Disappearing Commissioners
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Independent regulatory commissions are, in the face of a judicial campaign against their independence, suffering from an internal ailment that is just as serious. These mainstays of the administrative state, including the Federal Trade Commission, National Labor Relations Board, and other important regulators, are becoming one-person bands, dominated by their chairs, which in turn is leading to a rash of associate commissioner resignations.
The phenomenon of the disappearing associate commissioner threatens the very purpose of independent commissions. The trend has degraded commissioners’ ability to marshal expertise, resist the political branches’ influence, and deliberate as multi-member bodies. This Article shows how chairs and chair-supervised staff have wrested control from other commissioners; how the White House, executive agencies, and Congress have encroached on commissions’ turf; and how an increasingly partisan climate has turned deliberative discussions among commissioners into party-line votes. Leveraging data on 684 current and former commissioners on eleven key commissions, the Article then identifies, for the first time, associate commissioners’ growing propensity to exit their positions early in their terms.
These developments suggest that many of the perceived benefits of the independent-commission form fail to be fully realized. Shorter tenures erode commissions’ political insulation and collective experience and may degrade the quality of their deliberations and the signal value of dissents from commission daises. Whereas proponents of independent commissions vigorously defend the form against judicial challenges, they have failed to confront these developments that, as a functional matter, chip away at the purposes that independence is designed to serve.
To address this oversight, we offer several key prescriptions to reinvigorate commissions. Most notably, Congress should encourage associate commissioners to serve their full terms by granting them greater programmatic authority, agenda-setting power, and tiered or deferred compensation that rewards lengthy service. Through these and other changes, officials can restore commissions to their previously exalted place in the administrative state.
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Referências
See infra notes 4-11 and accompanying text for a review of these efforts.
See infra Part III.
See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1207-09 (2014).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010). Specifically, the Court held “multilevel protection from removal”—i.e., situations in which both the executive branch officer and that officer’s superior possess statutory removal protection—“is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President.” Id.
Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020).
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051-55 (2018). Because the SEC staffers, and not the commissioners themselves, selected the adjudicators, the cases that these adjudicators presided over had to be retried in some circumstances, at least if the defendant had raised the constitutional infirmity at the administrative proceeding. Id. at 2055.
United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (2021).
Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446, 449-50 (5th Cir. 2022).
See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified….”).
MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 223 (D.D.C. 2016). The Chamber of Commerce, an influential interest group, is pursuing a litigation strategy to impose similar restrictions across independent commissions. See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 912-19, 950-55 (2015) (reviewing the Chamber’s litigation efforts); WILLIAM L. KOVACS, JOSEPH M. JOHNSON & KEITH W. HOLMAN, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., CHARTING FEDERAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 9 (2015), https://www.uschamber.com/assets/archived/images/021615_fed_regs_costs_benefits_2014reportrevise_jrp_fin_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL5B-37RF] (“Independent regulatory agencies should be held to identical standards as executive branch agencies for high impact rulemakings.”).
The former Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) Director and current D.C. Circuit Judge Neomi Rao made the case for cost-benefit analysis requirements for independent agencies. Neomi Rao, Regulatory Review for Independent Agencies, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/regulatory-review-for-independent-agencies-by-neomi-rao [https://perma.cc/MWA2-35RW].
See, e.g., Christine Kexel Chabot, Interring the Unitary Executive, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 129, 132-33 (2022); Blake Emerson, Liberty and Democracy Through the Administrative State: A Critique of the Roberts Court’s Political Theory, 73 HASTINGS L.J. 371, 408-21 (2022); Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2-8; Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-33 (2017).
See infra Sections III.A-.B (discussing how associate commissioners’ shorter tenures may reduce agency expertise).
See David Zaring, Toward Separation of Powers Realism, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 708, 708 (2020) (contending that Supreme Court decisions “finding venerable parts of the administrative state … to be unconstitutional … make no real-world difference because of the modest remedies paired with those [decisions]”).
See Todd Phillips, Commission Chairs, 40 YALE J. ON REGUL. 277, 281-83 (2023).
See id.; MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 295-96 (2015).
BREGER & EDLES, supra note 16, at 350.
COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, H.R. DOC. NO. 81-116, at 5-6 (1949) (quoted in BREGER & EDLES, supra note 16, at 295).
BREGER & EDLES, supra note 16, at 295.
Id.
Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 297. To be sure, the relative power of chairs ebbs and flows. See, e.g., Revisions to Rules of Practice, 86 Fed. Reg. 38542, 38543 (July 22, 2021) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 0, 1) (authorizing the chair, rather than the agency’s chief administrative law judge, to select the person who will oversee a rulemaking).
See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 16, at 297.
Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 95 (1987) (describing the importance of similar agenda-setting power held by chairs of congressional committees).
See Phillips, supra note 15, at 280-81.
See id.
COMM’N ON ENERGY & COM., DECEPTION AND DISTRUST: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER CHAIRMAN KEVIN J. MARTIN 2-3, 20 (2008), http://jerrykang.net/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/2011/10/cache-lh_-fcc-majority-staff-report-081209a.pdf [https://perma.cc/F45B-33M4].
See, e.g., Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950 § 1(a)(1), 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (May 25, 1950) (transferring to the SEC’s Chair “the executive and administrative functions of the Commission, including functions of the Commission with respect to (1) the appointment and supervision of personnel employed under the Commission”).
See, e.g., James J. Park & Howard H. Park, Regulation by Selective Enforcement: The SEC and Initial Coin Offerings, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99-101 (2020); CTR. FOR CAP. MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 14 (2015), https://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/021882_SEC_Reform_FIN1.pdf [https://perma.cc/624W-SM6X].
See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, supra note 28.
5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (2018). The Act also covers certain other multimember entities within the federal government. The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to apply only to when multiple commissioners “deliberate[] upon matters that are within … [their] formally delegated authority to take official action.” FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 472 (1984).
BREGER & EDLES, supra note 16, at 320.
Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1140, 1145 (2001).
Id. at 1146.
See id. at 1147 n.31 (collecting citations regarding the shift from adjudication to rulemaking in many agencies during the 1960s and 1970s); J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 (1974) (declaring that “[a]dministrative law has entered an age of rulemaking”).
See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 851-52 (2006); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997).
See John Aldrich & David Rohde, The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 269, 271-72 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
Id.
See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 972-73 (2013).
16 C.F.R. § 3.52(b) (2023).
See id. §§ 3.52(b)-(h).
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Acting Chairwoman Slaughter Announces New Rulemaking Group (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/03/ftc-acting-chairwoman-slaughter-announces-new-rulemaking-group [https://perma.cc/4SBM-5TCR].
See 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also 15 U.S.C. § 57a (FTC Act provision outlining additional requirements for rulemakings concerning unfair practices). These requirements are in addition to the section 553 requirements. Id. § 57a(b)(1).
See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
See Phillips, supra note 15, at 286-88. One can reasonably assume the existence of some slack in the principal-agent relationship between commission chairs and staff. See generally Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873 (2007) (discussing slack between appointees and civil servants).
See Phillips, supra note 15, at 288 (“Simply as a matter of disparate resources, commission chairs direct staff to draft regulations that adhere to their visions while associate commissioners are left to negotiate textual changes to their chairs’ documents.”).
See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
As we discuss in Section III.D infra, a second shift is now underway: from rulemakings to “regulation by enforcement.” This more recent trend has not militated against the empowerment of chairs. That is because regulation by enforcement enables commission chairs, in concert with their chosen enforcement division heads, to set policy in a way that cuts out the role of associate commissioners.
Figure calculated by authors from subdelegations dataset. See generally Brian D. Feinstein & Jennifer Nou, Submerged Independent Agencies, 171 U. PA. L. REV. 945 (2023) (describing these data).
