Coordination of capital buffer and risk profile under supervision of Central Bank

Main Article Content

Joao Andre Marques Pereira
Richard Saito
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9512-9071

Abstract

This work investigates how banks react to the capital constraints imposed by the Central Bank. Using models that incorporate the simultaneity of capital decisions and risk decisions, our findings confirm the capital buffer theory, which predicts that adjustments to capital and adjustments to risk are positively related. Moreover, we find that regulatory pressures induce banks to increase their risk levels in response to capital adjustments but not vice versa.

Article Details

How to Cite
Marques Pereira, J. A., & Saito, R. (2015). Coordination of capital buffer and risk profile under supervision of Central Bank. Brazilian Review of Finance, 13(1), 74–101. https://doi.org/10.12660/rbfin.v13n1.2015.26393
Section
Long Paper