A democracia reduz a corrupção? Uma análise causal contrafactual entre países
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Este artigo examina o efeito causal dos níveis de democracia dos países sobre seus níveis de corrupção. As pesquisas mostram que os níveis de corrupção nos países diminuem quando atingem níveis mais altos de democracia. No entanto, a maior parte da evidência foi obtida através de estudos correlacionais ou de regressão que não esclarecem a conexão causal entre as variáveis. O presente estudo utilizou dados médios de 161 países correspondentes ao período de 2010-2019 para estimar um modelo de causalidade usando um estimador robusto (IPWRA), seguindo o referencial teórico da análise contrafactual. Os resultados indicam que existe uma relação causal, ou seja, maiores níveis de democracia nos países resultam em reduções nos níveis de corrupção.
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