Changes in the configurations of corporate governance and agency relationship: a longitudinal analysis in a privately held company
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Abstract
This article aims to identify the changes in corporate governance associated with the life cycle of companies. It is guided by the research problem of understanding what effects the maturity of the business has on its ownership structure, corporate relations, and other governance configurations. The study used longitudinal analysis of the changes that occurred in Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto Bolivia-Brasil SA (TBG), a privately held company controlled by Petrobras Logística de Gás, with the participation of several state and private partners. The data were collected through document analysis and interviews with executives. The results identified the relationship between the stages of the business and the characteristics of the investors, ranging from an initial moment built around energy companies specialized in the business to the maturity phase when the investment became interesting to capitalist partners interested in financial results. In addition, planning before capital consolidation, the existence of a financing structure, clear criteria for selecting partners, and the presence of a second relevant shareholder, mitigates any problems of abuse of power or non-compliance with established rules, contributing to preserving the relationship between shareholders over time and the sustainability of corporate agreements. The study contributes to a new perspective on the analysis of corporate governance, considering necessary changes and adaptations over time and reflections on the corporate structures and priorities of the governance actors.
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