Constructing the Digital Regulatory Ecosystem: Agency Collaboration
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The United States is entering a new phase of digital regulation, marked by bipartisan support for increased oversight of major online platforms. This essay argues that the central challenge is not merely expanding regulatory authority, but fostering effective collaboration among federal agencies. Because digital harms—ranging from competition and privacy to labor and corporate power—are systemic and cross-cutting, siloed regulatory approaches are inadequate. The prevailing model of interagency cooperation, based on ad hoc memoranda of understanding, lacks the stability and coherence required for this task. The essay contends that Congress should establish a more durable digital regulatory ecosystem by imposing structured, statutory duties of interagency collaboration.
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Referências
SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L., H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2020); Hearing on Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017).
Fed. Trade Comm’n., Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, Hearing No. 12: The FTC’s Approach to Consumer Privacy 131 (Apr. 10, 2019).
See, e.g., American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. (2021-2022); American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2021-2022); Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act of H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. (2021); Open App Markets Act, S. 2710, 117th Cong. (2021-2022); American Data Privacy and Protection Act, H.R. 8152, 117th Cong. (2022) (proposing omnibus federal privacy law); CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM., COUNTERING DISINFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2021) (noting more than 40 bills were introduced in the 117th Congress referencing “disinformation” or “misinformation,” an issue often intertwined with digital platform regulation).
The term “regulatory state” has been used to refer to “the collection of federal government laws and institutions that determine significant aspects of social and economic policy.” LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE, preface (3rd ed. 2019). This essay coins the more specific term the “digital regulatory state” to refer to the subset of those laws and federal agencies with regulatory responsibility in the digital economy.
Authors for this edition of the Virginia Journal of Law & Technology were prompted to frame the main challenges facing regulators in their fields.
In the interest of space, this short essay focuses on federal regulation, though equally pressing concerns exist around state-level interagency collaboration, and state/federal interactions.
Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 (2011) (“administrative law scholarship has tended to contemplate agencies in isolation from each other, subject only to the control of Congress, the President, and the courts.”); Verity Winship, Enforcement Networks, 37 YALE J. REG. 274, 330 (2020) (noting policy and academic debates often depict agencies as siloed “in solitary pursuit of their own statutory mandates.”).
Bradley, supra note 7, at 747 (“Traditionally, administrative agencies have been conceptualized as roughly independent actors, formulating and executing policy in their own domains”); Winship supra note 7, at 276 (“While agencies have relied on networks for decades, the study of coordinated agency action has been slow to catch up”).
Bradley, supra note 7, at 748.
Id. at 746.
Winship supra note 7, at 276 (“Agencies do not work alone, but in fact exercise power via networks, in tandem with other federal and state agencies as well as foreign powers.”).
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARVARD L. REV. 1131, 1155 (2012).
See, e.g., Digital Platform Commission Act of 2022, S. 4201, 117th Cong. (2022); Digital Platform Commission Act of 2022, H.R. 7858, 117th Cong. (2022) (proposing the creation of a new digital regulatory agency); see also STIGLER CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS FINAL REPORT 100 (2019) https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-center.pdf (calling for the establishment of a new federal digital regulator); TOM WHEELER ET. AL., NEW DIGITAL REALITIES: NEW OVERSIGHT SOLUTIONS IN THE U.S. THE CASE FOR A DIGITAL PLATFORM AGENCY AND A NEW APPROACH TO REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 5 (2020) (same). But see American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. §4 (2022) (establishing a new Bureau within the Federal Trade Commission (an existing federal agency) to regulate “digital markets,” rather than a new agency).
See, e.g., The Online Privacy Act of 2021, H.R. 6027, 117th Cong. (2022) (proposing a new privacy regulator).
Educating Against Misinformation and Disinformation Act, H.R. 6971, 117th Cong. (2021-2022) (proposing the establishment of a new commission to “support information and media literacy education and to prevent misinformation and disinformation.”).
Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Facebook, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 34, 41 (D.D.C. 2022).
Fed. Trade Comm’n., FTC Sends Refunds to Victims of Deceptive Money-Making Schemes Involving Cryptocurrencies, Nov. 4, 2020, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/11/ftc-sends-refunds-victims-deceptive-money-making-schemes-involving-cryptocurrencies.
Complaint, In the Matter of Credit Karma, LLC (F.T.C., Sept. 1, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/2023138-credit-karma-llc.
Fed. Trade Comm’n., FTC Sues Intuit for Its Deceptive TurboTax “free” Filing Campaign, March 29, 2022, https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/1923119-intuit-inc-matter-turbotax.
