmidt. Julgado em: 7 fev. 2018. Disponível em: https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?mYbVb954ULaAV-MRKzMwwbd5g_PuAKStTlNgP-jtcH5MdmPeznqYAOxKmGO9r4mCfJlTXxQMN01pTgFwPLudAwXUHKxn9EN1rnsGLwwkPlfxe-A0YGZpQI6JH90lrsHT%22. Acesso em: 23 fev. 2025.
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BRASIL. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica. Sistema Eletrônico de Informações. Ato de Concentração nº 16/1994. Relator: Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho. Julgado em 29 de março de 1995. Disponível em: https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei//modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_processo_exibir.php?062g277GvPsZDAxAO1tMiVcL9FcFMR5UuJ6rLqPEJuT08mg6wxLt0JzWxCor9mNcMYP8UAjTVP9dxRfPBcXrluc76NHRTIcgNYtbgRHjdhmthNeqAzbaLrH4ZPBtmRZ. Acesso em: 16 mar. 2025.
BRASIL. Lei n. 11.101, de 9 de fevereiro de 2005. Regula a recuperação judicial, a extrajudicial e a falência do empresário e da sociedade empresária.
BRASIL. Lei nº 12.529, de 30 de novembro de 2011. Estrutura o Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência; dispõe sobre a prevenção e repressão às infrações contra a ordem econômica; altera a Lei nº 8.137, de 27 de dezembro de 1990, o Decreto-Lei nº 3.689, de 3 de outubro de 1941—Código de Processo Penal, e a Lei n 7.347, de 24 de julho de 1985; revoga dispositivos da Lei nº 8.884, de 11 de junho de 1994, e a Lei nº 9.781, de 19 de janeiro de 1999; e dá outras providências.
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DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS. Competition Committee. Failing firm defense: note by the United States, n. 103, 2009. Disponível em: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2010/10/the-failing-firm-defence_a0e37e7e/c90c3d1e-en.pdf. Acesso em: 23 fev. 2025.
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Article received on March 18, 2025 and approved on May 22, 2025. DOI: https://doi.org/10.12660/rda.v285.2026.94074. ↑
Ph.D. in Economic Law and Development from the Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná (PUCPR). Full Professor of Business Law at the undergraduate level and in the Graduate Program in Law at PUCPR. Visiting Researcher at Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. Member of the Law and Economics Study Group (GRAED) at PUCPR. Attorney based in Curitiba, practicing in the field of Business Law. Country: Brazil. E-mail: eduardo.agustinho@pucpr.br. ↑
LL.B. from the Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná (PUCPR). LL.M. candidate in the Graduate Program in Law at PUCPR. Country: Brazil. E-mail: kimpalhano@gmail.com. ↑
HOLANDA et al., 2024, p. 53-54. ↑
Ibidem.↑
In US English, "Defense" is the standard spelling. "Defence" (British English) may be used. ↑
US SUPREME COURT, 1930. p. 292. ↑
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Public Law. pp. 108-237, June 22, 2004. The act encourages the development and promulgation of voluntary consensus standards. It provides relief under antitrust laws for standards development organizations (SDOs) with respect to conduct adopted in the elaboration of voluntary consensus standards and for other purposes. ↑
OECD, 1996. p.21 ↑
US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1992. p. 29 ↑
ZWIRSKA, 2003, p. 10. ↑
US Supreme Court, 1969, p. 143. ↑
DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE, 2009. p. 2. ↑
Ibidem. ↑
Ibidem, p. 3. ↑
Ibidem, p. 9. ↑
FILHO, 2017 ↑
OECD, 2010. p.11 ↑
Ibidem. ↑
Ibidem. ↑
Ibidem. p.12 ↑
OECD, 1996, p.21. ↑
OECD, 1996, p. 26. ↑
OECD, 1996, p. 91. ↑
Ibidem, p. 91. ↑
KOKKORIS, 2021, p. 3-12 ↑
BRASIL. Lei n. 11.101, de 9 de fevereiro de 2005. Regulates the judicial and extrajudicial reorganization and bankruptcy of entrepreneurs and business entities. ↑
KOKKORIS, op. cit.p.2-3 ↑
KOKKORIS, op. cit. p. 3- 6 ↑
CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA, 1995. ↑
ROCHA, 2023, pp. 13-16 ↑
CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA, 2018. ↑
BRASIL.CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA. Ato de Concentração n. 08700.000726/2021-08. Applicants: Claro SA ("Claro"), Telefônica Brasil SA ("Telefônica"), TIM SA ("TIM"), Oi SA ("Oi"). Judg-Rapporteur Luis Henrique Bertolino Braido. Brasilia, February 9, 2022. Published on February 18, 2022. Available at https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?HJ7F4wnIPj2Y8B7Bj80h1lskjh7ohC8yMfhLoDBLdda3qxZljOlIj6itZIw4Ylz3tDMkp8TH3-Cwm59awKcdEn05Eh_j9SRBE9EyRkgB0TLrbeQDN3Jv93widSPfzKrd. Accessed on: 30 May 2025. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
SCHMITT. 2005. p. 15 ↑
Ibid. ↑
CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA, 2016. ↑
BRASIL, Lei 11.101, de 09 de fevereiro de 2005. art. 50, II. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/lei/l11101.htm. Accessed on: 23 June 2025. ↑
BRASIL, Lei 11.101, de art. 50, XVIII. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/lei/l11101.htm. Accessed on: 23 Jun. 2025. ↑
STELZER et al, 2022, p. 35 ↑
BRASIL. Lei nº 9.873, de 23 de novembro de 1999. Establishes the Brazilian Competition Defense System; provides for the prevention and repression of violations against the economic order; amends Law No. 8.137 of December 27, 1990, Decree-Law No. 3.689 of October 3, 1941 (Code of Criminal Procedure), and Law No. 7.347 of July 24, 1985; repeals provisions of Law No. 8.884 of June 11, 1994, and Law No. 9.781 of January 19, 1999; and provides for other matters. ↑
FILHO, 2017 ↑
ROCHA, 2023, p. 90. ↑