Theorising Utility Regulation
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This article argues that utility regulation remains a central and enduring feature of modern governance, despite liberalisation and expanded competition. Developments in the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United States, and post-privatisation states demonstrate that regulatory institutions continue to play a decisive role. The author critiques two dominant theoretical models: the bilateral or contractual approach, including capture theory, and stakeholder theory, which situates regulators within a network of competing interests. Neither framework adequately explains the complexity of regulatory practice or provides a sound basis for reform. The article proposes a return to political and constitutional theory, advancing a rights-based approach as a more coherent foundation for understanding and structuring utility regulation.
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Referências
Department of Trade and Industry, A Fair Deal for Consumers: Modernising the Framework for Utility Regulation Cm 3898 (1998) (the Green Paper); A Fair Deal for Consumers: The Response to Consultation (London: Department of Trade and Industry, 1998).
For an introduction to these debates see C. Scott, Competition and Coordination: Their Role in the Future of European Community Utilities Regulation (London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, 1995) and ‘Changing Patterns of European Community Utilities Law and Policy: An Institutional Hypothesis’ in J. Shaw and G. More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Particularly important questions have arisen with the establishment of new forms of regulatory bodies for telecommunications in France, Germany and Italy.
See eg R. Pildes and C. Sunstein, ‘Reinventing the Regulatory State’ (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 3.
The arguments in this section are based on research published in much greater detail as T. Prosser, Law and the Regulators (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
The most influential statement of this view in relation to UK utility regulation was S. Littlechild, Regulation of British Telecommunications’ Profitability (London: Department of Trade and Industry, 1984).
See C.D. Foster, Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) esp ch 9.
Green Paper, n 1 above, para 2.8.
See C. Shearing, ‘A Constitutive Conception of Regulation’ in P. Grabosky and J. Braithwaite (eds), Business Regulation and Australia’s Future (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1993).
Green Paper, n I above, para 7.13.
This perhaps appears most clearly in the case of the water industry, for which see Prosser, n 4 above, 127-132; it also applied to the other utilities and was the basis for the imposition of the ‘windfall tax’ on their activities by the incoming Labour Government.
See D. Goldberg, T. Prosser and S. Verhulst (eds), Regulating the Changing Media (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) esp chs I and 9.
OFTEL, Universal Telecommunication Services: Proposed Arrangements for Universal Service in the UK from 1997 (London: OFTEL, 1997); this will be discussed more fully towards the end of this article.
Green Paper, n 1 above, ch 5.
I. Byatt, The Regulatory Scene (Birmingham: OFWAT, 1996). This concern was also central to the reluctance of the Director General of Gas Supply to become involved in the promotion of energy efficiency schemes; see Environment Committee, Energy Efficiency: The Role of OFGAS, HC 328 (1993-94) and Prosser, n 4 above, 110-113.
Green Paper, n 1 above, paras 2.13-18, 5.4; Response to Consultation, n 1 above, paras 10-14, 57-62.
Green Paper, n 1 above, para 2.19; Response to Consultation, n 1 above, para 14.
C. Scott, C. Hall and C. Hood, ‘Regulatory Space and Institutional Reform: The Case of Telecommunications’ in Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, Regulatory Review 1997 (London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, 1998) 231, 250.
For the legal duties see Prosser, n 4 above, ch l; T. Prosser, ‘Privatization, Regulation and Public Services’ (1994) Juridical Review 3.
The original source for this phrase is the Law Magazine, quoted in H. Arthurs, ‘Without the Law’: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 169.
For a good statement of this point in relation to telecommunications see Scott, Hall and Hood, n 17 above.
Green Paper, n I above, paras 3.3-9; Response to Consultation, n I above, para 16.
C. Scott, ‘The Proceduralization of Telecommunications Law’ (1998) 22 Telecommunications Policy 243.
J. MacKinnon, ‘Conference on Regulatory Reform’ (1993) 4 Utilities Law Review 119, 119-120. For a fuller consideration of the relationship between the privatisation process and regulation see J. Kay and Z. Silberston, ‘The New Industrial Policy: Privatisation and Competition’ (1984 Spring) Midland Bank Review 8.
The relevant provisions are the Telecommunications Act 1984 ss 12-15; Gas Act 1986 ss 23-27; Electricity Act 1989 ss 11-14; Water Industry Act 1991 ss 13-16; Railways Act 1993 ss 12-15.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, BG pie. A Report Under the Gas Act 1986 on the Restriction of Prices for Gas Transportation and Storage Services (London: Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1997).
For a similar criticism of the license modification procedures see Scott, Hall and Hood, n 17 above, 241.
For a detailed description of the procedures see Prosser, n 4 above, 83-85, 113-115, 144-147, 177-178, 198-199.
Green Paper, n 1 above, paras. 7.47-79; Response to Consultation, n 1 above, paras. 91-4; cf the new arrangements in general competition law: Competition Act 1998 s47.
OFTEL, Pricing of Telecommunications Services from 1997: OFTEL’s Proposals for Price Control and Fair Trading (London: OFTEL, 1996). The fair trading conditions successfully survived a challenge by judicial review; see R v Director General of Telecommunications, ex p British Telecommunications pie, CO 3596196, QBD.