49 C.F.R. § 800.24(i) (2021).
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS 183 (2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2020/pdf/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP8R-LHSV] (noting that the NTSB general counsel is a career appointment). For other subdelegations, the relevant commission and its internal subdelegated exercise concurrent authority over a subject. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) to issue regulations for “real-time public reporting” of swaps transactions. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13). To prevent evasion of these regulations, Congress also empowered the CFTC to classify transactions as swaps even when no derivatives clearing organization has done so. Id. § 2(h)(4)(B). In 2013, the CFTC subdelegated several of these powers—e.g., the power to determine new swap categories—to the director of the commission’s Division of Market Oversight. Procedures to Establish Appropriate Minimum Block Sizes for Large Notional Off-Facility Swaps and Block Trades, 78 Fed. Reg. 32866, 32940 (May 31, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 43.7(a)). Although the commissioners retained concurrent authority to make these determinations, the division director’s determinations also are binding. See Feinstein & Nou, supra note 49, at 962 (explaining when agency employees’ decisions become judicially enforceable under the Accardi doctrine).
Indeed the heightened propensity for appointees to subdelegate when their views are aligned with agency civil servants’ views, as well as the greater frequency of subdelegations during the “midnight” period leading up presidential transitions, both suggest that current appointees may intentionally subdelegate to civil servants as means of disempowering subsequent appointees. See Brian D. Feinstein & Jennifer Nou, Strategic Subdelegation, 20 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 746, 781 (2023). The disempowered individuals naturally include future associate commissioners.
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267-68 (1954). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569 (2006) (discussing the Accardi doctrine, which requires agencies to follow their own rules, including rules concerning subdelegations of authority).
Michael O’Rielly, Delegated Authority: Serious Objections and Solutions, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N: FCC BLOG (Feb. 2, 2015, 3:47 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2015/02/02/delegated-authority-serious-objections-and-solutions [https://perma.cc/S4QA-WXWW].
See discussion supra Section I.A.1; see also BREGER & EDLES, supra note 16, at 295-96 (explaining that a chair of an agency operates as the agency’s chief executive as well as its administrative officer).
5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1).
Id. § 801(a)(1)-(b)(2).
For a discussion of how the presidential power to remove disloyal appointees compels their fealty to presidential priorities, see Rao, supra note 3, at 1244.
See Act of June 30, 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-24, 135 Stat. 296 (disapproving an OCC rule defining the circumstances under which certain financial institutions are considered to be lenders); Act of June 30, 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-22, 135 Stat. 294 (disapproving the EEOC’s conciliation procedures); Act of May 21, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-172, 132 Stat. 1290 (disapproving the CFPB’s auto-lending rule); Act of Nov. 1, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (disapproving the CFPB’s arbitration-agreement rule).
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612.
Id. § 611.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520.
Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988).
Id. § 1(b).
Id. § 2.
See Deborah Solomon, Paulson Pulls for U.S. Markets, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116156338980900442 (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
See id. (“The Working Group is a significant lever to influence policies outside the Treasury’s bailiwick.”).
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Releases Report and Recommendations on Stablecoins (Nov. 1, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0454 [https://perma.cc/LW3M-Z2HC]; PRESIDENT’S WORKINGGRP. ON FIN. MKTS., PROPOSALS TO REDUCE PRIME MMFS VULNERABILITIES 1 (2021), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/221/TBACCharge2Q32021.pdf [https://perma.cc/67YU-2LHM].
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5374.
Id. § 5321(b).
See id. § 5323(a)-(b) (voting rules to subject nonbanks to Federal Reserve supervision). But see id. § 5331(a) (requiring a two-thirds supermajority but not the Treasury Secretary’s assent to take actions to mitigate a bank holding company’s grave threats to financial stability).
See Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative Process,
65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 699 (2013) (asserting that the Secretary’s role on FSOC constitutes “an attempt to add political control”).
Hiba Hafiz, Interagency Coordination on Labor Regulation, 6 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 199, 209-12 (2021).
Id. at 217-20 (Obama); id. at 220-21 (Trump).
Id. at 220-21.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5322 (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council).
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 27, 1974) (establishing the Council on Wage and Price Stability).
See Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 825-26 (2015) (providing examples).
Bijal Shah, Executive (Agency) Administration, 72 STAN. L. REV. 641, 646, 713-16 (2020).
See id. at 646-47.
For an example of this sort of advocacy, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (“[A]ny decision not to quantify costs and benefits, or to show that the latter justify the former, does require some kind of explanation….”).
See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195-96 (Feb. 17, 1981) (establishing OIRA review of executive agencies’ proposed rules); Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9340 (Jan. 30, 2017) (issuing most recent executive order on the subject).
