Beyond the Convergence-Divergence Divide: Comparing Banking Regulation in Latin America
Keywords:
Banking regulation, Latin America, embeddedness, insulation, convergence-divergenceAbstract
Over the last few decades, the rivalry between regulatory convergence and divergence has dominated scholarly debate. In accordance with this divide, countries tend to either converge toward Basel rules, becoming globally standardized players, or diverge from them, leaving their local institutions untouched, particularly within developmental States. Banking regulation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, however, brings challenging evidence to that debate. Brazil, which, from among the group, has most converged toward Basel rules, relies on a sizeable developmental State. Argentina, which has also widely converged, relies on significant State intervention in the financial system. Conversely, Chile, a market-friendly country, has not adhered to international capital rules on the same level. Finally, Mexico has been in-between, reinforcing State-owned banks and adopting the new Basel standards, however, to a lesser degree, compared to Brazil. These findings support the claim that such countries combine global and local institutions more diversely than the convergence-divergence divide predictions would suggest.