Unpaid commitments and loss of budgetary credibility

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André Carlos Busanelli de Aquino
Ricardo Rocha de Azevedo

Abstract

This article discusses the use of unpaid commitments and its impacts on the credibility and transparency of pu­blic finances. Based on a typification of the four types of existing carry-over in current Brazilian regulation, the article shows evidence of the emergence of a “parallel budget” in the three levels of government with regulation and external control issues. The development of the balances and enrollment of the unpaid commitments was proxied by the sum of these accounts in the Federal Government balance sheet, as well as in 26 States and the Federal District, and for 4,100 cities. Additionally, the interpretation given by the Courts of Auditors for unpaid commitments usage by governments without financial ballast was observed as well as the level of transparency given by those governments with the larger amounts of unpaid commitments. The results indicate that, besides the growing debt, the weak regulation of unprocessed unpaid commitments is seriously reducing the credibility and transparency of the budget at all levels of government.

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How to Cite
Aquino, A. C. B. de, & Azevedo, R. R. de. (2017). Unpaid commitments and loss of budgetary credibility. Brazilian Journal of Public Administration, 51(4), 580–595. Retrieved from https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71173
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