Command and Control: Operationalizing the Unitary Executive

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Gary Lawson

Resumo

The concept of the unitary executive is written into the Constitution by virtue of Article II’s vesting of the “executive Power” in the President and not in executive officers created by Congress. Defenders and opponents alike of the “unitary executive” often equate the idea of presidential control of executive action with the power to remove executive personnel. But an unlimitable presidential removal power cannot be derived from the vesting of executive power in the President for the simple reason that it would not actually result in full presidential control of executive action, as the actions of now-fired subordinates would still exist as law until repealed. Rather, the cleanest implication from the Article II Vesting Clause is a presidential power to nullify or veto actions by subordinates, even if those subordinates can continue to hold their congressionally created offices and draw their congressionally created salaries and benefits. 


The President likely also has the ability directly to make executive decisions, even when Congress tries to vest power in subordinates to the exclusion of the President. The Constitution’s unitary executive controls actions, not personnel. 


This view does not completely foreclose arguments for a presidential removal power, though it makes them considerably more difficult to develop. It is consistent with some, but not all, of the views expressed by Attorneys General in the first half or so of the nineteenth century, when those actors expressly thought about the President’s ability to control executive decisionmaking.

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Lawson, G. (2025). Command and Control: Operationalizing the Unitary Executive. Revista De Direito Administrativo, 284(1), 73–97. https://doi.org/10.12660/rda.v284.2025.93027
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Biografia do Autor

Gary Lawson, Boston University

William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University School of Law.

Referências

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.

See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

See id. art. III, § 1

See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.

See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 & art. II, § 1, cl. 6. John Adams famously bemoaned: “My country has contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived.” Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 19, 1793, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 459, 460 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856).

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

One could locate the power to create lower federal courts in either the Necessary and Proper Clause, see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, or the clause authorizing Congress to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” Id art. I, § 8, cl. 7.

There must be at least one Justice to constitute the “supreme Court” created by Article III, and there must be a Chief Justice to preside over presidential impeachment trials. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

Id. art. II, § 4.

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

This basic point is not always recognized even by able Attorneys General, see, e.g., Office and Duties of Attorney General, 6 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 326, 342 (1854) (Caleb Cushing) (“the Constitution and the laws give to him agents”), even when those persons were otherwise more careful about the matter. See id. at 327.

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

The Constitution might mandate the creation of a treasury because the President and federal judges must receive federal “Compensation.” Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. III, § 1. Technically, one perhaps could have compensation without a treasury. The Constitution provides only that money cannot be withdrawn from the Treasury without an appropriation, see id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, not that money can only be spent out of a treasury. But I can imagine a structural argument that requires creation of a federal treasury.

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).

See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. For more detail on the Constitution’s deferral to Congress on the structure of the federal government, see STEVEN GOW CALABRESI & GARY LAWSON, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: CREATION, RECONSTRUCTION, THE PROGRESSIVES, AND THE MODERN ERA 287-89, 381-85 (2020).

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *262 (1787). See also id. (“as the king may create new titles, so may he create new offices”). Does this mean that reorganization acts that allow the President to create new offices, such as happened with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, are unconstitutional, at least if those reorganizations are not specifically ratified by statute? Probably. It definitely means that the Attorney General cannot create an office of Special Counsel that is not created by statute. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Why Robert Mueller’s Appointment as Special Counsel Was Unlawful, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 87, 102 n.80 (2019).

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.

Id. art. III, § 1. On the significance of the “ordain and establish” language, and its relationship to the grant of power to “constitute Tribunals,” see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1025-36 (2007).

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

For the classic study of the structural differences between Article II and Article III, see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).

Id. art. II, § 3.

See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, “A Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary CONSTITUTION (2017); Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111 (2019); Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications for Self-Pardons and Non-Delegation, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 463 (2019).

I am discussing here only constitutional interpretation — that is, the ascertainment of the communicative meaning of the historically concrete document known as the Constitution. There are many other activities that one can perform regarding that document, such as normative prescription, adjudication, daydreaming, etc. I am not downplaying or questioning the value of those other activities. I am just not engaged in any of them here.

For a range of views on the scope of executive power all published in the same year, see MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING: EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (2020); SAIKRISHNA PRAKASH, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY: AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EVER-EXPANDING POWERS (2020); Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 1269 (2020).

See MCCONNELL, supra note 27, at 144-45.

