Limits of Brazilian public accounting and control systems to address the systemic corruption problem: lessons from the Swedish and Italian cases

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Leice Maria Garcia
Armindo dos Santos de Sousa Teodósio

Abstract

This article seeks to understand the reasons for the persistence of corruption in the Brazilian federal government, despite strong public accounting and financial control systems in the country. More than two-thirds of the states in the world, including Brazil, face the challenge of plundering public finances by political, economic, and bureaucratic elites. In this context, the exclusive use of the dominant approach of economic theories for the structuring of public control systems is limited. It is more appropriate to consider corruption as a problem of collective action. Hence, the theoretical reference chosen includes Bourdieu’s theory of practice and Tocqueville’s and Ostrom’s collective action theories, as they have been understood respectively by Mungiu-Pippidi and Rothstein. The methodological strategy adopted is an exploratory analysis of the cases of contemporary day Brazil, based on the lessons learned from the nineteenth century Sweden, and Italy in the 1990s. The results indicated that overcoming systemic corruption requires more than control systems. It demands, at least, a trigger to disrupt the perverse social imbalance, institutional capacity to offer normative effectiveness, and a cohesive and active civil society.

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How to Cite
Garcia, L. M., & Teodósio, A. dos S. de S. (2020). Limits of Brazilian public accounting and control systems to address the systemic corruption problem: lessons from the Swedish and Italian cases. Brazilian Journal of Public Administration, 54(1), 79–98. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-761220180115
Section
Papers: Thematic Issue