Allocating Power Within Agencies
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Resumo
Standard questions in the theory of administrative law involve the allocation of power among legislatures, courts, the President, and various types of agencies. These questions are often heavily informed by normative commitments to particular allocations of governmental authority among the three branches of the national government. These discussions, however, are incomplete because agencies are typically treated as unitary entities. In this Article, we examine a different question: how does administrative law allocate power within agencies? Although scholars have sometimes cracked open the black box of agencies to peer inside, their insights are localized and confined to particular contexts. We will generalize the idea, attempting to show that administrative law allocates power both horizontally and vertically within agencies and offering some hypotheses about the nature of the resulting effects. Horizontally, administrative law directly or indirectly determines the relative influence within agencies of various types of professionals—lawyers, scientists, civil servants, politicians, and others. Vertically, administrative law directly or indirectly determines the relative influence within agencies of appointed agency heads, mid-level bureaucrats, and line personnel. This perspective illuminates several of the most puzzling judicially developed principles and doctrines of administrative law, including the doctrines surrounding Chenery, Chevron, Mead, and Accardi, as well as agency structures and procedures established by statute or executive order. The internal allocation perspective offered here both improves upon and critiques existing justifications for the these developments, and in that sense points the way toward a superior understanding of administrative law.
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Referências
We cite the local arguments in the appropriate places below. There is a more general literature in political science that addresses “agency design” or agency “structure and process”. For an overview, see Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333-62 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). Yet this literature for the most part treats “the agency” as a unit and asks how and why institutions such as Congress and the President impose various structural and procedural requirements on agencies. In other words, this literature (for the most part) asks how the black box should be shaped, not what lies inside it. We cite some of the exceptions to this generalization in the body of the paper.
Apologies to Ken Shepsle. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They”, Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
In an ongoing project, Anne Joseph O’Connell and her coauthors are acquiring and analyzing a mass of information about the characteristics of these stakeholders. Some of the results to date can be found in George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Measuring Loyalty and Competence of Presidential Appointees in U.S. Federal Government Agencies, 1977-2005: A Generalized Latent Trait Analysis (Apr. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Qualifications of Agency Leaders (Mar. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967) JERY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM (1978); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).
See generally HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1960) (providing a classic case study of fragmentation and efforts to overcome fragmentation in the U.S. Forest Service).
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1980).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1924).
See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). The Supreme Court has recently held that “dual for-cause” arrangements are unconstitutional. In such an arrangement, a principal officer whom the President can remove only for cause is authorized to appoint officers whom the principal officer can remove only for cause. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151-61 (2010).
U.S. 254 (1970).
See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (holding that due process does not require a hearing when an increase in property valuation applies equally to all property owners); Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing when a tax assessment sets individual property owners’ shares of costs for road improvements); Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and Due Process: The Historical Connection, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 223.
U.S. 80 (1943).
Id. at 94.
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 Yale L J. 952 (2007).
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
Stack attempts to tie the horizontal allocation effect of Chenery to the nondelegation idea by saying that Chenery reallocates power to politically accountable decisionmakers within the agency, as opposed to lawyers. Stack, supra note 14, at 993-96. But, as understood by the Supreme Court, the nondelegation doctrine requires some minimum, not of political accountability simpliciter, but of political accountability on the part of legislators, as opposed to other types of officials. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that nondelegation requires that Congress itself, not agency officials, must adopt an intelligible principle to constrain the agency’s lawmaking power). The political accountability of agency officials is neither here nor there, as far as the nondelegation doctrine is concerned. Moreover, the decisionmakers who, under Chenery, formulate agency policy before the fact need not be politically accountable appointees in any event; they may also be and usually will be scientists or other professionals or civil servants enjoying insulation from political oversight. Thus, Chenery is best understood to constrain the role of lawyers, rather than as an attempt to enforce principles of political accountability; Chenery is not necessarily or even systematically tied to political accountability in any form.
In most cases these will be appellate lawyers because relevant statutes direct petitions for review of agency action to federal courts of appeals. However, in some cases the first hearing the will occur before a district court, and in that sense trial lawyers are also covered by the Chenery principle.
See Stack, supra note 14, at 958-59.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505 (2009).
U.S. 218 (2001).
See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (1985).
U.S. 134 (1944).
Yet another approach can be seen as a precursor to Chevron. In NLRB v. Hearst Pub’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), the Court emphasized that Congress had delegated to the agency the primary task of interpreting a key statutory term. See id. at 130 (“It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation around the term ‘employee’. That task has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act.”).
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,11 (2005)
Id. at 12.
See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598-600 (2009).
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006); see also Thomas W. Merril & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (coining the term “Chevron Step Zero” before Mead was decided).
See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221(2002) (“[T]he fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through means less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due”. (citation omitted)).
U.S. 576, 586-87 (2000).
Id. at 587.
Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring).
For an introduction to and critique of feasibility analysis, see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010).
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1680-81 (2001).
S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
Id. at 1503 (quoting Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006)).
Id. at 1502-05, 1507.
Justice Breyer wrote an Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1505-06.
Id. at 1506-09.
See Masur & Posner, supra note 34, at 662.