See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-51 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Chamber of Com. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142-44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 242 (D.D.C. 2016) (concluding that the MetLife designation “decision intentionally refused to consider the cost of regulation, a consideration that is essential to reasoned rulemaking”).
In Biden v. Nebraska, the Court invoked the major questions doctrine in response to the “economic and political significance” of a $430 billion student debt relief plan, holding that the HEROES Act used to justify the plan “provides no authorization for the Secretary’s plan even when examined using the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation—let alone ‘clear congressional authorization’ for such a program.” Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2023) (providing that agencies who adopt regulations of such significance must point to clear congressional authorization to do so).
Justice Gorsuch advocated that the rarely used nondelegation doctrine should be reinvigorated in a dissent joined by two other Justices, noting that the “doctrine [operates] in service of the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring that power to an executive agency,” requiring that a “statutory gap” not be filled where it “concerns ‘a question of deep economic and political significance.’” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015)). Justice Alito wrote in a concurrence that he would be open to a reconsideration of the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 2130-31 (Alito, J., concurring). And Justice Kavanaugh, who did not vote in Gundy, wrote elsewhere that “Justice Gorsuch’s thoughtful Gundy opinion raised important points that may warrant further consideration in future cases.” Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019). For a discussion, see Zaring, supra note 14, at 720.
For instance, in West Virginia v. EPA, a case concerning the EPA’s power to encourage power plants to shift away from coal toward wind and solar, the Court explained that “in certain extraordinary cases … something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary” to permit a new agency to go forward. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022). In the case of EPA, the policy was to encourage power providers to switch away from coal and toward gas and renewable energy. Id. at 2602-03. To do so, “[t]he agency instead must point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the power it claims.” Id. at 2609 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)); see also supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases concerning for-cause removal of independent commissioners).
Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independent-agencies-sometimes-in-name-only. html (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (“[T]he S.E.C. has in recent years splintered into factions far more than ever before.”); see also Floyd Norris, Help Wanted at the S.E.C.; Help Needed for Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/13/business/help-wanted-atthe-sec-help-needed-for-reforms.html (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (reporting that the Commission’s deliberations concerning selecting the first chair of the newly established Public Company Accounting Oversight Board “dissolved into partisan bickering” and that this “squabbling and lack of cooperation … spill[ed] over to other commission matters”).
Leah Nylen, “Unlike Anything I’ve Seen at the FTC”: Biden’s Chair Makes Her Public Debut, POLITICO (July 1, 2021, 8:49 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/01/ftc-lina-khanantitrust-chair-497764 [https://perma.cc/A222-LYX7].
See John M. Broder & Matthew L. Wald, Report Blasts Management Style of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/science/earth/11nuclear.html (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (reporting allegations that the NRCchair “exhibit[ed] complete disregard for … bipartisan collaboration” (quoting Illinois Representative John Shimkus)); Matthew L. Wald, Split Within Nuclear Regulatory Agency, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/science/earth/21nuke.html (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (similar).
Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Faces a New Set of Challenges After Powell, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/24/business/media/fcc-faces-a-new-set-of-challenges-after-powell.html (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
Andrew Martin, After Long Battle, Safer Cribs, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/with-new-safety-rules-for-cribs-makers-scramble-and-retailers-fume.html (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
See David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage, 120 MICH. L. REV. 753, 756-58 (2022); Jody Freeman & Sharon Jacobs, Structural Deregulation, 135 HARV. L. REV. 585, 587-90 (2021).
See MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 2-11 (2009); see also Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel A. Abrams & Jeremy C. Pope, Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings, 70 J. POL. 556, 557 (2008) (describing greater partisan polarization among political elites than the general public).
See Brian D. Feinstein & M. Todd Henderson, Congress’s Commissioners: Former Hill Staffers at the S.E.C. and Other Independent Regulatory Commissions, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. 175, 234-35 (2021).
Id.
Id. at 235.
