The Administrative State, Inside Out
Barra lateral de artigos
Conteúdo do artigo principal
Resumo
In the United States, Are administrative agencies illegitimate? A threat to democracy? A threat to liberty? To human welfare? To defining constitutional commitments? Many people think so. But an understanding of the actual operation of the administrative state, seen from the inside, makes it difficult to object to “rule by unelected bureaucrats” or “an unelected fourth branch of government.” Such an understanding casts a new light on some large objections from the standpoint of democracy, liberty, and welfare; indeed, it makes those objections seem coarse and largely uninformed. What is needed is more conceptual and empirical work on welfare and distributive justice, and on how regulators can increase both.
Downloads
Detalhes do artigo
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Os autores mantêm os direitos autorais de seus artigos publicados na Revista de Direito Administrativo (RDA) e concedem à Fundação Getulio Vargas / FGV Direito Rio o direito não exclusivo de primeira publicação.
Os artigos são licenciados sob a Creative Commons Atribuição–NãoComercial–SemDerivação 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), que permite o compartilhamento do conteúdo por qualquer pessoa, desde que seja dada a devida atribuição aos autores e à publicação original, vedado o uso para fins comerciais e a realização de modificações ou obras derivadas.
Os autores assumem total responsabilidade pela originalidade e integridade de seus trabalhos, isentando a FGV Direito Rio de qualquer responsabilidade por violações de direitos de terceiros. Os artigos publicados na RDA não refletem, necessariamente, a posição institucional da Fundação Getulio Vargas.
Referências
See Deliberative Democracy (Jon Elster ed. 2012).
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn T. Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 46 (2002).
See Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum L Rev 277 (2021).
On early history, see Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379 (2017).
An essential text is Jerry Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution (2012).
See, e.g., id.; Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum L Rev 277 (2021). I am acutely aware that I am going over some large territory very briskly here.
In precisely the same sense discussed in The Invention of Tradition (Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger eds. 2012).
See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (1981), for a classic discussion.
See Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927).
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring).
Lester Ward, Plutocracy and Paternalism, 20 Forum 304-09 (November 1885), quoted in Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State 262 (1956). An excellent discussion of this period is Barbara Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Robert Hale and the First Law and Economics Movement (2001).
Robert Hale, Current Political and Economic Review, 8 Am. Bar Ass’n. J. 638 (1922).
Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 471 (1923).
Id. at 214; Robert Hale (unpublished manuscript), quoted In Barbara Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Robert Hale and the First Law and Economics Movement (2001); Hale, Current Political and Economic Review, 8 Am. Bar. Ass’n. J. at 639.
Hale, id., at 639. A similar point was made by Gerald Henderson in 1920, see Gerald Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 902 (1920).
See F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 43-45 (Bruce Caldwell, ed., 2007).
Id.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge (2021).
See Matthew Adler, Welfare and Fair Distribution (2011).
The following table and citations are reproduced from Cass R. Sunstein, On Neglecting Regulatory Benefits, 72 Admin. L. Rev. 445, 451-54 (2020). All figures represent $bn in adjusted 2020 dollars.
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit Revolution (2018).
See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers (1999).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Welfare Now, Duke L. J. (forthcoming 2023).
See generally HM Treasury, The Green Book: Central Government Guidance on Appraisal and Evaluation (2020).
See Sunstein, supra note; Matthew D. Adler, Welfare and Fair Distribution (2011).