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (advocating “modest” substantive review of administrative action on the assumption that “judges will acquire whatever technical knowledge is necessary as background for decision of the legal questions”), and Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F. 2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J.) (“[T]he necessity to review agency decisions, if it is to be more than a meaningless exercise, requires enough steeping in technical matters to determine whether the agency ‘has exercised a reasoned discretion’”. (quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970))), with Ethyl Corp., 541 F. 2d at 67 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (warning that “substantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable”).
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-35 (2007).
See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935); Miss. Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1934).
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n. 9.
Compare id. at 52 (stating that rescinding a regulation that was based on a policy conclusion requires “a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))), with id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (positing that a new administration’s shift in policymaking priorities is a “perfectly reasonable basis” for an agency to rescind a regulation).
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).
Id. at 1672.
Id. at 1632.
See id. at 1653-54.
See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 154 (1988) (arguing that agencies respond to the prospect of hard look review by “hir[ing] more lawyers and giv[ing] them more of a role in producing decisions that will withstand court scrutiny”).
Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 57, 67.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
For an overview and a collection of cases and examples, see Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009).
F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
See Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1096 n.2 (citing DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUITION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2006)).
For some recent findings suggesting that ossification is not an enormous problem, see Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. REV. 1111, 1125-31.
See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997, at 77-78 (2003); Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 684 (2006) (describing the President’s creation of the Office of Homeland Security).
See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (2009).
See Lewis, supra note 63, at 79.
Id. at 44-48, 58-59.
Id. at 91.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). President George H.W. Bush left President Reagan’s executive order in place.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2007).
Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009).
See, e.g., Cass R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002).
See supra notes 68-71.
See National Labor Relations Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2006); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Jonathan B. Rosenblum, A New Look at the General Counsel’s Unreviewable Discretion Not To Issue a Complaint Under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349 (1977).
For the place of the customs agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, see Border Security, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/files/bordersecurity.shtm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). For the Article III status of the Court of International Trade, see About the Court, U.S. CT. INT’L TRADE, http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/informational/about.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). For the Article III status of the Federal Circuit, see Court Jurisdiction, U.S. Ct. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=i44&Itemid=27 (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 565-70 (2002)
See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 264-70 (outlining the differing statutory arrangements for controlo f agency litigation).
Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies’ Programs, 52 Admin. L. REV. 1345 (2000).
Devins, supra note 77, at 166.
Barron and Kagan argue for an internal “nondelegation” principle that would reward na agency with Chevron deference only when top-level officials take responsability for the agency’s statutory interpretation. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201.
Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Thomas W. Merrill in Support of Petitioner at 14-26 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (No. 99-1434); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 29, at 837.
See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386-90 (2004).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
Id.
Id. at 240-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 258.
See Barron & Kagan, supra note 80, at 236.
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569 (2006).
See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their Own “Laws”, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for an Agency’s Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653 (1992); Note, Violations by Agencies of their Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 629 (1974).
See Merrill, supra note 88, at 570, 604.
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV 859, 873-88 (2009)
See id. at 884-86.
See id.
U.S. 497 (2007).
Id. at 532-35 (suggesting that inaction could be justified only “[i]f the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming”).
Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51.
U.S. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)).
Brief for Federal Respondent at 35, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120).
U.S. at 533-34.
Id. at 534.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 556, 557(d)91) (2006).
Id. § 5372.
Id. § 7521.
Id. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule”).
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
Id. at 492 (quoting NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 752 (2d Cir. 1950)).
Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 496.
United States v. Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409 (1941); United States v. Morgan (Morgan III), 307 U.S. 183 (1939); Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
Morgan I, 298 U.S. at 477-78.
Id. at 481.
The Universal Camera Court discussed this matter as it discussed the then-new APA provisions regarding judicial review of agency factfinding. See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 481-91.
Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 415-16.
U.S. 1 (1953).
Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of the legislative debates leading to this structure, see Seymour Scher, The Politics of Agency Organization, 15 W. POL. Q. 328 (1962).
U.S.C. § 153(d) (2006).
Id.
U.S.C. §§ 301-399ª (2006).
Id. § 334(h)(1)(A) (2006).
Id. § 334(h)(1)(B)
Id.
Exec. Order No. 13,422 § 5(b), 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2764 (Jan. 18, 2007).
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6 (a) (2), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,741 (Oct. 4, 1993).
U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
Id. § 552(a) (3).
“Deliberative privilegie” is a subset of a wider FOIA exemption: Exemption 5, which covers privileges. See id. § 552(b)(5) (providing exemption from disclosure for materials “which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency”).
See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
See Am. Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975).
See Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 869 (finding that the Department of Energy regional counsel’s memoranda were not deliberative privilege materials but werw instead agency policy).
Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980).
See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956).
Storer, 351 U.S. at 203.
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
For the hypothesis that lawyers, by training, are mare tolerant of institutional rules and procedures that yield decisions perceived to be wrong or mistaken in specific cases but yield superior outcomes in general, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-10 (2009); and Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology of Judging?, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 103 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
See, e.g., Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 141, at 149.
U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
McGarity, supra note 55, at 82.
See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004) (analyzing the significance and the judicial treatment of agency choices about how to implement policy goals).
This hypothesis is especially fragile because it is in some tension with Fred Schauer’s hypothesis that lawyers are more tolerant of rules that override what would otherwise be the best policy decision in particular cases. See SCHAUER, supra note 141, at 8-10. Needless to say, the issues here are ultimately empirical.
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1990).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447.