See Patrick Temple-West, Warren Allies Delay Obama’s SEC Pick, POLITICO (July 7, 2015, 5:17 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/barack-obama-elizabeth-warren-sec-wall-street-119780 [https://perma.cc/AH5E-BUWB] (“Elizabeth Warren and her liberal allies appear to be on the verge of another victory in their battle to stop the White House from choosing financial regulators with ties to Wall Street.”); see also Burgess Everett, Controversial Judicial Pick Asks Biden to Withdraw After Failing to Win Dem Support, POLITICO (May 18, 2023, 12:36 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/18/biden-admin-expected-to-withdraw-controversial-judicial-pick-00097665 [https://perma.cc/27YV-AQRY] (explaining President Biden recently withdrew his judicial nomination for Michael Delaney after opposition from democrats due to Delaney’s position as a board member for the New England Legal Foundation, a probusiness organization that opposes progressive ideals on labor rights, climate change, and consumer protection in favor of corporate interests). Moreover, “Congress actively discourages private-sector views on the National Credit Union Administration, where ‘[n]ot more than one’ out of the three board members may hail from a credit union.” Feinstein & Henderson, supra note 95, at 183 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b)(2)(B)).
Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 18, 31 (2018).
See id. at 39-57.
See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
These commissions are: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRS”); CPSC; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); FCC; Federal Election Commission (“FEC”); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”); FTC; National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”); NRC, along with its predecessor the Atomic Energy Commission; National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”); and SEC.
David C. Nixon, ICPSR #4221—‘Independent Regulatory Commissioner Database, 1887-2000,’INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & SOC. RSCH. (Sept. 25, 2007), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/4221 [https://perma.cc/4D7G-H3AU].
Our dataset can be found here: Brian D. Feinstein & David Zaring, ResearchBox # 2075 ‘Disappearing Commissioners,’ RESEARCHBOX, https://researchbox.org/2075 [https://perma.cc/72PF-73VD] [hereinafter Disappearing Commissioners Dataset]. For each individual, we record the years in which they entered and left service as a commissioner, the number of consecutive Years of service, and whether they served as chair at the time of their departure. For the fifteen commissioners that served nonconsecutive terms, each nonconsecutive term had its own row in the dataset.
Disappearing Commissioners Dataset, supra note 104.
Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent Codebook [hereinafter Selin, Codebook], https://my.vanderbilt.edu/davidlewis/files/2018/07/selin_indep_codebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/92W5-TAKA]. See generally Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (2015) [hereinafter Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?] (developing estimates of agency independence using collected data). For CPSC commissioners, Commission terms begin to run “from the date of the expiration of the term for which [the commissioner’s] predecessor was appointed.” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(b)(1)(B).
Notionally, our study runs until 2022. Because we exclude currently serving commissioners, however, the end date for each agency refers to the date of the last commissioner departure prior to our data collection in early 2022. This year is earlier than 2021 for most commissions.
Includes members of the predecessor Atomic Energy Commission (1946-1975).
See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 519.
Disappearing Commissioners Dataset, supra note 104.
Id.
Id.
For chairs, regressing length of service on the year in which the individual began serving on the commission yields null results. For associate commissioners, the coefficient estimate is negative and statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level (β = 0.024, SE = 0.007). With R2 = 0.02, however, the year in which an associate commissioner began service explains little of the variance in those individuals’ lengths of service.
Readers may wonder whether the overrepresentation of members of the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) Board of Governors early in this series skews our results. When the Fed was established in 1914, governors served ten-year fixed terms. Congress extended that term to twelve years in 1933 and to fourteen years in 1935. 12 U.S.C. § 241; see also The Federal Reserve System After Fifty Years: Hearings on H.R. 3783, H.R. 9631, H.R. 9685, H.R. 9686, H.R. 9687, and H.R. 9789 Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 88th Cong. 26 (1964) (statement of William McChesney Martin, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board and C. Canby Balderston, Vice Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/house/1964_house_fed50_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6LK-GSZB] (explaining the historical changes to term limits for the Board reflect its independence from politics). In practice, Fed governors serve substantially less than this ten-to-fourteen-year ceiling: 6.6 years on average. With the Fed overrepresented in the earliest decades in our dataset (before other agencies were established) and with the maximum length of service for Fed governors substantially longer than that for other commissioners, however, one may ask whether the preponderance of Fed governors early in our dataset drives our results.
