Determinants of a board structure
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Abstract
This article analyzes the business characteristics that influence the number of members of the board of directors, their independence, and the duality of the chief executive officer (CEO). The study sample consisted of 162 financial and nonfinancial companies listed on the Brazilian stock market B3 between 2010 and 2014. It was noted that larger, less indebted, and growth-oriented companies have more members on their board. Holdings, older, less profitable companies, and companies where the CEO is also a board member, had fewer independent members. More indebted companies, firms where the CEOs serve on the board, and companies with larger boards, presented more external members. Finally, smaller, and more profitable companies with fewer growth opportunities showed CEO duality.
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