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12 at 1138-39 (summarizing debate over the pros and cons of bureaucratic redundancy, which can have benefits such as insuring against single agency failures).
See Rebecca Crootof & BJ Ard, Structuring Techlaw, 34:2 HARVARD J. OF L. & TECH. 348, 364 (describing Kiel Brennan-Marquez’s helpful analogy, which is adapted here to apply to agencies).
Id.
Very recently, cryptocurrency regulation has begun to emerge as a bright spot of interagency collaboration, in contrast to the other areas of digital regulation discussed in this essay. See Exec. Order No. 14,067 on Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets, 87 Fed. Reg. 14143 §3 (March 14, 2022) (emphasizing a “whole of government” interagency approach to cryptocurrency regulation); WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM, White House Releases First-Ever Comprehensive Framework for Responsible Development of Digital Assets (Sept. 16, 2022) (describing a framework jointly developed by several federal agencies to advance the priorities identified in the Executive Order on Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets).
The term “big tech” is employed here (albeit reluctantly) because of its common usage, with the caveat that its generality can be unhelpful in certain digital policy discussions.
The National Banking Act of Feb. 25, 1863, c. 58, 12 Stat. 668.
Interstate Commerce Commission Act of Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
See generally, INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1.
Journalism Competition and Preservation Act of 2021, S.673, 117th Cong. (2022) (proposing a temporary antitrust law safe-harbor for print and print, broadcast, or digital news companies to collectively negotiate with online content distributors for content licensing).
James Niels Rosenquist, Fiona M. Scott Morton & Samuel N. Weinstein, Addictive Technology And Its Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, 100 N.C. L. REV. 431 (2022).
See, e.g., Educating Against Misinformation and Disinformation Act, H.R. 6971, 117th Cong. (2021-2022).
Trade Regulation Rule on Com. Surveillance and Data Security: A Proposed Rule by the Federal Trade Commission, 87 Fed. Reg. 51273 (Aug. 22, 2022) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. chpt. 1) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking on commercial surveillance and data security practices that harm consumers).
The lengthy list of digital concerns often includes perceived partisan bias in moderation of content, and even the facilitation of crimes such as sex trafficking. See Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S.1914, 116th Cong. (2019-2020) (prohibiting large social media companies from engaging in perceived “political bias” in moderation); Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 230).
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1184 (“[Interagency consultation] processes can force agencies to consider valuable information they might otherwise overlook, would prefer to overlook, or lack the expertise to produce themselves … [It] can help agencies to think more holistically and can help to mitigate systemic risk.”).
See, e.g., Erika M. Douglas, The New Antitrust/Data Privacy Law Interface, 130 YALE L.J. F. 647, 657-660 (2021) (discussing the under-emphasized tension between data privacy and competition).
Environmental Protection Agency, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, July 9, 1970, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/reorganization-plan-no-3-1970.html (archived announcement of the creation of the EPA and noting “the present governmental structure for dealing with environmental pollution often defies effective and concerted action.”).
Interestingly, the same council that recommended the creation of the EPA—the Ash Council on Executive Organization—also recommended that the FTC be abolished and replaced with two newly created, separate agencies: one for consumer protection and the other for antitrust law enforcement. See American Bar Association, Report of The Section of Antitrust Law on the Ash Council Report, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 220, 220-222 (1970).
See, e.g., The Online Privacy Act of 2021, H.R. 6027, 117th Cong. (2022).
See, e.g., Digital Platform Commission Act of 2022, S. 4201, 117th Cong. (2022); Digital Platform Commission Act of 2022, H.R. 7858, 117th Cong. (2022).
European Parliament Resolution of 14 March 2017 on Fundamental Rights Implications of Big Data: Privacy, Data Protection, Non-Discrimination, Security and Law Enforcement, 2018 O.J. (C 263) 1, R.
DIGITAL CLEARINGHOUSE, About, https://www.digitalclearinghouse.org/ (last visited September 20, 2022). It is fair to ask whether antitrust law (or competition law, as it is called internationally) is truly “regulatory” in nature. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998) (observing that antitrust law has taken a regulatory turn in its nature).
Giovanni Buttarelli, The Clearinghouse Gets to Work, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR (May 29, 2017), https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/blog/digital-clearinghouse-gets-work_en (“The core aim is to respond to the calls from dozens of regulators to allow a space for dialogue and to identify how their respective actions might be made more effective.”).