C. Scott, ‘Deregulation of BT’s Pricing and the New Fair Trading Requirements’ (1997) 8 Utilities Law Review 120.
There are also tentative proposals for extending collective licence modification procedures in the Review: Green Paper; n I above, paras 7.70-72; Response to Consultation, n I above, para 95, and Department of Trade and Industry, Licence Modification Procedure: Proposed Changes to the Telecommunications Act 1984 (London: Department of Trade and Industry, 1998).
C. Veljanovski, The Future of Industry Regulation in the UK (London: European Policy Forum, 1993) 59-60.
I. Byatt, Speech at European Policy Forum on Tuesday 7 May 1996 (Birmingham: OFWAT, 1996) 4-5.
See eg R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906, and C. Forsyth, ‘Wednesbury Protection of Substantive Legitimate Expectations’ [1997] Public Law 375.
The literature of capture theory is immense and I can only hint at some of its themes here. For useful introductory surveys see Foster, n 6 above, ch 11 and A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) ch 6.
The seminal statement of capture theory is G. Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2(1) Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 1, concentrating mainly on the establishment of regulation to benefit regulated firms. For an early statement of life-cycle theory see M. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955).
See Foster, n 6 above, 372-373.
See ibid and eg R. Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 335-358.
n 36 above, 1.
Posner, n 38 above, 341-342.
For an elegant statement of a similar theme see J.Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980) ch 10; as he puts it, ‘[a] single-explanation theory of regulatory politics is about as helpful as a single explanation of politics generally, or of disease’ (393).
For a useful summary of the pluralist literature on this point see P. Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 14-27.
G. Cannon, The Politics of Food (London: Century Hutchinson, 1987).
L. Hancher and M. Moran, ‘Organizing Regulatory Space’ in Hancher and Moran (eds), Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
ibid 276. For an application of these ideas see Scott, Hall and Hood, n 17 above, and A. Melville, ‘Power, Strategy and Games: Economic Regulation of a Privatized Utility’ (1994) 72 Public Administration 385.
See in particular S. Peltzmann, ‘Towards a More General Theory of Regulation’ (1976) 19 Journal of Law and Economics 211 and Posner, n 38 above.
For a summary of the ‘Virginia’ approach see Foster, n 6 above, 384-388; for an excellent critique of the enormous public choice literature see Dunleavy, n 42 above.
cf Wilson, n 41 above, 361-363.
For a sustained attack on public choice theory on this and other grounds, see M. Kelman, ‘On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement’ (1988) 74 Virginia Law Review 199.
n 6 above, 387.
See notably M. Levine and J. Forrence, ‘Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis’ (1990) 6 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 167, and T. Makkai and J. Braithwaite, ‘In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture’ (1995) 12 Journal of Public Policy 61.
See eg Levine and Forrence ibid 181-182 where the substantive analysis of policies is left to ‘a broader philosophical debate’ or to notional ratification by an informed polity.
D. Souter, ‘A Stakeholder Approach to Regulation’ in D. Corry, D. Souter and M. Waterson, Regulating Our Utilities (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1995).
ibid 45.
ibid 35-53.
I. Byatt, n 33 above, 6.
Green Paper, n 1 above, para 1.5.
See eg Green Paper, n I above, paras. 2.9, 5.1-2, 7.18; Response to Consultation, n 1 above, paras 6, 96.
R. Drury, ‘The Relative Nature of a Shareholder’s Right to Enforce the Company Contract’ (1986) 45 Cambridge Law Journal 219. See also the seminal work in this area, M. Stokes, ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in W. Twining (ed), Common Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) 155.
Stokes, ibid 178.
See (from an enormous literature) J. Kay and A. Silberston, ‘Corporate Governance’ (1995) 153 National Institute Economic Review 84 and for some reservations, P. Ireland, ‘Corporate Governance, Stakeholding, and the Company: Towards a Less Degenerate Capitalism’ (1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 287, with a reply by D. Campbell, ‘Towards a Less Irrelevant Socialism: Stakeholding as a “Reform” of the Capitalist Economy’ (1997) 24 Journal of Law and Society 65. For an attempt to apply a stakeholder approach see Royal Society of Arts, Tomorrow’s Company: The Role of Business in a Changing World (London: Royal Society of Arts, 1995).
Ireland, ibid 305 (emphasis retained). For a critique from the right on similar grounds see eg M. Friedmann, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
See Campbell, n 6 I above.
Prosser, n 4 above, ch I; cf J. Ernst, Whose Utility? The Social Impact of Public Utility Privatization and Regulation in Britain (Buckingham: Open University Press, I 994) 60.
For an example see Prosser, n 4 above, 301-304.
Byatt, n 33 above, 6.
cf the duty of company directors to consider the interests of employees in Companies Act 1985, s 309.
The Gas Industry: Report of a Committee of Enquiry, Cmd 6699 (1945) paras 45-46.
n 53 above, 43.
