Transparency of subnational governments: the impact of inequality on transparency
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Abstract
What are the effects of extractive informal institutions on the horizontal accountability process in a developing democracy? This paper presents evidence about the harmful effects of extractive informal institutions on horizontal accountability within subnational governments in Brazil. After three decades of free and competitive elections, the institutional design of oversight institutions for state governments has hardly changed. We explore the hypothesis that more extractive informal institutions, measured by the level of income inequality, is associated with decreasing transparency levels. Given its extensive social, political, and economic diversity embedded in an overall centralized formal institutional framework, Brazil provides an appropriate setting to test the hypothesis that extractive informal institutions responsible for increased income inequality can undermine horizontal accountability in new democracies.
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