This concern is unfounded. Reproductions of Figures 1 through 3 without the Federal Reserve appear substantially similar after approximately 1930. Notably, the downward trend in recent decades apparent in Figures 1 and 3 remain intact. Table 3 and the Appendix figures show that this downward trend is present in many agencies beyond the Fed.
Disappearing Commissioners Dataset, supra note 104. Differences in means and associated t-statistics calculated using Welch’s two-sample t-test. *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10.
We include the FEC among these eight. Although the FEC has seen a slight uptick in commissioner term lengths in recent decades, the overall trend since the 1980s has been a substantial decline.
Disappearing Commissioners Dataset, supra note 104.
Further, statutory provisions providing for staggered terms reduce the likelihood that commissions are left with unexperienced leadership. When commissioners serve their entire terms, vacancies do not persist, and terms are staggered—e.g., for a five-member commission with five-year terms, one commissioner is replaced each year—there will always be someone on the commission who knows their way around the agency serving in the final year of their term. As commissioners leave their terms earlier and earlier, however, the amount of expertise at the top will also decline, as few commissioners serve out their terms sufficiently long enough to build the wealth of experience to be bequeathed to their juniors.
Notably, corporate lawyers often cite the risk of short-termism as a justification for staggered boards, which are structured like commissions, with staggered terms for directors. See, e.g., Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment, and Innovation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 2027, 2046-47 (2015) (recommending “insulating directors from shareholder pressure so they can credibly commit to a long-term investment strategy”); Richard H. Koppes, Lyle G. Ganske & Charles T. Haag, Corporate Governance out of Focus: The Debate over Classified Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1028 (1999) (“[C]lassified boards, at least in major U.S. companies, are more likely used to promote the stability necessary for strategic, long-term planning.”); cf. William C. Johnson, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Sangho Yi, The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 329-30 (2015) (showing that antitakeover defenses, such as a staggered board, may provide a valuable commitment from shareholders to other stakeholders in the context of specific relationships).
See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 786, 790 (2013) (reporting that twenty-three agencies contain both features and thirty-three additional agencies have statutorily specified tenures but not removal protections).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (“[T]he terms of office of … [SEC] commissioners first taking office after June 6, 1934, shall expire as designated by the President at the time of nomination, one at the end of one year, one at the end of two years, one at the end of three years, one at the end of four years, and one at the end of five years, after June 6, 1934.”).
See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 29 (2010) (“Giving agency officials tenure for a term of years can also foster expertise, as agency heads gain wisdom from their experience on the job. The terms must be sufficiently long to allow agency heads to gain the relevant experience. And in the case of multimember agencies, the terms of the members must be staggered so that institutional expertise can accumulate without gaps.” (footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935) (describing a “[c]ongressional intent to create a body of experts”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 612 (2010) (“Independence was traditionally justified, particularly during the New Deal era, as promoting expertise.”).
S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 10-11 (1914).
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 206 U.S. 441, 454 (1907) (referring to the members of the Interstate Commerce Commission as “appointed by law and informed by experience”).
See Barkow, supra note 123, at 27-28 (“Empirical studies on when Congress opts for good-cause provisions support the view that this design feature seems largely aimed at stopping presidential pressure in particular and not necessarily at preventing interest group or partisan influence in general.”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259-60 (asserting that agency independence “is based largely” on for-cause removal protection, fixed terms, and partisan balance requirements).
See Barkow, supra note 123, at 38-40.
See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111 (1992) (describing this condition).
See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 459 (2008). Devins and Lewis also find that, following a presidential transition, commissioners who share the new President’s party stay at their posts until eleven months before their fixed term ends on average, whereas opposition-party commissioners remain in their positions until four-and-a-half months before their term ends on average. Id. at 472. That difference suggests that opposition-party commissioners serving on commissions with partisan-balance requirements strategically delay their departures to push back the date on which the President’s party will hold a majority of seats. This partisan difference in commissioner turnover complicates, but does not negate, our basic claim that more frequent turnover yields greater agency responsiveness to the President.
Barkow, supra note 123, at 24.
Datla & Revesz, supra note 121, at 820. For regulatory commissions with statutory removal protection, they explain, “the President will be faced with at least some holdover appointees and will not be able to exert influence” until their terms expire. Id.