Kay and Silberston, n 61 above, 93. The quotation is from M. Bishop, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1994) 330 The Economist 53. For detailed discussion of the nationalised industries problem see Foster, n 6 above, ch 3.
Kay and Silberston, n 61 above.
See eg Ireland, n 61 above, esp 300-306, 310-315.
Stigler, n 36 above, 6. The work of Levine and Forrence and of Makkai and Braithwaite (n 51 above) is an important exception to this hostility to participative regulation.
See I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) ch 3.
For the UK see Prosser, n 4 above, 83-86, 113-115, 144-147, 177-178, 198-199, 259-266, 296-297; for analysis and critique of the US ‘interest representation’ model see R. Stewart, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 1669-1813.
For a very clear introduction to autopoiesis see M. King, ‘The Truth about Autopoiesis’ (I 993) 20
Journal of Law and Society 218; for an earlier example with some direct relevance to regulation see
G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modem Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239, and for later development eg G. Teubner, ‘Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’ in G. Teubner (ed), Juridification of the Social Spheres (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987) and his Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). For a direct application to regulatory concerns see J. Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ (1996) 59 MLR 24. The literature is once again enormous; for an interesting criticism see J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press 1996) 52-56.
King, ibid 222 (footnote omitted).
ibid 227; for a summary see also Teubner, n 76 above (I 993) 69-71.
Teubner, ibid 77-79.
ibid 57.
Teubner, n 76 above (1987) esp 19-27; Black, n 76 above, 47.
Teubner, n 76 above (1983) 256 (footnote omitted).
Teubner, n 76 above (1987) 34; see also Teubner, n 76 above, (1983) 270, 275, 277 and Black, n 76 above, 44, 46.
See Black, n 76 above, and Ayres and Braithwaite, n 74 above, ch 4.
C. Scott, ‘The Juridification of Regulatory Relations in the UK Utilities Sectors’, in J. Black, P. Muchlinski and P. Walker (eds), Commercial Regulation and Judicial Review (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998). A key decision was Mercury Communications Limited v Director General of Telecommunications [1996] I WLR 48.
This has been particularly the case in the regulation of broadcasting: R v Independent Television Commission, ex p TSW Broadcasting Ltd [1996] EMLR 291 (HL); R v Independent Television Commission, exp Virgin Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 318.
See Prosser, n 4 above, ch 1.
See M. Loughlin, Legality and Locality - The Role of Law in Central-Local Government Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) ch 7.
Teubner, n 76 above (1987) 10-19.
Scott, n 22 above.
n 76 above 48-49.
Teubner, n 76 above (1993) 66-67.
Black, n 76 above, 50 (footnote omitted). Her discussion of this issue at 48-55 is a particularly illuminating one; cf C.B Grabner and G. Teubner, ‘Art and Money: Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere?’ (1998) 18 OJLS 61.
See R. Craufurd Smith, Broadcasting Law and Fundamental Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).
See notably A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), and for applications see D. Beyleveld, ‘The Concept of a Human Right and Incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights’ [1995] Public Law 577 and D. Beyleveld, and C. Villiers, ‘A General Right to a Minimum Wage in English Law: An Argument from Generic Consistency’ (1997) 17 Legal Studies 234.
R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986) 295 and see generally ch 8.
See eg A. Coote, The Welfare of Citizens: Developing New Social Rights (London: Institute of Public Policy Research, 1992).
Habermas, n 76 above. For an attempt to apply his earlier work in a related context see T. Prosser, ‘Towards a Critical Public Law’ (1982) 9 Journal of Law and Society 1.
n 76 above, 440.
ibid 123.
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, SI 1981 no 1794.
See Beyleveld, n 95 above and Beyleveld and Villiers, n 95 above, for examples.
N. Lewis and M. Seneviratne, ‘A Social Charter for Britain’ in Coote (ed), n 97 above. See also N. Prouvez, ‘The European Social Charter: an Instrument for the Protection of Human Rights in the 21st Century?’ (1994) 53 The Review (International Commission of Jurists) 30.
For a summary see J. Pelkmans, ‘Utilities Policy and the European Union’ in Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, Regulatory Review 1997 (London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, 1998) 111.
S. Verhulst and D. Goldberg, ‘The European Institutions’, in Goldberg, Prosser and Verhulst, n 11 above.
Gewirth, n 95 above (1996), 327.
Telecommunications Act 1996, 47 USC §§ 151 et seq, s 254(b); for the outcome of the regulatory process see Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order in the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service (Washington: FCC 97-157, 1997).
OFTEL, Review of British Telecom’s Tariff Charges (London: OFTEL, I986).
OFTEL, A Framework for Effective Competition (London: OFTEL, 1994) para 12.1; for a more detailed account of the consultation process see Prosser, n 4 above, 78-83.
OFTEL, Universal Telecommunications Services: Proposed Arrangements for Universal Service in the UK from 1997 (London: OFTEL, 1997).
See eg Commission of the European Communities, Developing Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, COM(93)159 (final); European Parliament and Council Directive 98/10/EC on the application of open network provision to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment, OJ L 101, 1.4.1998.