Specifically, the President may subdelegate the power to execute the laws, though not necessarily other functions granted by Article II such as the commander-in-chief power or the pardon power. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 25, at 127-28. Accord: Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 OP. O.L.C. 91 (1981). Because this power to subdelegate law execution is an incident to the Constitution’s grant to the President of “[t[he executive Power,” it comes directly from the Constitution. Congressional statutes that try to limit this power of subdelegation — by, for example, requiring subdelegations to be in writing and published in the Federal Register, see 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) — are unconstitutional to the extent that they constrain rather than help “carry[] into Execution” the President’s constitutionally vested power of subdelegation. A famous opinion of an Attorney General, to be discussed later, see supra —, suggests otherwise, see Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 463, 481 (1855), but I think that is a mistake.

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 25, at 134-35.

See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE LJ. 1836 (2015).

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 19, at 136-37.

Why have the Opinions Clause at all? While it is possibly a vestige of earlier plans at the Constitutional Convention for executive councils, in the final unitary design of the executive it does serve the important function of clarifying the President’s relationship to the principal officers by foreclosing Congress from creating such officers who report only to Congress and not to the President. It is thus more a limitation on Congress than an empowerment of the President. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 30-32. Mike Rappaport independently came up with the same analysis of the clause. See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 729 n.137 (crediting Mike Rappaport with the idea).

See Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (2017).

It might also be inconsistent with historical practice, see Daniel D. Birk, Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive, 73 STAN. L. REV. 175 (2021); Christine Kexel Chabot, Interring the Unitary Executive, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 129 (2022); Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three Permissions: Presidential Removal and the Statutory Limits of Agency Independence, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2021), but, as I explain below, that is not something to which I give much weight in ascertaining the text’s communicative meaning.

It is commonplace, for example, to look at actions of the First Congress as valuable expositions on constitutional meaning. If the Constitution could speak, I think it would warn us against that practice, as the Constitution pretty obviously contemplates a Congress full of corrupt and venal gasbags. See Gary Lawson, The Constitution’s Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 399 (2009). The First Congress lived down to those expectations; its very first enactment was blatantly and obviously unconstitutional. See id. at 403-06.

The rationale for this methodological preference would require a separate article (or perhaps book), but: Persons in positions of actual power are likely to have concerns other than correctly ascertaining the Constitution’s communicative meaning. In particular, if those persons are well motivated, they are likely to be interested in constructing arrangements that will allow the government to function effectively. If they are poorly motivated, they are likely to be interested in constructing arrangements that will allow the government to function effectively (so that they can efficiently use the machinery of government to extract wealth for themselves and their favorite causes). In either case, one would expect constitutional “interpretation” to be shaped at least as much by practical attention to real-world results as to accurate ascertainment of communicative meaning. The extent to which the Constitution’s communicative meaning does in fact generate a fully functional government needs to be the conclusion of an argument rather than a premise.

A catalogue of scholars who defend this position on the basis of theory, precedent, practice, and/or policy would fell forests. For a representative sample, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Presidential Removal: The Marbury Problem and the Madison Solutions, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2085, 2088 & nn. 18-26 (2021).

A list of defenses of this position would not be as long as a list of pro-removal books and articles, but it would be long. For two really good representative works, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2014).

Robert V. Percival, Who’s In Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2488 (2011).

Jed Shugerman correctly points out that the word “all” does not appear in the Article II Vesting Clause. See --. Nor does it appear in the Article III Vesting Clause. That is because (1) the article “the” does the needed work and (2) the Constitution nowhere else vests executive power in anyone. As the cast of the Warner Bros. cartoons would say upon seeing the Article II Vesting Clause: “This is it.”

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

Id.

Who delegated “executive Power” to the President? The same hypothetical entity that delegated legislative power to Congress and judicial power to the federal courts: The “We the People” who ordained and established the Constitution in order to manage some portion of its affairs. On the significance and meaning of “We the People,” see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Are People in Federal Territories Part of “We the People of the United States”?, 9 TEX. A & M L. REV. 655 (2022).

See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L REV. 1451, 1475-76 (1997) (describing George Washington’s view of executive officials as his assistants).

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

The same reasoning explains why Congress cannot tell courts how to decide cases or authorize clerks to decide motions. See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENTARY 191 (2001). The importance of the requirement that laws under the Necessary and Proper Clause be “for carrying into Execution” federal powers was first emphasized by David Engdahl. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 75, 102-03.

