The politics and economics of the Bolsonaro government: an analysis of budget capture
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Abstract
This article aims to analyze the late Bolsonaro administration from the point of view of the ability to arbitrate the distributive conflict and to govern. To do that, the 2021/2022 budget process is analyzed. The analysis focuses on political economy and politics. It starts from the assumption that the budget is the expression of distributive conflicts inherent to society and that they must be arbitrated at the cost of loss of agenda items and lack of a control of fiscal policy. The article describes how institutional and structural elements are behind the construction of credible, sustainable and effective budgets, as well as their opposites. First, a political economics analysis is carried out, followed by political science. The conclusion is that the 2021/2022 budget process is a symptom of the governance crisis, as there is evidence that there was no arbitration of the distributive conflict.
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