U.K. Competition Markets Authority (CMA), Policy Paper: Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum Launch Document (July 1, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-regulation-cooperation-forum (announcing the formation of a Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum between the U.K. competition agency, privacy agency and telecommunication agency to “support regulatory coordination in digital markets, and cooperation on areas of mutual importance.”); Opinion on Coherent Enforcement of Fundamental Rights in the Age of Big Data, EDPS Opinion 8/2016 at 15 (Sept 23, 2016) (recommending the establishment of the Digital Clearinghouse in response to “an urgent need for coherent enforcement of digital rights in all domains of law regulating online markets.”).
CMA, Decision to Accept Commitments Offered by Google in Relation to its Privacy Sandbox Proposals, Case No. 50972, Feb. 11, 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62052c52e90e077f7881c975/Google_Sandbox_pdf; U.K. Information Commissioner’s Office, ICO Statement on the Google Privacy Sandbox (Feb. 11, 2022), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/media-centre/news-and-blogs/2022/02/ico-statement-on-the-google-privacy-sandbox/.
EDPS Opinion 8/2016, supra note 42, at 15 (recommending the establishment of the Digital Clearinghouse); CMA, Policy Paper: Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum Launch Document, supra note 42, at 1(observing that “the unique challenges posed by the regulation of online platforms require an even greater level of regulatory cooperation” between the agencies than in the past).
Though it is worth noting that the FTC has participated in some Digital Clearinghouse meetings. Statement From The Third Meeting of the Digital Clearinghouse, June 21, 2018 https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-06-22_third_meeting_digital_clearinghouse_statement_en.pdf (last visited February 28, 2023) (noting FTC participation).
See, infra at B. The Essential, Inadequate Memoranda of Understanding.
See, e.g., The Online Privacy Act of 2021, H.R. 6027, 117th Cong. (2022). The creation of a new and separate privacy agency would align the U.S. with global norms, as most nations with omnibus privacy laws also have a dedicated privacy law enforcer. Other federal privacy bills would expressly vest privacy law enforcement with a new Bureau of the FTC. See, e.g., American Data Privacy and Protection Act, H.R. 8152, 117th Cong. (2022). This would replicate the cross-Bureau collaboration challenges discussed in the text above.
Digital Platform Commission Act of 2022, S. 4201, 117th Cong. §4 (2022) (establishing a digital agency that would focus its attention on the regulation of digital firms, but with a wide mandate to regulate in the “public interest,” including in the interests of consumer protection, competition, public safety and to encourage the marketplace of ideas online).
The FTC uses its general consumer protection powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act to protect data privacy, in the absence of federal omnibus privacy legislation. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598-600 (2014) (describing and labelling the emergence of a “new common law of privacy” through the FTC’s use of its authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018)).
More generally, Freeman and Rossi also observe that agencies engage in various forms of internal cooperation within and between agencies, such as “routinely exchang[ing] information and intelligence, manag[ing] jurisdictional conflicts, and work[ing] cooperatively on policy issues in ways that can be largely invisible and hard to track.” Supra note 12, at 1156.
FED. TRADE COMM’N., Bureaus & Offices, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices (last visited Feb. 20, 2023). The FTC also has a separate Bureau of Economics. Id.
The FTC was initially granted only competition powers. Its consumer protection powers were conferred later, with the passage of the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (declaring unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce …”).
See Fed. Trade Comm’n., Federal Trade Commission Annual Performance Report for 2021 and Annual Performance Plan for Fiscal Years 2022 to 2023, 4-7 (annual goals and performance metrics). Note, however, that one metric tracks the number of investigations or cases in which evidence or information was shared between the FTC and other U.S. federal, state or local agencies. Id. at 4 (metric 1.3.1).
Fed. Trade Comm’n., FTC Report to Congress on Privacy and Security 4 (Sept. 13, 2021) (emphasizing that the agency will “spend more time on the overlap between data privacy and competition.”); See also Nominations Hearing: Questions for the Record Jonathan Kanter Nominee to be Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 2 (2021) (Jonathan Kanter responses to questions from Senator Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Effective antitrust enforcement should address the full range of competitive harm in markets involving the extraction and use of data. These include, among other things, harms related to privacy, innovation, resiliency of technology infrastructure.”) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1155-1180 (cataloguing a variety of substantive and procedural forms that interagency collaboration may take in the context of environmental regulation).
Id. at 1161 (observing that MOUs are “the most pervasive instrument of coordination in the federal government”); Hiba Hafiz, Interagency Coordination on Labor Regulation, 6:4 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 203-204 (2021) (observing that, for agencies tasked with regulating labor market, the “primary means of coordinating policy and enforcement priorities are through memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and other informal mechanisms.”).
