Disciplina de mercado no setor bancário angolano: uma análise da monitorização realizada pelos depositantes

Conteúdo do artigo principal

Carlos Mota
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9807-2528

Resumo

Este estudo analisa a disciplina do depositante bancário em Angola, um mercado emergente. Investiga se os depositantes são capazes de monitorizar os riscos bancários, reconhecendo e penalizando os bancos mais arriscados por meio das alterações nos depósitos e juros pagos. Utiliza os dados anuais de um painel de instituições bancárias angolanas, no período entre 2008 e 2017, para analisar o impacto e valor explicativo dos fatores de risco no comportamento dos depositantes. Os resultados sugerem não haver evidência consistente de disciplina de mercado. Os depositantes angolanos se mostram pouco receptivos ao risco bancário, após controle de outros fatores, e a capacidade explicativa global dos modelos de regressão é reduzida. No entanto, nem todos os fatores de risco evidenciam a mesma ausência de preponderância. Evidencia-se, ainda, que a disciplina não difere entre os vários grupos de bancos em função da proveniência e propriedade do capital e que a monitorização dos comportamentos de risco efetuada pelos depositantes não foi significativamente alterada pela crise econômica e financeira angolana.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Detalhes do artigo

Como Citar
Mota, C. (2019). Disciplina de mercado no setor bancário angolano: uma análise da monitorização realizada pelos depositantes. Revista De Gestão Dos Países De Língua Portuguesa, 18(1), 57–78. https://doi.org/10.12660/rgplp.v18n1.2019.78484
Seção
Artigos

Referências

ALANIS, E.; BELADI, H.; QUIJANO, M. Uninsured deposits as a monitoring device: their impact on bond yields of banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, v. 52, p. 77-88, 2015.

BARAJAS, A.; STEINER R. Depositor behavior and market discipline in Colombia. ‎Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2000. (IMF Working Paper N. 00/214).

BERGER, A. Market discipline in banking. In: CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION, 27., 1991, Chicago. Proceedings... Chicago, IL: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1991. p. 419-437.

BERGER, A. N.; TURK-ARISS, R. Do depositors discipline banks and did government actions during the recent crisis reduce this discipline? An international perspective. Journal of Financial Services Research, v. 48, n. 2, p. 103-126, 2015.

BLISS, R. R.; FLANNERY, M. J. Market discipline in the governance of US bank holding companies: monitoring vs. influencing. Review of Finance, v. 6, n. 3, p. 361-396, 2002.

CALOMIRIS, C. W.; POWELL, A. Can emerging market bank regulators establish credible discipline? The case of Argentina, 1992-99. In: MISHKIN, F. S. (Ed.). Prudential supervision: what works and what doesn’t. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001. p. 147-196.

COOK, D. O.; SPELLMAN, L. J. Repudiation risk and restitution costs: toward understanding premiums on insured deposits. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, v. 26, n. 3, p. 439-459, 1994.

CROCKETT, A. Market discipline and financial stabilities. Journal of Banking and Finance, v. 26, n. 5, p. 977-987, 2002.

DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, A.; HUIZINGA, H. Market discipline and deposit insurance. Journal of Monetary Economics, v. 51, n. 2, p. 375-399, 2004.

DICKEY, D. A.; FULLER, W. A. Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a unit root. Journal of the American statistical association, v. 74, n. 366, 427-431, 1979.

GALINDO, A. J.; POWELL, A. P.; LOBOGUERRERO, A. M. Latin American banks, market discipline and official regulation: completing the circle. 2005. Disponível em: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.712883>. Acesso em: 07 maio 2019.

GHOSH, S.; DAS, A. Market discipline in the Indian banking sector. Mumbai: National Stock Exchange of India, 2003. (NSE Working Paper N. 24).

GILBERT, R. A.; VAUGHAN, M. D. Do depositors care about enforcement actions? Journal of Economics and Business, v. 53, n. 2-3, p. 283-311, 2001.

GREENSPAN, A. Harnessing market discipline. The Region, v. 15, n. 3, p. 6-7, 2001.

HAMALAINEN, P.; HALL, M.; HOWCROFT, B. Market discipline: a theoretical framework for regulatory policy development. In: KAUFMAN, G. (Ed.). Market discipline in banking: theory and evidence. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2003. p. 57-95.

HAMALAINEN, P.; HALL, M.; HOWCROFT, B. A framework for market discipline in bank regulatory design. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, v. 32, n. 1‐2, p. 183-209, 2005.

HASAN, I. et al. Market discipline during crisis: evidence from bank depositors in transition countries. Journal of Banking & Finance, v. 37, n. 12, p. 5436-5451, 2013.

HOSONO, K.; IWAKI, H.; TSURU, K. Bank regulation and market discipline around the world. Tokyo: The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2004. (RIETI Discussion Paper Series N. 04-E-031).

HOSONO, K.; IWAKI, H.; TSURU, K. Banking crises, deposit insurance, and market discipline: lessons from the Asian crises. Tokyo: The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2005. (RIETI Discussion Paper Series N. 05-E-029).

HOU, X.; GAO, Z.; WANG, Q. Internet finance development and banking market discipline: evidence from China. Journal of Financial Stability, v. 22, p. 88-100, 2016.

JAGTIANI, J.; KAUFMAN, G.; LEMIEUX, C. Do markets discipline banks and bank holding companies? Evidence from debt pricing. Chicago, IL: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2000. (Emerging Issues Series S&R-99-3R).

KARAS, A.; PYLE, W.; SCHOORS, K. How do Russian depositors discipline their banks? Evidence of a backward bending deposit supply function. Oxford Economic Papers, v. 62, n. 1, p. 36-61, 2009.

LEVY-YEYATI, E.; MARTINEZ PERIA, M. S.; SCHMUKLER, S. L. Depositor behavior under macroeconomic risk: evidence from bank runs in emerging economies. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, v. 42, n. 4, p. 585-614, 2010.

LLEWELLYN, David T. Alternative approaches to regulation and corporate governance in financial firms. In: BREARLEY, R. et al. (Eds.). Financial Stability and Central Banks. New York: Routledge, 2002. p. 125-161.

MAECHLER, A.; MCDILL, K. Dynamic depositors discipline in US banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, v. 30, n. 7, p. 1871-1898, 2006.

MARTINEZ PERIA, M. S.; SCHMUKLER, S. L. Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? Market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises. The Journal of Finance, v. 56, n. 3, p. 1029-1051, 2001.

NIER, E.; BAUMANN, U. Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation, v. 15, n. 3, p. 332-361, 2006.

OLSSON, C. Risk management in emerging markets. London: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 2002.

ROMERA, M.; TABAK, B. Testing for market discipline in the Brazilian banking industry. Banks and Bank Systems, v. 5, n. 3, p. 112-128, 2010.

SHIMIZU, K. Is the information produced in the stock market useful for depositors? Finance Research Letters, v. 6, n. 1, p. 34-39, 2009.

TSURU, K. Depositors’ selection of banks and the deposit insurance system in Japan: empirical evidence and its policy implications. Tokyo: The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2003. (RIETI Discussion Paper Series N. 03-E-024).

UNGAN, E.; CANER, S.; ÖZYILDIRIM, S. Depositors’ assessment of bank riskiness in the Russian Federation. Journal of Financial Services Research, v. 33, n. 2, p. 77-100, 2008.

WU, Y.; BOWE, M. Information disclosure and depositor discipline in the Chinese banking sector. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, v. 22, n. 4, p. 855-878, 2012.