Efeito da propriedade institucional comum sobre o tunneling: Evidências empíricas da China
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Este estudo examina o papel da propriedade institucional comum (PIC) na redução do comportamento de tunneling dos acionistas controladores em empresas chinesas listadas em bolsa. Utilizando um modelo de regressão múltipla, a influência da PIC no tunneling é examinada empiricamente. Os resultados mostram que a PIC restringe o tunneling, e o impacto se intensifica com o aumento da PIC e um índice de participação acionária mais alto. Esse efeito é mais acentuado em empresas com ambientes de informações deficientes, baixa supervisão externa, propriedade não estatal e um alto grau de separação entre propriedade e controle. Descobrimos que os investidores institucionais comuns aliviam o tunneling usando a vantagem da informação e participando do ativismo dos acionistas. Esses resultados oferecem novas evidências sobre o efeito dos investidores institucionais comuns no comportamento dos acionistas controladores.
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