Hafiz, supra note 56, at 218 (“a significant proportion of all labor MOUs since 1970—a full 34%—were signed during the Obama administration …”); see also infra note 58.
See, FED. TRADE COMM’N., Legal Library: Cooperation Agreements, https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cooperation-agreements (last visited Feb 15, 2023) (listing a total of 53 agreements, all but seven of which are with foreign nations or other foreign entities).
See id. (listing, within the last ten years, new MOUs with the National Labor Relations Board, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Department of Veteran Affairs, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and a revised agreement with the Federal Communications Commission). Prior to this, the FTC’s domestic agency agreements were more occasional, and included agreements with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (1999), the Food and Drug Administration (1971), and the Federal Communications Commission (dating to at least 2003). Id.; The Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (the other U.S antitrust enforcer along with the FTC) has also reached several recent MOUs, including with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2020, and with both the Department of Labor and National Labor Relations Board in 2022. Memorandum of Understanding between the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission Relative to Cooperation with Respect to Promoting Competitive Conditions in the Securities Industry (June 22, 2020); Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Labor (March 20, 2022); Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Labor Relations Board (July 26, 2022).
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1192 (“Nonbinding agreements such as MOUs are highly valuable because of their relative informality, ease of enactment, and adaptability.”).
Id. at 1161 (“… [T]here appears to be no generally applicable statutory or executive branch policy regarding the use of MOUs, leaving their content largely to the discretion of the agencies.”).
See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission Relative to Cooperation with Respect to Promoting Competitive Conditions in the Securities Industry, §1-3 (June 22, 2020).
See, e.g., FCC-FTC Consumer Protection Memorandum of Understanding 2 (November 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/151116ftcfcc-mou.pdf (delineating the agencies’ position that their jurisdiction overlaps because the statutory exclusion of certain telecommunications companies from the FTC’s jurisdiction does not preclude the FTC from addressing misconduct unrelated to the carrying telecommunications signals).
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense Regarding Cybersecurity (Sept. 27, 2010), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/20101013-dod-dhs-cyber-moa.pdf.
See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Labor Relations Board 1, 4-6 (July 26, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1522096/download.
Hafiz, supra note 56, Appendix A at 240.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Labor 7 (March 20, 2022).
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations Board Regarding Information Sharing, Cross-Agency Training, and Outreach in Areas of Common Regulatory Interest (July 19, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/ftcnlrb%20mou%2071922.pdf (terminable on 30 days’ notice from either agency).
Freeman & Ross, supra note 12, at 1165 (observing that “Agencies may negotiate MOUs but then let them languish, sometimes for years.”).
Id. at 1165.
This influence is apparent even over purportedly independent federal agencies. See e.g. Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1431 (1998) (observing that “the FTC’s formal political independence has failed to shield it from the wrath of either the executive or legislative branch”).
Bradley, supra note 7, at 758 (noting that when agencies are subject to statutory obligations rather than just MOUs, “private parties can secure agencies’ compliance by means of judicial review”).
See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1158 (providing an example from the Endangered Species Act, which requires interagency consultation on protected species.).
Id. at 1159 (providing the example of the Federal Power Act, which requires the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to solicit recommendations from interested federal agencies before issuing hydropower licenses, and permits FERC to decline such recommendation only if it believes that doing so would conflict with the agency’s legal duties.).
Id. at 1160 (noting such approvals are used in the environmental law context).
Though data suggest such joint-rulemaking is fairly rare, it has been used in the securities and environmental contexts. Id. at 1167.
Trade Regulation Rule on Com. Surveillance and Data Security: A Proposed Rule by the Federal Trade Commission, 87 Fed. Reg. 51273 (Aug. 22, 2022) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. chpt. 1) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking requesting public comment on the prevalence of commercial surveillance and data security practices that harm consumers).
American Data Privacy and Protection Act, H.R. 8152, 117th Cong., §404(b)(4) (2022) (declaring certain telecommunications privacy rules inapplicable to entities that are covered by the proposed act).
Id. at §404 (a)(1)(B) (preserving rules for common carriers under §64.2011 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations (data breach notifications)).
Though, oddly enough, the bill does indicate that the FTC should reach memoranda of understanding with agencies involved in the enforcement of civil rights law related to algorithms. Id. at §207(b)(4).
Digital Platform Commission Act of 2022 S.4201, 117th Cong., §11 (2022).