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.

For a vigorous debate about the Decision of 1789, compare Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision o 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2006), with Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Indecisions of 1789, 171 U. PENN. L. REV. – (2023) (forthcoming).

See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 389 (l1789) (statement of Rep. Jackson; id. at 477 (statement of Rep. Huntington).

In all likelihood, there are lots more officers than people today think. See Jennifer Mascott, Who Are “Officers o the United States?”, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018); James C. Phillips, Benjamin Lee & Jacob Crump, Corpus Linguistics and “Officers of the United States,” 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871 (2019). But even under the strictest test for officer-dom, there are going to be several million federal employees.

See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 19, at 101-02.

See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 391 (1789) (statement of Rep. Thatcher); id. at 391-92 (statement of Rep. Jackson); id. at 393-94, 500-05 (statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 496-98 (statement of Rep. Livermore).

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 25, at 8-11.

See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 389-90 (1789) (statement of Rep. Bland); id. at 391, 473-74 (statement of Rep. White); id. at 393 (statement of Rep. Sylvester); id. at 395-96, 490-92 (statement of Rep. Gerry); id. at 509-10 (statement of Rep. Page); id. at 585-91 (statement of Rep. Stone).

See THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Hamilton).

See Shugerman, supra note 39.

See supra.

Indeed, modern procedural due process law severs the procedures for termination of a statutorily created position from the other elements of the position, including the salary and benefits. See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). This body of doctrine is not distinguished by its intellectual rigor. See Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85.

See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 724 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Michael McConnell also suggests this move. See McConnell, supra note 27, at 165-66.

U.S. 52 (1926).

See, e.g., MCCONNELL, supra note 27, at 167.

See, e.g., Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 46, at 1483 (discussing how George Washington ordered the dismissal of prosecutions).

See Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825 (2019).

See Richard W. Murphy, The DIY Unitary Executive, 63 AZ. L. REV. 439 (2021).

Umm, Andrew Johnson?

I am grateful to Christine Chabot for highlighting the negative character of the cancellation power.

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

See Murphy, supra note 66, at 450-54.

Wheaton’s glowing account of his deeds can be found at Appeal of Joseph Wheaton, Late Deputy Quarter Master General and Major of Cavalry, to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America (1820), https://www.loc.gov/resource/gdcmassbookdig.appealofjosephwh00whea/?

Id. at 24. To be fair, it was not so much a hundred eyes as two that concerned Wheaton: He thought he got screwed by the Third Auditor.

Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. LXXVI, 6 Stat. 232.

Wheaton eventually got a few hundred bucks out of Congress for his troubles. See Act of May 17, 1824, ch. LXXXV, 6 Stat. 302.

The President and Accounting Offices, 1 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 624-25 (1823).

Id. at 625, 629.

The President and Accounting Officers, 1 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 678, 678 (1824). See also The President and Accounting Officers, 1 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 705 (1825) (conclusorily repeating the same position).

See id. at 625, 628-29.

See id. at 625-28.

Wirt was highly respected as a lawyer. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 14 (1999).

See Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870);.Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121 (2014).

See id. at 131.

I am grateful to Steve Calabresi for bringing these considerations to my attention.

Decisions of Accounting Officers — to What Extent Final, 2 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 302 (1829).

See United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S.Ct. 1970 (2021).

Accounts and Accounting Officers, 2 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 463, 464 (1831). And in 1834, the 1829 decision was reaffirmed. See Accounts of General Parker and Accounting Officers, 2 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 652, 653 (1834).

Accounts and Accounting Officers, 2 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 507, 509-10 (1832).

Power of the President Respecting Pension Cases, 4 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 515 (1846).

See id. (“Considering the high constitutional duties of the President, which occupy his whole time, it requires no argument to show that he could not acquit himself, by their adequate performance, if he were to undertake to review the decisions of subordinates on the weight or effect of evidence in cases appropriately belonging to them”).

See Jurisdiction of the Accounting Officers, 5 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 630, 635-36 (1852).

See Office and Duties of Attorney General, 6 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 326, 342-44 (1854).

See id. at 339-40.

Id. at 343-44.

See Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 463 (1855).

Id. a t 465.

See id. at 460 (“by the explicit and emphatic language of the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President of the United States”).

Id. at 469-70.

Id. at 470.

See id.

See id. at 470-71.

See id. at 481.