51 CONG. REC. 10376 (1914) (quoted in Barkow, supra note 123, at 24).
12 U.S.C. § 241.
Barkow, supra note 123, at 24; Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 348 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
For a biographical account of how experience in bureaucracies can be leveraged to influence outcomes, see generally BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY (2008).
See, e.g., John M. Carey, Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell & Gary F. Moncrief, The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 105, 124 (2006).
See supra Section I.A.1.
See Verkuil, supra note 127, at 260-61 (asserting that because appellate panels with multiple judges “promise[] greater accuracy (and thereby fairness) because of the dialectical nature of the deliberative process,” so too should multimember agencies).
See Sharon B. Jacobs, Administrative Dissents, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 587-92 (2017) (explaining that dissents can improve majority’s reasoning); id. at 578-79 (detailing separate statements’ fire alarm function); Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 99, at 73 (similar).
Ganesh Sitaraman & Ariel Dobkin, The Choice Between Single Director Agencies and Multimember Commissions, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 726 (2019).
Id. at 723.
Opponents of the revolving door posit that “‘capture’ theory arises out of concerns with the revolving door between industry and regulators, or regulators who over time become too cozy with the industry they are supposed to monitor.” William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1609 n.223 (2007).
See Feinstein & Henderson, supra note 95, at 184-86, 193.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (setting out the requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking).
See Brian D. Feinstein, Identity-Conscious Administrative Law: Lessons from Financial Regulators, 90 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2022) (summarizing this argument).
See Brian D. Feinstein & Abby K. Wood, Divided Agencies, 95 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 778-79 (2022).
See supra Section III.B; see also Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1989) (“A fire alarm converts the oversight job of a politician from active monitor to reactive servant of affected constituencies…”); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166, 175 (1984) (noting “Congress’s … preference for fire-alarm oversight [which] entails a preference for command-and-control regulatory policy”).
See, e.g., Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski, Democratizing Rule Development, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 793, 843 (2021) (“Enhancing public engagement with agenda setting and rule development will lend greater democratic accountability and legitimacy to policymaking than other remedies for the administrative state’s ‘democracy deficit.’”); Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2011) (“Na agency’s public proposal of a rule and acceptance of public comment prior to issuing the final rule can help us view the agency decision as democratic and thus essentially selflegitimating.”); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 60, 67 (2000) (asserting, in a discussion of notice and comment, that “involvement in a process enhances perceptions of legitimacy among participants, independently of whether outcomes ultimately favor [them]”).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34, 43 (1983).
See Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 734-35 (2016).
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 959 n.180 (2008).
For an explanation of why a rule takes a long time to promulgate—the time from start to finish lasts between forty-seven and ninety-five months on this account, see Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 86, 93 (2011) (testimony of Sidney A. Shapiro, Univ. Distinguished Chair in L., Wake Forest Univ. Sch. of L.). For a classic discussion of the ossification of rulemaking, see Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-436 (1992). Some scholars worry less about ossification than does McGarity. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1420-22 (2012) (concluding that the rulemaking remains efficient in at least some parts of the federal bureaucracy).
For a classic example of this critique, see Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REGUL. 149, 156 (1990) (“The SEC has, at times, resorted to ad hoc enforcement of the federal securities laws in particular contexts, in the absence of meaningful advance guidance (or warning) to those subject to the agency’s jurisdiction, in large measure because of the agency’s institutional fear that any specific regulations it might promulgate could prove underinclusive or susceptible of easy evasion.”). See also Donna M. Nagy, The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 133 (2015) (worrying that agencies might “entirely bypasses the rulemaking process on particularly contentious issues to formulat[e] new regulatory policy through the prosecution of enforcement cases”); Douglas C. Dreier, Note, The Lending-Limit Combination Rules: Regulation by Enforcement at the OCC, 62 DUKE L.J. 1747, 1751 (2013) (noting that financial regulators “ha[ve] received criticism for bypassing the rulemaking process and instead making policy through enforcement actions and no-action letters—in other words, for regulation by enforcement” (footnote omitted)).
James Park reviews the standard critique in James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 635 (2007).
