Transparência dos governos subnacionais: o impacto da desigualdade na transparência

Conteúdo do artigo principal

Gustavo Andrey de Almeida Lopes Fernandes
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8281-390X
Ivan Filipe Fernandes
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4236-4393
Marco Antonio Carvalho Teixeira
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3298-8183

Resumo

Quais são os efeitos das instituições informais extrativas no processo de accountability horizontal numa democracia em desenvolvimento? Este artigo apresenta evidências sobre os efeitos nocivos das instituições informais extrativistas na accountability horizontal dos governos subnacionais no Brasil. Após três décadas de eleições livres e competitivas, o desenho institucional das instituições de fiscalização dos governos estaduais praticamente não mudou. Exploramos a hipótese de que instituições informais mais extrativas, medidas pelo nível de desigualdade de renda, estão associadas a níveis decrescentes de transparência. Dada a sua extensa diversidade social, política e econômica, inserida num quadro institucional formal centralizado, o Brasil oferece um cenário apropriado para testar a hipótese de que as instituições informais extrativas responsáveis pelo aumento da desigualdade de rendimentos podem minar a accountability horizontal nas novas democracias.

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Fernandes, G. A. de A. L., Fernandes, I. F., & Teixeira, M. A. C. (2023). Transparência dos governos subnacionais: o impacto da desigualdade na transparência. Revista De Administração Pública, 57(6), e2023–0025. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-761220230025
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