Effect of common institutional ownership on tunneling: Empirical evidence from China

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Published: Aug 5, 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-759020240503
Keywords:
common institutional ownership tunneling, information advantage shareholder activism China

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Yajie Bai
Central University Of Finance And Economics, School of Economics, Beijing, China
Maoguo Wu
Shanghai University, SILC Business School, Shanghai, China

Abstract

This study examines the role of common institutional ownership (CIO) in reducing the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies. We empirically examined the influence of CIO on tunneling using a multiple regression model. The results show that CIO restrains tunneling, and the impact intensifies with an increase in CIO and a higher shareholding ratio. This effect is more pronounced in firms with poor information environments, low external supervision, non-state ownership, and a high degree of separation between ownership and control. We find that common institutional investors alleviate tunneling by using information advantage and engaging in shareholder activism. These results offer new evidence of the effect of common institutional investors on controlling shareholders’ behavior.

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How to Cite
BAI, Yajie; WU, Maoguo. Effect of common institutional ownership on tunneling: Empirical evidence from China. RAE - Revista de Administracao de Empresas , [S. l.], v. 64, n. 5, p. e2023–0156, 2024. DOI: 10.1590/S0034-759020240503. Disponível em: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rae/article/view/91619. Acesso em: 11 nov. 2026.
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Vol. 64 No. 5 (2024): September-October
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