For an example of a proponent of this sort of regulation, see generally Todd Phillips, A Change of Policy: Promoting Agency Policymaking by Adjudication, 73 ADMIN. L. REV. 495 (2021) (arguing that agencies now make policy through rulemaking and should return to the adjudication model in many cases); Cameron F. Kerry & Daniel J. Weitzner, Rulemaking and Its Discontents: Moving from Principle to Practice in Federal Privacy Legislation, BROOKINGS (June 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/06/05/rulemaking-and-its-discontents-moving-from-principle-to-practice-in-federal-privacy-legislation [https://perma.cc/2S3U-DNWA] (stating a “preference for adjudication over rulemaking reflected a conscious choice to err on the side of flexibility”).
See Roger L. Martin, Yes, Short-Termism Really Is a Problem, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
See, e.g., Ivan Marinovic & Felipe Varas, CEO Horizon, Optimal Pay Duration, and the Escalation of Short-Termism, 74 J. FIN. 2011, 2011 (2019).
See id. Delaware corporate lawyers have expressed concerns in the past that underinsulated boards might produce “excessive management short-termism.” Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 734, 745-47 (2007). Along these lines, “[w]hile some Delaware cases have indicated that boards of directors should act in the long-term interests of their firms, these cases provide that boards have the discretion to determine the time horizons for their decisions which means that they can readily engage in short-termism without fear of liability.” Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 357 (2012).
See Dallas, supra note 159, at 357.
This is also thought to be a problem for corporate oversight. “The officer or director has ‘IBG, YBG’ (‘I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone’) in the back of his mind, especially given the frequency of job-hopping among executives.” Colin Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1291 n.134 (2009).
An analogy might be drawn to the similarly short windows faced by officials appointed to lead agencies in an acting capacity (for example, if the original appointee retires or is fired). “Commentators worry that the lack of confirmed officials contributes to agencies progressing slowly with important initiatives and employing unhappy workers.” Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 695 (2020).
See supra Part III.
See supra Sections III.A-.B.
As we have observed, short tenures empower political oversight and could even lead to the decline of the independent agency project, a project that some—though not us—believe has unduly interfered with executive power. For a relatively extreme version of this critique, see generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2011).
12 U.S.C. § 242.
Id. § 136(a).
See, e.g., Erin McDowell, 15 Jobs That May Seem Off-Putting but Pay Surprisingly Well, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2020, 10:45 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/dirty-and-dangerous-jobsnobody-wants-how-much-they-pay-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/8LZ2-MQVV] (noting that workers holding unusually dangerous jobs sometimes receive wage premia).
Brian Klaas, Golden Handcuffs: Getting Dictators to Exit, GLOBALIST (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.theglobalist.com/golden-handcuffs-getting-dictators-to-exit [https://perma.cc/W8U4-CDRH]; 1 MARVIN HYMAN, CORPORATION FORMS § 12:53 (2023), Westlaw CORPFORMS (“[G]olden handcuffs serve to keep key employees tied to the company for a fixed number of years.”). As Richard Lazarus has put it, “[p]olitical scientists, philosophers, scientists, and economists refer to such self-imposed restraints on future behavior as ‘precommitment’ strategies.” Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1195 (2009).
18 U.S.C. § 207(d).
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1671 (2015).
See Devins & Lewis, supra note 130, at 474.
See O’Connell, supra note 172, at 1652, 1661 (reporting a nomination failure rate of 18.8 percent for cabinet officials and 30.5 percent for independent regulatory commissioners during the period from 1981 to 2014).
For a discussion of how precommitment strategies operate, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1117 (2000).
See generally Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 11 (1993) (discussing credible commitment problems in governance).
Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684, 704 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 242).
See Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence, 32 YALE J. ON REGUL. 257, 308-10 (2015).
As Andrew Kean Woods has put it, “[e]xpressive commitments can be reputationally costly because they are made to a large audience, and are seen as broadly characteristic of the actor making the expression, putting the actor’s reputation on the line.” Andrew Keane Woods, The Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2018).
See Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
Indeed, this Article is the first to observe associate commissioners’ increasingly early exits. Although several scholars have discussed a single one of these elements in isolation, see, for example, Phillips, supra note 15, at 312-13 and Shah, supra note 79, at 684-85, none has grappled with how they combine in ways that are greater than the sum of their parts.